



CIA FILE ON
REINHARD GEHLEN
VOL. II



@fileandclaw322

SECURITY INFORMATION

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MTLA-11839

SECRET CONTROL
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CLASSIFICATION

TO : EE

DATE: 5 June 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Photos

Transmitted herewith for your disposition is a set
of photos of UTILITY and @ HERDAHL. The photos
were taken in the United States by []
We have retained no copies in our files.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



GEHLEN

GLA-11839 (ATT)

EXTRACT from MQOW 14899 dated 7 July 1952

[] s.d.-briefing of Guenther COLLY

5. Important Zipperites whom V-11126 first met after the war, including an assessment of each:

201-
A. UTILITY. V-11126 knew him only by name and reputation during the war. He first met UTILITY in the fall of 1946, after the latter's return from his first trip to America. The introduction was performed by BAUN. At this time BAUN was accustomed to stay in the home of V-11126 in Oberzeismering and to hold his conferences there whenever he was in the Munich area. BAUN began bringing UTILITY to such conferences. UTILITY took a personal liking to V-11126 (Field Comment: this statement was verified independently and earlier by both [] and V-12053), began himself to visit Oberzeismering frequently (unaccompanied by BAUN), and often solicited the advice of V-11126 in IS matters. V-4091 (mentioned in para. 3 D above), who had succeeded BAUN as operations chief, is the brother-in-law of UTILITY. V-11126 told UTILITY flatly that V-4091 was unsuited to IS work, and this blunt statement opened the first rift between the two men. Subsequently a clique opposed to V-11126 on the grounds that he was a BAUN man undertook to break the friendly relationship between him and UTILITY. This clique consisted of SCHACK (who succeeded V-4091 as chief of operations); GATTHITZ (cover name), a representative of HORN in evaluation; and WITTMANN. The efforts of this clique, plus the fact that the currency reform made it easier for UTILITY to get hotel accommodations, did put an end to his visits to Oberzeismering. The clique did not succeed in changing the

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nature of the friendly relationship, which persisted until V-11126 left Germany. Evidence that V-11126 is still persona grata with UTILITY is the latter's last-minute attempt to persuade him to remain in Germany and Zipper and his offer of employment should V-11126 ever return.

V-11126 provided the following evaluation of UTILITY: very intelligent, devious but persistent, and intensely ambitious. Gravest weakness: a lack of courage in personal matters; evades taking up unpleasant subjects with the person concerned, either achieves his goal by indirection or delegates the responsibility for a frontal attack to someone else. Is not deterred by ethical standards in reaching his goals. Second gravest weakness: lack of knowledge of IS work. Chief ambition: political in nature. Wishes to leave his name engraved on German history.

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ERKLÄRUNG

Ich habe von der Firma SINDOVER G.m.b.H. den

PKW, Opel-Kapitän
Amtliches Kennzeichen Nr. B 55-3563
Fahrgestell Nr. 51-LV-027 605
Motor Nr. 2,5-L-52-09000
Baujahr 1952

zum Geschäftsgebrauch erhalten und verpflichte mich zur ordentlichen Pflege und schonenden Behandlung desselben.

Ich werde den Weisungen des Eigentümers hinsichtlich des Fahrzeuges Folge leisten und keinen anderen als den vereinbarten Gebrauch davon machen.

Im Falle einer Beschädigung oder eines Unfalles werde ich unverzüglich berichten.

Datum:

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30 July 1952

VIA: AIR
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SECURITY INFORMATION

ATTACH No. MGL-A-12649

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CLASSIFICATION

For pouch by pouch

For pouch by cable

DATE: 7 August 1952

For info and files

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *Chm*

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Progress Report - ZIPPER Transfer to The Federal Republic

1. We have had an excellent opportunity to debrief Dr. HORN during his two day stay in Munich prior to his three week leave to Austria. The information received from him plus what we have learned from Drs. GRAU and GUMBEL (GLOBKE's Administrative and Financial experts studying ZIPPER), and recent discussions with UTILITY has given us a rather lucid picture of ZIPPER developments and progress to legalize themselves with the Bundesrepublik towards becoming the German Intelligence Service.

2. The team of GRAU and GUMBEL completed a three day visit on 18 July 1952. After an overall introduction by UTILITY the following subjects were discussed in detail:

- a. Personnel matters.
- b. Relationship and cooperation with other governmental authorities.
- c. Cover and Legalization problems.
- d. Basic questions of financing and administrative handling.
- e. Accounting procedure.
- f. Budget planning.
- g. Examination of financial matters.
- h. Insurance matters.
- i. Travel costs, disposal costs, procurement of consultants and specialists.
- j. Procurement of foreign currencies.
- k. Property and financial assets.
- l. Vehicles and motorization.

DMS Jct

IP/ED	SEARCHED
IP/ED	INDEXED
IP/ED	CODE NO. (2, 3)
IP/ED	PRICAT RESE. CODE
IP/ED	CABLE NO. (11)
IP/ED	NO. (8)
IP/ED	FOR INFO

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MAR. 1949
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3. Apparently ZIPPER has prepared the background material of the points listed above and has now been asked to prepare the subjects and contents of this material in a format acceptable to the government. We have asked UTILITY to provide us with copies of the reports they will turn over to Bonn.

4. After considering the problem of transfer from all points of view we have decided not to interfere or attempt to influence UPGROWTH in their scheduled program. We have advised UTILITY to this effect to which he concurs. All concerned feel that our involvement may be considered as unwarranted interference in what is considered a basic internal national problem, and we might do more harm than good. We have given assurance of assistance when it may be required or necessary, and have asked UTILITY to keep us au courant with developments.

5. Finance Minister SCHAEFFER and Mr. BLANK have been officially briefed by UPTHRUST that he intends to integrate ZIPPER into the Federal Republic under the jurisdiction of the Chancery as the centralized national intelligence service. It is considered that the above two individuals are the only ones who need know this for the present time, and specifically to assist in the financial and personnel planning. The only other members of the Bonn government officially involved and briefed are members of GLOBKE's office. UPTHRUST plans to brief the other Ministries and the Bundestag Committee after ratification of the treaties. Blank has also been advised by UPTHRUST to visit the ZIPPER installation in the near future and to discuss mutual problems. We intend to spend some time with BLANK during his visit here, and hope to get a clearer picture of the possible solutions to the complex personnel problem, particularly of the military slots confronting ZIPPER.

6. The actual transfer of ZIPPER does not appear complicated and is envisaged as follows:

a. Upon the effective date of the entry into force of the conventions, UPTHRUST intends to publish a letter order announcing the establishment of a centralized national intelligence service under the Chancery. An executive order or appointment is not necessary since under German law, the Chancellor may create or establish an organization under his jurisdiction which does not have executive powers. The Bundestag has no jurisdiction over such an establishment.

b. Following UPTHRUST's acceptance the only other thing necessary is to receive governmental approval of the budget requirements for the intelligence service. The budget requirements need only be submitted to the Bundes Haushaltsausschuss (Budget Committee) for approval. Preparations for this are under way in the form of studies to be submitted by ORAN and GUMBEL. UPTHRUST controls the Budget Committee since the CDU coalition controls 15 of the 24 votes and the SPD coalition has the remaining 9. Only a simple majority is necessary to carry a motion.

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- 3 -

*28
PARA 7-9
[unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]*

7. HORN advised us he was informed by McCloy, prior to the latter's departure from Germany, that the United States will recognize the sovereignty of Germany as soon as the German Federal Republic ratifies the two treaties, which is expected to take place approximately 10 October 1952. HORN realizes this is not in accord with Article 11 of the "Conventions on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, which clearly states that " - - - The present convention shall enter into force immediately upon the deposit by all Signatory states of instruments of ratification of the present convention - - - ". Since this is quite significant and if true will have considerable bearing on our own time table vis a vis ZIPPER we asked HORN again several days later. He reaffirmed the statement and said it was in connection with leverage to force France to ratify the treaties as soon as possible thereafter.

8. As it stands now, UTILITY and WENDT are handling the financial, personnel and administrative matters with GLOCKE and his specialist assistants. During a meeting with UTILITY, MERKER and HERDAHL, Wallop again raised the question of cover for the compound once ZIPPER is recognized as the GIS, and what will be the position of the Americans sitting in the middle of a national service, to which UTILITY, as he has in the past, stated he foresees no physical change necessary for the time being; the cover for the compound will be changed from American military cover to either German military or some sort of German governmental cover; that there may be an in-between period that may offer some complications, however, this may be resolved by erecting a fence between the ZIPPER and POB staff.

9. The relationship of operational and staff procedure is apt to take on a more significant character. UTILITY stated that after acceptance of ZIPPER as the GIS he will have a overt office in Bonn in addition to a liaison staff section, headed by HERDAHL which will be responsible for conducting liaison with the allies. It does not appear likely that the POB staff will be initially effected by this establishment.

*definitely not!
by the way*

10. UTILITY does not consider that there is any rush considering the intelligence relationship of the GIS with other governmental agencies, nor does he think there is any urgency in considering the overall intelligence mission of the GIS, and its related problems. These matters will probably not come up for consideration until after the acceptance of ZIPPER, although some advance considerations must be given these important points by UPGROWTH and UTILITY. We will try to keep ahead of the game.

11. For the past six months we have repeatedly attempted to obtain UTILITY's views on a secret USIS/GIS bi-lateral intelligence agreement. It now appears as if we may finally get it. MERKER has assured us he finished a draft which is presently in UTILITY's office pending his

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return to Pullach on 8 August, which we may expect in the next few days. To a great extent the future of the POB relationship with the GIS will depend upon this secret agreement.

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1 - BONN
2 - File

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mfw

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NAME **GEHLEN, Rheinhardt (General)**

SECURITY INFORMATION

CASE No.

DATE 27 August 1953

NATIONALITY **German**
PRESENT POSITION **Chief, Intelligence**
Organization
LOCATION

BIRTHDATE
BIRTHPLACE

RACE
SEX **Male**
MARITAL STATUS
NAME OF SPOUSE

GEN. OCCUPATION **Intelligence Agent**

CHILDREN

EDUCATION

RELIGION

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

LANGUAGES

ATTITUDE TOWARDS: U.S.

HONORS

U.S.S.R.

REMARKS:

Former General, Rheinhardt GEHLEN, who served in Hitler's General Staff as Chief of the Department of Foreign Armies reportedly currently heads a secret organization in West Germany which evaluates intelligence from the East. When the Hitler armies collapsed in 1945, Gehlen is said to have escaped westward with most of the secret files of his department. He allegedly kept in his control many of the top secret lists of German agents planted in the Soviet Union and the eastern neighbor states which subsequently became Soviet satellites. He supposedly had the key to the espionage network built by Canaris, Himmler and Schellenberg. The Americans reportedly took him prisoner but not for long because American intelligence chiefs reportedly became very impressed by his ideas and his documentation which he was able to put at their disposal. They are said to have set him up in an office and permitted him to pick a small staff of ex-Wehr officers (Gen. Canaris's Intelligence Service) most of whom were equipped with good anti-Nazi records. Within a few weeks Gehlen was providing excellent reports on Soviet military and political activities in the eastern zone and was subsequently permitted to expand his staff and his scope of activities. As he expanded, however, many Nazis, SS men and SD men crept into his organization where they enjoyed full protection.

Today Gehlen's espionage organization is said to have agents in all parts of the world. The Americans reportedly supply the funds which amount to \$3,500,000.00 a year. The former General is said to be able to multiply this sum to many times its original value through clever business deals. It is believed that he has already succeeded in piling up a substantial reserve which would enable him to carry on independently should the Americans cease to support him. The material collected by Gehlen is said to be of first class value. 1/ The interpretation of it, done by his

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(General)

(continued)

skills. Analysts at their headquarters in Munich has impressed not only the Americans but the British and the French as well. A Navy intelligence report of November 1948 states that Gehlen's organization maintains 15 to 16 outer listening posts along the borders of the Russian occupied zone while the organization itself is composed of between 30 and 40 General Staff officers and 50 to 60 other officers. 2/

The danger of Gehlen's organization lies in the future. It has already become an immense underground power in Germany and has key men in all German Government offices, in the police, newspapers, radio stations, etc. His organization has even penetrated the Adenauer Government's Office for the Protection of the Constitution (deemed the secret police office). 1/ Gehlen has been suggested for a position with this office, according to several reports. 3/ 4/ In any event for the present, his network is only using its underground power to expand its influence still farther, get its member in strategic positions, and cover ex-Nazis and SS men from any persecution.

Gehlen himself is reportedly not ambitious for political power. (He is however listed as a member of the Bruderschaft) 5/ His hope supposedly is to become the Intelligence chief of the European Army. The many ex-Nazis and ex-officers high up in his machine, however, are regarded as ambitious and representing the real danger. 1/

SOURCES:

- 1/ DAILY EXPRESS, 17 March 1952, Unclassified.
- 2/ Navy, Comnavforger, 350-8-48, 15 November 1948 (B-3), Secret.
- 3/ State, Bonn Report, 7 April 1950, Confidential.
- 4/ State, Ol Bonn Memo to Ol Frankfurt, 14 April 1950, Secret.
- 5/ State, BI files, Confidential.

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MAIL-4-12955

Chief, Bonn Liaison Section

27 August 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

Operational

Biographic Data Report on ex-General Reinhard GEHLEN

1. Pursuant to HICOG Biographic section's request we are forwarding a biographic data report on GEHLEN.
2. As will be noted the report is extremely brief and sketchy. We have deliberately refrained from writing a full analysis of the man.

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1 - COS w/attach
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Biographic Data Report on ex-General Reinhard GEHLEN

GEHLEN, Reinhard (ex-Brigadier General)

Personal data: Born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt, Thuringia. Protestant.

Married; four children.

Education: Graduated from Humanistisches Gymnasium, Breslau, 1920.

Languages: English, some French.

Career:

1920 Entered military service (artillery).

1923 Commissioned Second Lieutenant.

1928 Promoted to First Lieutenant.

1933-1935 General Staff Academy, Berlin.

1934 Promoted to Captain.

1935-1938 General Staff assignment.

1938-1939 Battery commander.

1939 Promoted to Major.

Chief of Staff, 213th Infantry Division.

1939-1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff.

1940 Adjutant to General HALDER, Chief of General Staff.

1941 Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

1940-1942 Section Chief in Department for Plans and Operations.

1942 Promoted to Colonel.

1942-1945 Chief of Department Fremde Heere Ost.

1944 Promoted to Brigadier General.

1945 Dismissed by special order of HITLER on 9 April 1945.

American PW, 27 May 1945.

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Remarks:

Rainhard GEHLEN was born the son of German Army First Lieutenant Walter GEHLEN. His father left the military service a few years after Reinhard was born and became a moderately successful business man, and spent the majority of his years as Director of a Publishing House in Breslau until his death in 1943.

Up until 1942 Reinhard GEHLEN followed a routine career pattern similar to other professional army officers. His promotions can be considered consistent with other officers. His highest tactical command function was that of a company commander.

In April of 1942 GEHLEN, then a Colonel, was assigned to take over the intelligence group "Freunde-Heere Ost" or "Foreign Armies East" under the High Command of the Army. His mission with this unit at that time was to obtain all possible intelligence material dealing with the military, political and economic situation existing in the USSR and the south eastern European countries. He gave an able demonstration of himself until in March/April 1945 he was relieved of his post upon the personal order of HITLER.

GEHLEN reportedly has never been a member of any political party or faction. He has a fear and hatred for communism. According to the 7th Army interrogation report dated 21 June 1945 GEHLEN was reported to anticipate a Russian-allied conflict.

He professes to stand for a united Western Europe built around a Franco-German Axis, for collaboration with England and the United States, for social reform but not socialism, for the review of such occupation and post-war "injustices" as War Criminal Trials and some aspects of denazification. He does not favor the remilitarization of Germany, except as part of Western European Defense. In the intelligence field he believes that a small country such as Germany should have a unified service. []

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DISPATCH NO. KDM-15016

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TO : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 28 August 1952

FROM : Chief, FE

Attn: Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Operational

SPECIFIC. German Influence in the Near East

1. Presumably you have seen the 25 August issue of Newsweek and the article entitled, "The German Influence Behind the Egyptian Revolt". If not, in brief, Newsweek singles out Lt. Gen. Wilhelm FRIEDRICH, (Maj. Gen. Oskar HUNZEL and HANAUER) as the key figures of a group of former German officers now employed as military advisors and technical consultants by the Egyptian Government whose advice may have contributed to the smooth efficiency of General NAQUIB's coup. Newsweek's editors note that "The Americans and British find nothing sinister in the activities of the Germans".

2. In Syria, however, the picture is different. Newsweek reports the Syrian Army and Military Intelligence have felt the influence of German military advisors in Lebanon. On the chance that you may not have the article at hand, the following is a verbatim quotation: "The top-ranking German in Syria today is General STUTTENHEIM, but the most influential is a Colonel KRIEHL. He served during the war in what the Germans called the "Department of foreign armies" - a sort of combat intelligence organization - in the Oberkommando des Heeres, the army headquarters. He worked under General GERLEN, who now plays an important role in security matters in Germany. GERLEN supposedly picked KRIEHL for the Syrian job. Both the Americans and British say they know little of the Germans in Syria, but the ever-suspicious French think they belong to a group organized by the Americans to carry out work Americans cannot - or would rather not - do."

3. We hold no pertinent traces on General STUTTENHEIM. Nor do we have any information which would substantiate Newsweek's contention that Colonel KRIEHL is General GERLEN's son in Syria. KRIEHL, however, is undoubtedly identical with Col. Palmer KRIEHL who is fairly well documented in reports from Damascus. Attached are two recent reports on his role in Syria.

4. You might be interested to know that this article was first brought to our attention on 15 August by the BYCLAW office, which had received an

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NO ATTACHMENTS FOR FILE

ADDITIONAL	INDEX
DATE	2 SEP 1952

FORM NO. 64-10
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advises release from Hammond and was checking on the necessity of this information and, needless to say, whether Slipper was involved in Bayla.

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AIR

Gehlen

EGLA-807

Reinhard

Dossitz

3 November 1952

Chief, EE

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational

GEHLEN 10 October Letter to L

Reference: EGLA-286

1. Please pass the original of attachment to L
2. This letter is the direct result of discussions reported in reference.
3. The last and penultimate sentences of paragraph 3 assure us of future access to the present ZIPPER intelligence product.

Attachment: Subject Letter

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- 3 - GCM (1 with attachment)

See copy attachment

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ESBA-253

ESBA-253

Chief, EE

6 November 52

Chief of Mission, ☒

240 GEHLEN

Operational

Interview with UTILITY

1. UTILITY called me up during the morning of 4 November to announce his presence ☐. We met at my apartment for about an hour that same afternoon.

2. His conversation was restricted exclusively to the turbulent political currents immediately affecting his organization. His estimate of the forces working against him may be summarized as follows:

(a) The British, who, he feels, are determined to see the organization confined within an area of purely military intelligence.

(b) The Soviets, who are determined to see the organization as weak as possible.

(c) Certain French elements whose opposition is explicable within the general framework of French anxiety about a rearméd Germany.

3. Within this outline, the currents and cross currents are turbulent indeed. A good deal of UTILITY's discourse covered familiar ground and familiar names, but some new names and items turned up--new, at least, to me. I pass them along on the chance that they may be new to others. The most orderly process would seem to be to proceed according to names:

(a) CAPOTE: He is still a factor. ☐ and UPTHRUST have been confronted by the evidence of his service for foreign intelligence agencies. They seem to have been neither greatly moved nor entirely convinced. Which brings us to:

(b) ☐ UTILITY explains his persistent loyalty to CAPOTE by recent information according to which ☐ served, toward the end of the war, with the Brandenburg Division under CAPOTE. The latter thus continues to be a thorn in the ZIPPER side, and UTILITY continues to express his conviction that

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CAPOTE works for the Soviets, or at least has connections to them. UTILITY continues, however, to express a high opinion of [] The same cannot be said, however, with regard to--

(c) Franz Josef STRAUS, Secretary-General of the CSU, who has frequently been reported as a contender for [] a job and whom UTILITY identifies with what he always calls "Der Kreis um Josef Mueller." As you know, UTILITY has always regarded MUELLER as one of the instruments of Soviet influence upon Western German politics. STRAUS has attempted on several occasions to see UTILITY, but the latter, acting on warnings from BONN, has politely declined. Which brings us to--

(d) Dr. Otto JOHN. Not much new here, except that relations between the two men continue to be outwardly cordial. They reassure each other from time to time of their determination to respect and support the other's prerogatives. UTILITY passed on an unconfirmed report from an allegedly reliable source, according to which, JOHN, in his cups, once confided to the source that he had belonged to the "Special Service" of the British Foreign Office. A similar distinction, according to UTILITY, is enjoyed by HEINE of the SPD. JOHN, by the way, has now been identified as a co-author of the article by Sexton Delmar.

(e) General GERSDORFF. The name was mentioned by me and produced the following story. Gersdorff recently got in touch with UTILITY on two counts: (1) to ask for his support in obtaining an IC position with the German contingents; (2) to tell him that he had been offered a job with []'s office and ask his approval of acceptance, which, as UTILITY remarked, was certainly unnecessary. UTILITY responded by asking GERSDORFF to Munich, an invitation which GERSDORFF accepted. UTILITY initiated him into the lesser mysteries of ZIPPER and was quite pleased with what he had done. It later turned out that GERSDORFF is in line to succeed CAPOTE if and when the latter should go. I am not sure of all the details of this chapter and would suggest that [] sound UTILITY out on GERSDORFF at some appropriate time. Both UTILITY and MUELLER have always had a good opinion of him. I didn't tell UTILITY that [], who knew nothing of ZIPPER or my connection with it, once told me about it in high indignation and with great inaccuracy, basing his remarks on what GERSDORFF had once told him at the race track in Cologne. I have always suspected that GERSDORFF's orientation came from JOHN.

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Austrian SECURITY INFORMATION
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1 good for []
[] COPY agent []

can't identify

German mission
business

Düsseldorf

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ESBA-253

(f) Georges BLUM. UTILITY called my attention to this character, who is the Berlin correspondent of the Journal de Geneve. He has a long intelligence record, going back to World War I, and has allegedly worked at one time or another for the British, the French, the Russians and probably the Swiss. UTILITY, who had just been briefed by [] believes that his present masters are the British and/or possibly the Russians, and that he may have had a hand in recent anti-ZIPPER items which have been turning up in the French press.

4. That about covers it. I delivered UTILITY safe and sound at the doorstep of his French friend. From there he was to proceed to Liechtenstein to visit []

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central
Intelligence

SUBJECT: Personal Letter from General
Reinhard Gehlen

Attached hereto is a personal letter from
General Reinhard Gehlen to the Director.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

BY (Signed) Richard Helms

EE/FI/Z:TG:js
20 November 1952

Distribution:

Orig & 1 to addressee
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1 - EE/FI/Z

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Gehlen dossier

2. December 1952

Dear []

I thank you so much for the interesting book you sent me. I appreciate the friendly feelings which this gift expresses.

I take the opportunity to wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. On the 19th we will have our usual Christmas party. Things are going the routine way and we have only one major problem, which is the budget. I hope it will be settled in December.

Do not forget to visit us if you should come to Germany some day again.

With many regards,

Sincerely yours,

R. Gehlen

It was a pleasure to receive your letter which Mr. Critchfield delivered to me today. I took the opportunity of his visit, which fortunately coincided with that of General Truscott, to discuss with them many of the major problems related to both current and future intelligence relationships between our respective services.

I am hopeful and optimistic that the near future will bring the establishment of the German Intelligence Service and that the trend which you mentioned in your letter can be continued and directed toward the establishment of a mutually beneficial liaison relationship between our services.

I am sure you share my deep conviction that satisfactory liaison arrangements are vital to insure the uninterrupted conduct of matters of mutual interest and of vital importance to our respective governments. With this in mind, and believing that our cooperation in intelligence matters can, to our mutual advantage, be extended, I have instructed Mr. Critchfield to explore with you our related interests in a number of activities in areas outside of the framework of our present cooperation in the production of intelligence on the Soviet Bloc. In this connection, Mr. Critchfield discussed with me your views on intelligence war planning and your emerging relationships with a number of friendly countries. I have instructed Mr. Critchfield to pass on to you my views on these matters.

Sometime during the next few months I hope to have the opportunity again to visit Germany and discuss personally with you a number of matters of mutual interest.

General Reinhard Gehlen
Germany

EE/FIO/Z:JC/mjs

Distribution:

Orig - addressee
2 - Signer
1 - DD/P
1 - C/FI
1 - EE/FIO/Z

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

EGQW-3423

EGQW-3423

JAN 13 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attention: Pullach/C
Chief, EE

Operational
Letter to General Gehlen

Done

Ref- BOLA-807

Please deliver attached letter from the Director
to General Gehlen.

Attachment: 1 envelope

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

EE/FI/2

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Orig: 6 January 1953

AIR

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Chief, ER

15 January 1953

Chief of Mission, []

Operational
Interview with Utility

Reference: (a) ESZA-61, (b) DIR 35323, (c) SPORN 0420, (d) SPULL 4695.

1. UTILITY came [] on 12 January. He had dinner with us in our apartment, after which [] went to the movies. UTILITY and I talked from 2030 until after 2300, after which I drove him to his hotel (the Gotthard). The next day he was to see [] and [].

2. As long as I have known UTILITY, and as pleasant as our relations have been, I have never known him to be as cordial and communicative as he was during our two-and-a-half hours' talk. In the course of what follows, there will be some frustrating gaps and some unanswered questions. Some of the things he said were not entirely clear to me, and wherever I felt that there was an even chance that such statements would be clear to my colleagues of the German Station I let them go rather than interrupt the flow of conversation and the relaxed atmosphere by possibly too persistent inquisitiveness.

3. With reference to the subject of reference (b) and (c), I simply asked UTILITY if he had heard anything of the sort. He said that he had not, but that it probably stemmed from the same source as the report of French-Soviet negotiations mentioned in reference (c) and was undoubtedly a plant. He stated that ZIPPER had possibly identified this source as one []. I did not recognize the name, but UTILITY threw it out as if my familiarity with it were to be taken for granted, and I hesitated to disabuse him, assuming that it would be in the file or known to others. Unfortunately, I have found nothing here on him. I would appreciate being enlightened. From UTILITY's further discourse, I gathered that [] was somehow involved in the Rado complex. In any case, it is UTILITY's theory that certain elements in that complex who worked both for the Soviets and the BIS during the war are still active and available for the planting of just such destructive rumors. For many reasons I did not tell UTILITY that we had heard of the rumor through CAPOTS, or even that we had run across it in Germany.

4. With respect to the subject raised in SPULL 4695, UTILITY gave no indication of deep concern. He knows that forces are at work to divert his organization to the EDC, and he thinks that the French are behind it, possibly fronting for the British. He apparently does not know which French individuals

Distribution:

Nash (3)
Fraz (2)
PULL (1)
Bona (1)
Files (2)

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

RESTRICTED COPY

or groups are involved. He says the idea is not taken seriously in Germany.

6. He is deeply concerned, of course, by the delays in treaty ratification, chiefly because he feels that the position of his organization becomes daily more exposed. To anticipate attacks from opposition elements, he has initiated preventative measures with both the SPD and the DVP through their respective Chiefs. Just before his trip to Switzerland, he conferred with both JOSE and GILLESPIES. The latter readily agreed to brief his associates on the existence and nature of LIPPER, remarking that one of LIPPER's problems was not that it was too well known but that it was not known well enough. JOSE will similarly brief the Laender Verfassungsschutz chiefs, this program having been coordinated with GILLESPIES.

5. As to JOSE, relations between the two men continue to be outwardly good, and UTILITY even went so far as to say that he would be reluctant to see him go, not because he is the ideal man for the job, but because (1) his dismissal would probably be attributed to UTILITY by the British, and (2) a successor might be worse. UTILITY reiterated his determination to maintain harmonious working relations with the British. He did state, however, that JOSE was engaging in foreign intelligence, not only in Eastern Germany, whose status as foreign territory is doubtful, but also in the Near East. UTILITY implied that this activity was probably directed by the British. He did not seem much concerned about it, remarking that this sort of thing could be easily handled once LIPPER is in the Government. JOSE, by the way, and according to UTILITY, boasts of a line to the immediate vicinity of BEIRUT and the Kremlin. When I asked for details, UTILITY mentioned "the British agent, Peter WYKE." My own estimate of the LIPPER-BR relationship as of the moment is that JOSE's position has been weakened, to what extent with or without subtle assistance from UTILITY is hard to tell. Conscious of this weakness, and also conscious of UTILITY's present strength with the Chancellor, he has become aware of LIPPER as a possible source of support. UTILITY, for the reasons given above, is rather disposed to support him. From UTILITY's point of view, the situation is eminently satisfactory.

7. We now move on to the weapons procurement scene, on which we have had such extensive reports from [] a garrulous source. UTILITY told a story which checks in its general outlines with the story told to [] by [] and reported in paragraph 6 of HIRA-61. According to UTILITY, however, the [] representatives were CAPILA and Peter STORMKATZEN (t), who has moved with his Farrenar firm to Hamburg, and the commission to be paid was five per cent, with four per cent to go to the [] fund and one per cent into CAPILA's pocket. The rest of the story is the same, with BURNETT reporting to SPRIDEL and the latter raising hell about it in Bonn. An additional wrinkle is that BURNETT, while he was in Germany saw, not only KUHARD, but also UTILITY, who assured him of a neutral position as between BURNETT and [] 8. He also assured [] that he has never seen any evidence to substantiate the reports of BURNETT's dealings with the East and discounts them.

SECURITY INFORMATION

8. While on this subject, it would appear that UTILITY is far less deeply involved in [] than had previously been assumed. As a sort of trial balloon, I told UTILITY that I was having lunch next day with [], whom I know to be a member of the board. To my great surprise, and for the moment to my considerable incredulity, UTILITY said he had never heard of []. This was doubly astounding in view of the fact that, at the Christmas party at Pullach, ROGER, rather in his cups, had mentioned [] to me and urged me to look him up. Picture my confusion, then, when [], next day told me that he had not seen ROGER since before the war in Berlin and had not even been aware that he was still alive! UTILITY even told me that he would be very much interested in any information I could give him about []. From my subsequent conversation with [], I gather that [] plays a pretty independent hand, and may well have a policy of keeping his many contacts separate from one another.

9. To conclude on a piquant note, here is a tentative list of some of UTILITY's future Chiefs of Station (diplomatic cover): France, MOORE (MUELLER); Spain, DOERR; USA, HENDRAHL; Italy, Brother HAYS (God help us!). He intends to limit these representations to a single man and a secretary.

P.S. To return for a moment to the weapons business, I asked UTILITY about []'s role in []. He said that [] was not a member of the board (his war name was not included on the list of board members given me by [], but that he was certainly trying to get into the act and that he (UTILITY) was encouraging [] to keep him dangling, for CI reasons. [] and his secretary, [] (sp?), who is []'s fiancée, are somehow involved in it all, which accounts for UTILITY's CI interest.

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 FEBRUARY 1953

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

GUT 90261

ROUTING

1	FI 2
2	FI A
3	Cham D
4	FI G
5	CEE
6	GEI
7	
8	

TO: SR REP: GERMANY (FULL, LHM) AUSTRIA (VIEN, L
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA (SALE)

GE/PI/7

523

ROUTINE

CONF: EE 6

2235Z 19 FEB 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, FI/RI 2

FEB 20 1953

DIR 41666

TO: SPULL INFO: SPAN SVEN SSALZ

CITE DIR

RE FULL 1993 (IN 38144)

3. NO DEROGATORY POSTWAR INFO. NO TRACES MULTIFOLA.
2. OBERSCHULTZ WILHELM KUEBART REFERENCE FOR TURKEY PERSIA IRAQ FRIENDS
HEREIN OCT SEPT 11 MAY 53 UNDER BRITISH INTERROGATION 45 STATED END 1943
HITLER ORDERED KLATT DROPPED BECAUSE JEWISH. AT INVESTIGATION FRIENDS WERE
OCT ZIESSLER CHIEF STAFF CHIEF REQUESTED EXCEPTION MADE. HITLER REFUSED.
KUEBART BELIEVED UTILITY MADE SECRET ARRANGEMENT WITH MAROGNA-RADWITZ CHIEF
AST VIENNA FOR KLATT'S TRANSFER FROM BULGARIA TO HUNGARY TO PERMIT FRIENDS
HEREIN OCT CONTINUED ACCESS HIS INTELLIGENCE.
3. FORTHING TRACES PER FOLIA 41666.

INFO: J.C.O. *[Signature]*

T6

LE/PI/G

LE/PI/A L.C.

TO

LE/CFK

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ROME AIR POUCH
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.

01RW-476
01RW 476

R. Rapate #327

CLASSIFICATION

MAR 18 1953

TO : Chief ☐

DATE:

FROM : Chief, WE

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL.

per CSN 43-26

SPECIFIC: Future German Intelligence Representative in Rome

RESTRICTED TO W/E/4

1. General Reinhard GEHLEN, ZIPPER Chief, in a recent conversation indicated that he intends to appoint his brother Giovanni (Johannes-Hans) GEHLEN senior German intell' nce representative in Rome when ZIPPER becomes the official intelligence service of the West German Government. GEHLEN plans to limit the GIS representation in Rome to a single man and a secretary.

2. Giovanni GEHLEN was first brought to the attention of the Rome Station in October 1949. You will recall that ☐ subsequently provided biographical data in PIRA-5449.

3. We have further traces indicating that Hans GEHLEN was arrested by CIO in Gorizia in October 1946. At that time, one Captain WALDMAN, a G-2 officer in Germany then running the embryo organization which is now ZIPPER, got in touch with CIO Italy and stated that GEHLEN was on a mission for him (WALDMAN), that GEHLEN be immediately released and that the Italian service not be advised. (Note: ☐ may recall this). As of March 1947, CIO interrogation of GEHLEN and a companion was forwarded ☐ to Headquarters under PIRA-194.

4. Please do not pass this information to liaison at this time.

Removed from Project Desk File

CS Classification: None

JOB # 62-4457

Box: 36 Folder: 7

HCG/iw/2Mar53

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/ZIPPER TG
COORDINATING OFFICER

WE/FI/L ☐
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1948

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SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GPO 63-39073

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SPULL- 5474

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

To: DIR INFO: SFRAN

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

From: SPULL

DATE: 20 APRIL 1953

CONFIRMATION:

MESSAGE OUT NUMBER:

INFORMATION:

TYPIST'S INITIALS:

Paraphrase Not Required: Handle as SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5.

1. UTILITY VISITING ROME 28-29 APRIL FOR ANNOUNCED PURPOSE SEEING OLD FRIEND PATER LEIBER IN VATICAN.
2. UTILITY STATES HE HAS HEARD THAT VATICAN INCLINED CONSIDER SOVIET PEACE MOVES LEGITIMATE AND BEGINNING POSSIBLE EVOLUTION IN SOVIET POLICY. POB COMMENT: WE ASSOCIATE TRIP WITH INCREASING GERMAN INTEREST VATICAN INTELLIGENCE REPORTED RECENTLY BY []
3. WHAT ARE ROBE POSSIBILITIES OF DISCREET CHECK UTILITY ACTIVITIES THAT WILL NOT COME TO UTILITY'S ATTENTION?

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SOURCE SMETHOOSEXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS
MLW

TOD:

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS
MLW

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM C 15677	PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
TO DIR INFO SPULL	DATE 29 APRIL 1953
ACTION SECRET	MESSAGE IN NO. 408
INFORMATION SECURITY INFORMATION	INITIALS NCW
Paraphrase not required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51(1) 60A AR-380-5.	

CONTROL

INTEL

RE: PULL 5474

1 HAS POSSIBILITY CONDUCTING CHECK UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES NOTED. PLS INDICATE IF SUCH DESIRED AND IF APPLICABLE NAME UNDER WHICH UTILITY TRAVELLING.

Smitty,
The Dir. traveled to Italy, Austria, and France in May 1950 (or rather had TD 19) in following name: Reinhard GEHLEN van VAERNEVICK, Passport No. 0005329.
In July 1950 traveled to Italy, Switz, Austria & France on TD in name of Robert GORTARD PP No. 185070.
In Jan. 51 PP No. 0005285 for Reinhard Gehlen van VAERNEVICK.

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005 **SECRET**
SECURITY INFORMATION

DIST.	Action	Info
25		
25:0		9.
CARDIED=		
File: 240 - Gehlen		

TOR 30/0752Z

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SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SPULL

482
5554

To: 1, INFO: DIR, SFRAN

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

FROM: SPULL

DATE: 30 APRIL 1953

CONFIRMATION:

MESSAGE OUT NUMBER:

INFORMATION:

TYPIST'S INITIALS:

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as

Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-330-5

REF: 1:5677

PRESUMABLY TRAVELLING UNDER REAL NAME REINHARD GEHLEN, HOWEVER POSSIBLY USING
REINHARD GEHLEN VAN VAERNEWICK OR ROBERT TONTARD.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3321
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOD:

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

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2005/04/11

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 APR 53

SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 20708

ROUTING

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP PULLACH

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

0109Z 1 MAY 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, SR 2, WE 2, FI/RI 2

PULL 5554

TO: C 1

INFO: DIR SFRAN

CITE: SPULL

REF C 7 5677 (IN 20133)

PRESUMABLY TRAVELLING UNDER REAL NAME REINHARD GEHLEN, HOWEVER
POSSIBLY USING REINHARD GEHLEN VAN VAERNEWYCK OR ROBERT GONTARD.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 4 MAY 1953	

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(44)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Fremhard Godelue

AIR

201
ESLA-905
ESLA-905

Chief of Base, Pullach

4 May 1953

Chief []

Operational

Transmittal of Sample Grenade and Card to UTILITY

RE: GNSPM 5716

Enclosed is a sample grenade forwarded by [] with
his card to [] to be passed on to UTILITY.

4 May 1953

Distribution:

Pull (2) with 2 enclosures
Fram (2)
Wash (3)
Files (2)

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DATE 2005

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SECRET CONTROL

- 2 JUN. 1953

NAME: GEHLEN, Reinhard
(last, first, et al)

TITLES: Gen.

ALIAS: see next page

BORN: 3 Apr 02 ; Erfurt, Germany
(day, month, year, city/Prov.)

App. Age:
(+ or -# of yrs)

Religion:

Photo (if yes, date & file):

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION:

Ht: 174 cms Wt: 65 kg Eyes: blue Teeth:

Hair: dk blonde, central
baldness

Face-shape: round Complexion: blonde Scars:

Build: medium

Prominent/ident. features: military bearing, very pink and white coloring, extremely
young looking compared with chronological years, small mustache

FATHER: GEHLEN, Walter 1871
(last name, first, et al) (titles) (Birth day-mo-yr.: city/Prov.)

OCCUP:

RESIDENCE:

MOTHER: (maiden name): nee von VASERNEWICK, Katharina Margarete, b. 1881 *

OCCUP.:

RESIDENCE:

BROTHER IN LAW: SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Joachim, Sec 45

SPOUSE: nee SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Ilerta Charlotte Agnes Helene Liegnitz

CHILDREN: GEHLEN, Katharina, b. 19 Jan 34, Berlin: GEHLEN, Marie Therese, 4 Sept 40/

GEHLEN, Christoph, b. 11 Feb 37, Berlin: GEHLEN, Dorothee, 28 Feb 43, Liegnitz

RESID: BRG, Kra. Starnberg/Feldstr 68

TEL. #

(city-suburb/Province street #/floor)

BUSINESS: merchant

TID# 0587767

issued: 20 Jun 1951 for countries: US

0006440

20 Sept 49, Stuttgart US

PASSPORT#

issued: for countries:

H 519 712

3 Mar 47, Frankfurt/H.

KK# (true) B 03 611

issued:
(date city)

KK# (@):

issued:

ORG.: Sec 30

POS'N: chief, "30" EOD: 1946

COVER UNIT:

V#

S#

Payroll # 3002 Cryptonym: UTILITY

E Card #

ID Card #

Emergency #

SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION: Pistol Permit, GC 01082, 20 Mar 51

SUMMARY OF QUALIF., ACTIV.:

* occasional references to GEHLEN von VASERNEWICK, which would indicate that
either subject or his father combined their surname with that of subject's
mother - this is a fairly common practise in Germany

References: MGKW 3446, attac., 17 Nov 49; MGKA 14279, 7 Feb 50; MGKA 14959, 20 Mar
1950; MGKW 6130, 28 Aug 50; WFPA 5751, 29 Sept 50; MGFA 4364, 9 Nov 50; MGLA 4584;
MGLA 5260, 17 Feb 51; MGLA 5608, 10 Mar 51; MGLA 7487, 24 Jul 51 No 378, attach.;
MGLA 8460, 8 Oct 51; MSZA 716, 5 Jan 52; PULL 1963, 4 Apr 51; MGLA 7582, 30 Jul 51;
MGLA 11678, 17 May 52; MGLA 1540, 20 Mar 50; MGFA 3657, 17 Apr 50; MGLA 1806,
18 Apr 50; MGLA 12873, 19 Aug 52; MGLA 323, 26 Sept 52; SPULL 4439, 13 Nov 52;

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DATE 2001 2005

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2

GEHLEN, Reinhard (cont)

Aliases:

SCHNEIDER, Richard, Dr.

b. 4 Mar 05

KK No H 478 955

Gun permit GC 21025, F&O, 1 Mar 51

Gate pass to Nicolaus

HOLBEIN, Hans

b. 21 Jan 05

AGO Card D 147996 (Jul 49)

GARNER, Richard

b. 3 Apr 02

GROSS, Dr.

CONTARD, Robert

b. 4 Mar 05

Passport No 49203

ERNST, Dr.

Military career:

1920 Entered military service, artillery

1923 commissioned 2nd Lt

1928 1st Lt

1933-35 War academy, Berlin

1934 Capt.

1935-38 General Staff assignment

1937-38 First Gen. Staff Officer, 10 Dept. Fortifications

1939 Battery commander, Major

Sept 39 to Nov 39, Ia (G-3) 213d Div

Spring 1940 Chief of Fortifications, Gen. Staff

Jul 40 to Nov 40, Adjutant to Gen. Halder, Chief of Gen. Staff

Nov 39 to Jul 40, OKH, Gruppe Landesbefestigung

1941 Lt. Col

Nov 40 to Apr 42, Section Chief in Division for Plans and Operations

Gen Staff (Chief Gruppenleiter I Ost)

1942 Col

Apr 42 to Apr 45, Chief ABT Fremdeere, chief of Eastern Military Intelligence

Dec 1944 Brig. Gen

Apr 1945 Dismissed by special order of Hitler

May 45 American PW

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Abhard Gehlen 201

ESBA-1028, 23 June 1953

[]'s meeting with [] 9 June 53..

... [] told me of Utility's visit of three weeks ago.. when they parked in Utility's car on a concrete footpath in a park near the Dolder. After a couple of hours, their tryst was interrupted by the police, who addressed them somewhat as follows: "What are you goddamn Germans doing around here.....There were three of you when you arrived (Utility's driver had probably been sent walking)and now there are only two of you. I suppose you murdered the other fellow".. Etc. Utility, according to [] was rather upset and returned prematurely to Bavaria where the Landpolizei are better mannered, at least in their discourse with general officers. [] obviously enjoyed Utility's discomfiture. At least he enjoyed telling about it.....

see: 68-6-1-594 in RI

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DATE 2005

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Reinhard Gehlert
-77-
80LA 4741
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SECRET
SECRET

Chief, EE

INFO: COM

Chief of Base, Pullach

OPERATIONAL

[]'s 28 July Meeting with
UTILITY at FOB

REF: SBOMN 0982

1. UTILITY was well aware prior to the meeting that [] I would discuss (a) BLANK's statements to Ascham regarding ZIPPER/BLANK relations, and (b) a recent letter from UTILITY to [] requesting a reduction in KUBARK controls over ZIPPER operations.

COMMENT: On the evening of 27 July I had the opportunity to read UTILITY's "Achtannotiz" on his conversation with HORN. Since these notes were not intended for American eyes, I consider them an accurate description of the report HORN gave. While HORN had described BLANK's remarks to Ascham fairly accurately, he had added that he had not felt it an appropriate time to take issue in any way with BLANK; he had, however, at a latter opportune moment, advised both Ascham and [] that BLANK's remarks hardly presented a whole picture; that the coin had two sides. It would appear that HORN is attempting to keep peace with all sides which is fully consistent with his character.

2. [] led off with a very clear cut statement of BLANK's charges against ZIPPER, omitting any reference to comments on UTILITY as an individual. These charges, [] pointed out, were a matter of considerable concern to Ascham and to him since they represented a distinct threat to our objectives vis-a-vis ZIPPER and UFGROWTH.

3. UTILITY, showing no evidence of being emotionally disturbed by the charges, indicated that he was aware of them since he had been briefed by HORN after his return. He reviewed the history of the BLANK/ZIPPER relationships, maintaining the position that the ZIPPER military product had always been available to BLANK either directly or via HORN, depending on BLANK's own desires on

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3 EE
3 COM

29 July 53

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

the method of handling. However, UTILITY had never been willing, in the absence of specific instructions from the Chancellor, to pass ZIPPER reports to the BLANK office for indiscriminate handling until he received assurances that only persons that were not considered security risks by either BLANK or UTILITY would be involved. There the negotiation inevitably breaks down since no agreement on security of individuals in the BLANK intelligence office has been reached. Again UTILITY emphasized that BLANK and HORN have personally always had the benefit of the ZIPPER final product.

COMMENT: HORN has always gotten the ZIPPER weekly intelligence summary; that he did not pass it on to BLANK was not because of any expressed limitation by ZIPPER (Source: REINER, ZIPPER liaison officer in Bonn). During the absence of BLANK and HORN in the USA these reports were passed to BLANK's aide, BUSKE. Thus, the statement in SBONN 0982, para 1.d. appears to be ~~without factual basis.~~

4. In response to question by [] 1, UTILITY expressed the view that BLANK is a sincere, honest, well-motivated and fairly capable individual with whom UTILITY and ZIPPER could and would work once the problem of CAPOTE has been resolved. *perhaps misleading.*

COMMENT: This is UTILITY's consistent position on BLANK; however, on several occasions UTILITY has expressed skepticism of BLANK's ability to handle the job of Defense Minister once German participation in Western Defense becomes a reality. BLANK's excessive drinking and its effects on his sense of security as well as his physical and mental stamina has occasionally been the subject of derogatory comment in my presence.

5. Eventually the conversation turned to CAPOTE. UTILITY described his early effort to cooperate with the BLANK office (i.e. CAPOTE) when instructed to do so by UPTHRUST. CAPOTE had "sabotaged" this effort promptly and later, when UTILITY came to consider CAPOTE a security risk; any hope of a rapprochement was gone. In spite of this, UTILITY stated in unequivocal terms, he had not participated in any attacks upon CAPOTE.

6. At this moment [] asked UTILITY if he had ever passed derogatory information on CAPOTE to the government. UTILITY immediately replied that he had never passed a derogatory report on CAPOTE to either any government office or to the opposition (i.e. the SPD); the exception to this statement, he added, was on occasions a year or two ago when the Chancellor's office asked him for his view of CAPOTE. UTILITY further stated that he had not been asked to give either written or verbal testimony in the current investigation of CAPOTE "by the BrV" (sic).

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FOIA 4741

7. There was further discussion of the intrigues that surround this complex situation in Bonn but the above points struck me as the highlights of the conversation. What was accomplished? In the first place, it has been impressed upon UTILITY that KUBARK still wants to see ZIPPER make its peace with BLANK. Secondly, he is aware that we view the charges of political meddling, even if such charges are related to the never-ending intrigue surrounding the CAPOTE and Joseph MUELLER complexes, with disfavor. Thirdly, UTILITY was maneuvered into the position where he was forced to take a firm position on the question of his role in the anti-CAPOTE campaign.

8. From 1949 until 1951 the German Mission was constantly involved in a long and ~~unproductive~~ unproductive harangue over the relative merits of ZIPPER on the one hand and the CAPOTE/CAPILA complex on the other. Base Chiefs' conferences dwelt almost exclusively with this subject. I find it truly shocking to scan back through the files to see the thousands of words of cable traffic and hundreds of pouches that deal with the petty intrigue surrounding the continuing conflict between the ZIPPER and CAPOTE groups. It reflects not only a tremendous waste of communications expenses, but more important, the dissipation of the efforts of a number of our most experienced personnel in an effort that has nothing to do with the production of intelligence and far less with our over-all KUBARK interests than the effort suggests. More than that, the continued intense preoccupation of well-known senior KUBARK staff members with leading personalities on both sides has, in fact, encouraged the continuation of the feud.

9. I think we have greatly exaggerated the importance of the UTILITY/BLANK/CAPOTE relationship. I do not think it merits the attention it is accorded. Intentionally we have refrained from reporting dozens of minor related incidents brought to FOB by the dozen ZIPPERites who muddle around in Bonn coming in contact with the "opposition camp" as [] once labelled it. Obviously, CAPOTE and ZIPPER reports to their respective KUBARK contacts are going to be slanted, based on half-truths and highly provocative. When [] left Germany two and a half years ago I resolved to bring this play-by-play reporting of the ZIPPER/CAPOTE feud to an end. I see no useful purpose served by FOB carrying out a running disputation of detailed reporting on what BLANK, CAPOTE, [] or anyone else in Bonn has said.

10. All Germans in the intelligence business are up to much these days that they do not tell us about. The CAPOTE/ZIPPER feud is, in a sense a herring that has been effectively utilized to concentrate our attention on surface squabbles, while often ignoring matters that are in reality vital to the long-range interests of KUBARK.

11. I have the distinct impression, certainly one that was fortified by my last visit to Washington, that the general alignment of forces and interests in the German intelligence scene is well understood on the German desk and within EE; that the German Mission can, to a considerable degree, rely upon

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ECIA 4741

-5-

during periods in the past when this situation existed that the Bonn/POB views were reconciled without much unnecessary cable traffic between Washington and Germany.

j. I feel that routinely pouched reporting on the background of developments in the ZIPPER/UPGROWTH field is frequently either not available to or not taken into consideration by senior KUBARK officials who do read and are influenced by cable traffic. A periodic re-reading of the entire files on CAPOTE, on the ZIPPER/UPGROWTH history, on the HEUSINGER/BLANK/SONMERIN developments since 1949 and on related subjects involved in the development of KUBARK policy vis-a-vis German Intelligence circles provides a pre-requisite perspective for sound interpretation and evaluation developments. Admittedly, this cannot be done by senior KUBARK officials simply because the time is not available; therefore, it seems to be a desk function of greatest importance.

Tw
7/2/52

13. I will prepare a separate pouch on subject (b) in para 1 above.

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ECIA 4741

the accumulation of experience and background that exists in ES today and concentrate its attention less on the controversial figure of CAPOTE, who, as far as I know, has produced no intelligence for KUBARK, and more on the

political officer to ply his way between POB and Bonn. It has only been

Excerpta is Belier + SPD + LFU's
Sent 22/CF
FIG/Kelner - 21 Apr 52
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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

VON GEHLEN /GEN./

DOB ?

CIT 3.

CIT 3
[AGENT OF THE AMERICAN INTEL SERVICE, WHO
WAS THE CANDIDATE SUPPORTED BY THE SERVICE
FOR HEAD OF GERMAN I.S.

01 RA-01218 A02
29 JUL 53

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

15

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.



~~SECRET~~

(7-46)

VIA: _____
(INSERT AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. OIRA - 1218
BOETHESSE

SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WS
Attn: Chief, Italian Branch
FROM : Senior Representative, []

DATE 29 July 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL—

SPECIFIC— Activity of Karl HASS, alias Rodolfo or Carlo GIUSTINI

Sources: []
Date of Info: 20 April 1953
Date Recd: May 1953
Evaluation: B-2

1. The information summarized below has emerged from observation and control regarding the activities of Karl HASS.
2. Lois EDER, of the new German service, lives at Linz but also, probably, at Salzburg. The relations of the office and certainly those between Lois EDER and Karl HASS are not limited exclusively to business, which is apparent from the confidences of HASS to Source's informant who also was able to take a brief glance at some of EDER's letters. (See attachment 1).
3. HASS' commercial office in Rome is run by Harold EDER (alias EDER) and is located at Via Appia 21, telephone 709-756.
4. HASS' relations with police officials and officials of the Ministry of the Interior are not clear, at least in the light of statements HASS has made to his friends in confidence.
5. Reappearing on the scene, or so at least it seems, is the usual JOHN, who is and is not with the CIC in Austria, but who appears at the present time to have ties with HASS and HASS' friends.
6. In Attachment 2 are reported certain statements made in confidence by HASS about the conflict among former officials of the Abwehr and of the Sicherheitsdienst as to who would get the most important positions in the reorganized German intelligence service. HASS KARL THEODOR

PUNCHED
FEB 1960

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION

IPA-1218
28 July 1953
Page 2

Handwritten: Karl Friedrich
7. From information available, it seems clear that the position of the group under Colonel HEINZ, who participated in the plot against Hitler organized by Admiral CANARIS, is the strongest. Loth EDER belongs to the HEINZ group.

Handwritten: 1243
Handwritten: HOSTILE
8. The appearance of the former General of the S. S., HILL HOTTL, who under the name of HAGEN had published the book, "The War of the Spies", appears in a not very favorable light because of his attempts to cause injury to HEINZ in a disloyal manner; he was suspected of being in collusion with elements believed to be Soviet agents, reasons for which he was arrested together with the two officers of the CIC LAUDER and PANZER. This, HASS affirms. (See Attachment 3)

9. But General HOTTL's relations with the Soviet Colonel STERN constitute another circumstance which increased the doubts which arose regarding him and which must always be considered in the event that he should succeed, in spite of everything, in obtaining a position in the German service.

10. As is pointed out in Attachment 4, Colonel HEINZ's representative arrived in Rome on the 14th of this month to make contact with HASS and, probably, with functionaries of the Minister of the Interior (BARILETTA, CAPUTO) with whom there appears to exist a basis for semi-official collaboration.

11. On the strength of this information, it is possible to make the following deductions:

- a. The reorganization of the German Service is effectively under way not only in Bonn, but also abroad;
- b. HASS, who in agreement with the M.I. works also under the name of Rodolfo (or even Carlo) GIUSTINI, is the person intended for work in Italy under commercial cover;
- c. The visit of EDER* must indicate a kind of tolerance on the part of the Italian authorities regarding the activity of HASS.

*Investigations in course to identify.

Prepared by
28 July 1953
Distribution:

3-Wash
2-Files

SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION

824
Attachments 1 (as listed above)

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Attachment I to
OIRA-1215
Dated 29 July 1953

1. It is now possible to clarify a previous report which referred to the contents of a letter from Lois EDER in which explosives were mentioned. Lois EDER proposed to HASS a commercial collaboration for the sale of explosives in Italy and elsewhere, with an ex-official of the German political service, whose address is: Firma August Raichberger, Beethovenstrasse 4, Linz/Donau. Source is not yet sure if the name of the person corresponds, as is likely, with that of the firm indicated above. Source states, and this is the more important point on the basis of declarations by HASS himself, that the above firm collaborates very actively with some Soviet commands in Austria under the plan of economic sabotage in the Western Zone of Austria. To this and other similar firms the Soviets sell, at favorable prices, large quantities of general food products which are then resold under cost in the Western Zone of Austria, thereby making normal prices fall. It has been possible in the past for Source to ascertain personally that this singular form of economic collaboration was related to a more important intelligence collaboration. Under this aspect, considering the official position of EDER, "responsible" of the German Service in Austria, EDER-RAICHBERGER and RAICHBERGER-HASS contacts appear strange unless one wishes to presume a penetration attempt by the German service into some Soviet circles.

2. Source was able to view some passages of a letter of bid from the RAICHBERGER to the HERBERG firm. In this it was stated that TNT, of the 80 30 type, was not available and offered instead "Donarite" in its various types. HASS explained to Source that the "Donarite" is of Soviet origin or, at least, manufactured in the Soviet Zone of Austria. A specialist in explosives could easily determine its origin.

3. Source was able to see and study the technical description of the explosives offered: "Donarite I", "Donarite 2", and gelatine "Donarite I" was offered. Subject was particularly surprised that the description dwelled more on the methods of use, on ways to blow up railroads, bridges, concrete constructions, etc., how to prepare charges and primers for various types of strongholds and terrain, than on the technical characteristics. In conclusion, the language was more military than technical. This is due possibly to the particular mentality of the manufacturer (the instructions were written directly by the factory and not by the intermediary firm).

4. HASS proposed to negotiate for the sale of this material with STACCHINI, who sells and exports similar material, especially to the Middle East.

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Attachment 2 to
OIRA-1213
dated 29 July 1953

The German Information Service

1. Forwarded in condensed form is further information picked up from WATS recently regarding the German Service which is in process of reconstitution.

2. In the summer of last year, there were already very clearly outlined two groups of aspirants for the constitution of the new German Information Service. One group was headed by Colonel HEINZ, candidate of BLANK and functionary of the Security Service of the German Federal Republic; another group had as its chief the ex-Abwehr General VON QUELEN, agent of the American Intelligence Service, who was the candidate supported by that Service. *Revised - 201*

3. In Austria at that time, the cadres of HEINZ's group were constituted as follows:

Chief of the Service in Austria	- WILLI HOTTL
Vice Chief of the Service	- Baron Harry MAST (Linz) <i>201</i>
Secretary of MAST	- Miss KRAVETSKI (Linz)
Section Chief	- Lois EDER (Linz)
Courier	- VON ALBERT (Salzburg)

4. Shortly after the constitution of this cadre, HOTTL consigned to the courier VON ALBERT a sealed letter for BLANK. VON ALBERT, to whom it appeared not entirely correct for HOTTL to deal directly with BLANK, inasmuch as HOTTL's direct superior was HEINZ, opened the letter which contained disparaging statements against HEINZ and EDER, who, when they learned of the letter's contents, obtained the removal of HOTTL. (There are traces of this correspondence in the hands of the Italian authorities.) Baron MAST also withdrew from the HEINZ group (in this circumstance a trip to Rome by MAST's secretary did not take place). Immediately, HOTTL and Baron MAST agreed to work in Austria with the QUELEN group. From this moment a struggle ensued in Austria between the representatives of the two groups, HOTTL's group supported by the American Service which wanted to keep the new German Service under control.

5. The events of the past days (HOTTL's arrest) were allegedly the result of this struggle. The requisition of the periodical edited by EDER was due to the pressure of the American Service on the Austrian authorities, with a view to placing EDER's position in Austria in a critical light.

6. In retaliation, EDER and his friends in the HEINZ group allegedly furnished the American Service, which was already in possession of fragmentary information, definite proof of the collaboration of HOTTL with the Soviets, proof that led to his arrest. It seems that, in retrospect, the position of

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Attachment 2 to
OPRA - 1219
Page two

Saron HASS also is critical. (In the case of EDSF, for example, part of the correspondence with HASS was intercepted; not, however, the intelligence reports which HASS received at another address, probably Salzburg, care of VON ALBERT.)

7. What is HASS' position in this? He has continued to remain with the WEINZ group which appears to him to be the stronger. He has tried, up to the present, to maintain good relations with TOTTL in the event that the QUELEN group gained the upper hand. This, at least, is his version which, in consideration of past events, should be taken with some reserve.

3. The reasons for the presumed ascendancy of the WEINZ group lie essentially in the fact that WEINZ already has a strong official position in Bonn and in the fact that it is not possible that Bonn, according to HASS, could accept QUELEN, a well-known American agent, who has the minor merit of being anti-Nazi, as compared to WEINZ, who was one of the top men in the CANARIS conspiracy.

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Attachment 3 to
OSMA - 1213
dated 29 July 1953

The German Intelligence Service

1. The former General of the Sicherheitsdienst, Willi HOTTL (author of the book "The War of the Spies" which he wrote under the pseudonym HAGEN) was recently arrested by the CIC on the charge of military espionage in favor of the Soviet Union.
2. The arrest, according to correspondence received by HASS at Salzburg, is intimately connected with the arrest of the American CIC Officers LAUBER and FONGER, presumed Soviet agents and accomplices of HOTTL. On the occasion of HOTTL's arrest, HASS' correspondence was also impounded and the latter is preoccupied by this notwithstanding his efforts to minimize the event.
3. In the past HASS, in the period in which he lived in Austria, took upon himself to warn HOTTL that their contacts with Soviet Colonel STERN in Vienna had been discovered. According to HASS, HOTTL's version was completely satisfactory:

"Colonel STERN is a student at the University of Leningrad; it is of little importance that he was revealed to be a friend of ABAJUNOV, Chief of the Soviet Security Service, recently removed. In the role of student he was sent to Vienna to locate, and eventually photograph, cultural material in the libraries of Vienna and other similar institutes. This work was obstructed by the fact that nearly all the technicians of libraries and cultural institutes had been purged because they were Nazis. STERN then assembled in Vienna some of these technicians, among whom was HOTTL who in the past had been a teacher of philosophy and history at the University of Vienna. He accepted and went to Vienna many times to see STERN, no harm being done in this as it was merely a cultural thing. Unfortunately, he forgot to communicate these contacts to the American Service."

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Attachment 1 to
ODNA - 1213
dated 29 July 1953

Activity of Lois EDER, Member of the German Intelligence Service

1. Source saw HASS on 14 April 1953 at 1730 hours in the Rosati bar on Piazza del Popolo.
2. Lois EDER, WEINZ's trusted element in Austria, had arrived in Rome Saturday afternoon (11 April), later than expected because he had been called to report to the Chief for South Germany at Munich.
3. Lois EDER is a former official of the SD who resides at Linz and at Salzburg.
4. During the conversation Source learned that HOTTI, who had been arrested by CIC, had been subsequently freed and that he had written to HASS telling him about his misfortune. *
5. HASS' in presenting this person to Source, said that he (EDER) would be willing to work for the Agency, ** as he had vast possibilities in Austria where it is possible to get information regarding the location of all the Russian units in the Zone, order of battle, etc. Source let him talk on in this regard, then declined the offer on the grounds that it was not of interest to him because he was a journalist.

* Source Comments: This information is fully confirmed by another of Source's informants in contact with HASS.

** Mercury Press.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DD/P

* Gehlen 201

10 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: General Reinhard Gehlen's Views on
the World Situation

1. Attached is a letter from General Reinhard Gehlen to the Director forwarding a statement of his views on the world situation. This paper was prepared at the request of General Truscott. I feel sure that you and Mr. Kent will be interested in its contents.

2. For your convenience, a rough English translation is also attached.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P

Attachments (2)

EE/FIG/Z: ☐ :bw - 6 Aug 53
Rewritten: RHelms/ecd - 8 Aug 53
Distribution: Orig & 1 - w/atts - addressee
2 - EE/FIG/Z ✓
1 - DD/P file
1 - DD/P chrono

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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IN 12292

ROUTING

1	FILE
2	FILE-PPB
3	CHAND
4	BOARD
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TO: DIRECTOR CIA

FROM: SR REP FRANKFURT

AUG 21 1953

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE (1-4)

1540Z 21 AUG 53

INFORMATION: DCI (5), D/DCI (6), DD/P (7), COP (8), FI (9-10)

FRAN 8353

cc: *filed* West GIS.

TO: SPULL

INFO: DIR

CITE: SFRAN

KAPOK

RE: PULL 6239 (IN 12008), FRAN 8333 (IN 12053)

1. IN LIGHT 19 AUGUST TALKS WITH $\square \Rightarrow$ DO NOT FEEL DISCUSSIONS WITH UTILITY URGENT. WILL SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER MY RETURN FROM SWITZERLAND.

2. UTILITY OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO PANIC US INTO CONCESSIONS. AS STATED PREVIOUSLY, DEVELOPMENT NEW PATTERN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ZIPPER MAY BE IN ORDER BUT ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAREFULLY CONSIDERED FULLY-STAFFED PLANS. IF PROBLEM URGENT, SURPRISED UTILITY DID NOT RAISE IT AT OUR MEETING THREE WEEKS AGO.

3. $\square \Rightarrow$ HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION WITH AMERICAN HANDLING OF ZIPPER OR SUGGEST CHANGES IN EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS. HE DID NOT DO SO, BUT FULL OF PRAISE FOR AMERICAN MANAGEMENT. POSSIBLE $\square \Rightarrow$ NOT SINCERE BUT IF SO DIFFICULT SEE MOTIVATION.

4. BELIEVE UTILITY'S CURRENT CAMPAIGN ON HIS OWN, WITHOUT GOVERNMENT KNOWLEDGE OR BLESSING. MAY BE TRYING FORCE IMMEDIATE

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21 AUG 53

S E C R E T

IN 12292

FRAN 8353

PAGE TWO

CONCESSIONS ON CHANCE POST-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE MAY BE LESS FAVORABLE TO HIM.

5. IN ACCORDANCE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS THIS SUBJECT, REQUEST UTILITY AND YOU PREPARE PROPOSAL FOR NEW RELATIONSHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

26 August 1953

ECIA 5241

Subject: Visit with General Heusinger in Austria

* * * * *

10. Continuing, Heusinger said that the Washington suggestion of the replacement of UTILITY as head of the German organization was out of the question. He has very strong lines to the Chancellor and Globke and a great reservoir of loyalty among the ZIPPERITES. Nor did he believe that Merker could take over and still hold the organization together. Sooner or later the Economic Section (45/W) would be taken over by the Economic Ministry, the OB Sections (44/H and 45/L), by the Defense Ministry, etc. and the concept of a central intelligence service would be destroyed.

* * * * *

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DATE 2001 2005

File Gehlen - 201

Heinrich Gehlen - 201.

Debriefing of Dr. Karl STEIMEL 1 September 1953

Head of Research as well as Director of the Umlplant of West German Telefunken who was held in the USSR from 1946 until 1952:

STEIMEL described Gehlen as one of West Germany's most acute observers of the political, scientific and technical scene and his "Munich group" as extremely capable. Has heard much of Gehlen thru ex Col HEBEL, who was Telefunken's security officer during the war and is now chief of their small office in Bonn..Aware of Heusinger-Gehlen friendship..

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EO 1A-5304

11 SEPT 1953

Chief, EE

INFO: COM

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational

Gehlen - Reichard
- 201.

Der Spiegel Article, 26 August 53

1. For your information and retention, we are forwarding a photostat of an anti-LENZ/GLOBKE/GEHLEN article appearing in a recent issue of Der Spiegel.

2. On 23 August GEHLEN informed [] that he heard through his contact (WORGITZKI, GVB) to the Spiegel that an anti-governmental pre-election attack linking GEHLEN was forthcoming.

3. HORN discussed this article with GEHLEN and found that the latter was not particularly disturbed. GEHLEN reportedly considers it regretful that he has been linked with LENZ and GLOBKE in view of his negotiations with the latter. This undoubtedly will cause further fears and suspicions amongst the informed laity.

4. An interesting and unexplained point is that the organization's contact, who is a Special Connection, apparently was unable to stop publication of a rather garbled and slanted bit of reporting.

Approved:

[]

Distribution:

— 3 - EE (v. att.)
3 - COM

16 September 1953

Worgitzki

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MG 19 Sep

FLG/DH

EE/FI

22/10/53

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4-11-237

EGLA 5838

SECRET

- 8 OCT 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
(Attn: [])

INFO: EE (For ASCHAM)

Chief of Base, Pullach

OPERATIONAL/ZIPPER

UTILITY's Study Prepared at Request of [] for ASCHAM.

1. You will recall that UTILITY prepared, at our request, a study titled, "Gedanken zur Weltlage," dated 6 July 1953, which was forwarded as an attachment to personal letters to both [] and Ascham.

2. UTILITY's study was strictly his own work on this occasion and I feel that he attached a good deal of importance to his effort. From several sides I have learned that UTILITY, who is inclined to be rather over-sensitive about such matters, has been somewhat put out that he has never had any reaction.

3. I think it would be to our advantage if some positive reaction to UTILITY's study could be passed to him in the near future.

4. I think it worth emphasizing with the home office that this was not just another study by the ZIPPER political evaluation staff. UTILITY labored a good deal in preparing the report and our reaction should recognize that it represented a personal effort on his part.

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3 EE (Ascham)

THRU: COM

2 P.O.B.

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240/GEHLEN

Secret - Security Information

LGNA 2937

ECNA-2937

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Chief of Base, Bonn

IN-0: EE
POB

OCT 14 1953

Operational/CALL/CART

Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ

Ref: ECNA-2909 of 6 October 1953

1. On 29 September 1953, Robert H. HEILBRONN of the HICOG General Counsel staff (naturalized US citizen of German origin) gave me a copy of the attached note (photostats attached) from Judge Dr. LORENTZEN of the Landgericht Wiesbaden, requesting HICOG's permission to have General GEHLEN and Tommy HEZEMANS appear as witnesses in the trial of the State against Hellmut KILLOH. - *counsel for the defense of Gen ELAND - Duke Chen - accused of extortion & blackmail*
2. HEZEMANS, a Dutch citizen, was formerly with ODI HICOG in Wiesbaden and is now employed with MSA (FOA) HICOG. During the ELAND trial HICOG received the same request regarding HEZEMANS and at that time I counseled against permitting HEZEMANS to appear as a witness. I repeated the same counsel, and HEILBRONN said that in any case HEZEMANS would not be permitted to testify.
3. Concerning GEHLEN, I told HEILBRONN that he was not a US employee and therefore outside HICOG jurisdiction. HEILBRONN also mentioned that the Germans had asked him for the address of GEHLEN and I told him that I did not know anything about his whereabouts. HEILBRONN said he would inform Judge LORENTZEN that HICOG had no information on GEHLEN.

Genlen was to be purchased as witness of Heinz' credibility to be questioned especially re - importance and value of intel that Heinz passed to ELAND

Encls: H/S

Request fr Judge in Wiesb. 10 Jul 53

9 October 1953

Distr:

- 3 - OOM, w/encl
 - 3 - EE, " " (DIRECT)
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

100-10

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designation should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment, the officer should be drawn from the list and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial each mark (insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

100-1015

NO. 100-10
DATE 5 Jan 53

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
TC/FT/2			7/1/54	W/H	C
TC/	3				self suff. by am.
TC/PP/G		7/1		SK	
TC/PA/D		JAN 11 1954		11 Jan 1954	
TC/IC/B			11/1	27/1/54	
TC/	1		13/1	18	
TC/	1		14/1	18	
TC/SIB/	1				

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
SP 98

K-11172

Standard Report Form

REPORT No 00-W
CD No

COUNTRY German Federal Republic, German Democratic Republic
SUBJECT Political - Intelligence activities

DATE OF INFORMATION NOV 53

W
PUBLISHED Daily newspaper

DATE DIST

ERE
PUBLISHED Frankfurt am Main

No of PAGES

TE
PUBLISHED 10 November 53, 11 November 53

SUPPLEMENT TO

LANGUAGE German

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NO. 52-7
1950

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[Numbers in parentheses refer to appended sources.]

On Monday, 8 November, Hans Joachim Geyer submitted alleged secret documents at an East Berlin press conference which, for the first time in a long period, was also attended by representatives of the West German and the foreign press. Geyer claims to have been the deputy chief of West Berlin intelligence office supposedly engaged in espionage under the direction of former General Gehlen.

Geyer read a statement which he made to the GDR State Security Service after his flight to the East at the end of October. According to his statement, he turned over all secret documents of the West Berlin branch office X 9592 of Gehlen's organization to GDR authorities as a proof of his good will. He claimed that he had been misled into working for the organization, because he was told at the beginning that he would be working in the interests of Germany. According to Geyer, the organization was composed of former intelligence officers of the German army. The offices, he continued, used innocuous firm names as cover names. The espionage organization was financed entirely by the Americans and was operating under direct orders of the American intelligence service. Agents in the GDR were given espionage missions for economic, military and political targets. The organization, Geyer stated, was especially interested in information on the protection of bridges, and in the recruiting of radio operators and the setting-up of covert radio transmitters.

Geyer requested all his former co-workers in West Berlin and West Germany to stop their activities and to follow his example.

Horden, the official spokesman at the press conference, intimated that Geyer would not be prosecuted, as the government of the GDR was generous toward all those who had made a mistake and admitted their guilt and who were now trying to make amends.

Colonel Herman, of the State Security Service then gave details on the German chiefs of alleged branch offices of Gehlen's organization, and cited names and addresses of officials of the American intelligence service in West Berlin. He, too, claimed that the organization was closely co-operating with the Americans, and also charged that the German agents were being flown from West Berlin to the German Federal Republic in American courier planes, and that these agents had code numbers which protected them from interference by German police. He promised further revelations and also gave the names of a number of German agents who had been arrested during the past few weeks. He further charged that the espionage activities had also extended to Poland and to Czechoslovakia.

The spokesman at the press conference accused the Americans and the West Germans of having been the originators of the espionage activities. He claimed that there was close contact between Gerdien, Security Commissioner Blank, and Federal Minister for All-German Questions Kaiser. American foreign aid, he stated, provided only funds for espionage, and Gehlen alone was given

more than 3 million Dollars a year for operating his organization. He claimed that the GDR was not sending any spies and agents to West Germany, but only representatives of peace and unity. Gehlen was also active in espionage in Paris and in Northern France, he stated.

After the press conference, the journalists were shown miniature radio transmitters of American origin, explosives, and the original copies of documents of Branch Office [E] 9592. All those present agreed that the material exhibited was not a fake, but that it did not give any direct indications of sabotage and espionage.

Political observers in Berlin feel that Geyer was working for the GDR State Security Service for a long time, and fled to the East only after he had collected enough material.

A spokesman for the West Berlin Investigating Committee of Free Jurists stated that the existence of Gehlen's organization was a well-known fact and that it concerned itself with questions of military counter-espionage. However, he added, that co-operation between Gehlen and the Americans was unlikely. One of the reasons he gave for this opinion was the fact that the office in which Gehlen worked was located in the British and not in the American sector of Berlin. A West Berlin spokesman for the Federal Government stated that Gehlen's organization was private and that the Federal government had nothing to do with it. (1)

Informed Berlin circles call the case of Hans Joachim Geyer a very serious matter. It is said that indications have come to light that Geyer had infiltrated one of Gehlen's West Berlin offices with a definite mission given to him by the GDR State Security Service. In this connection it is pointed out that the GDR espionage service had succeeded in the Dr. Linse kidnapping case in infiltrating an agent into an important West Berlin office. During Geyer's activity in the West Berlin office, the State Security Service was able to arrest a number of persons hostile to the GDR regime. On the basis of this fact, the Gehlen group is now being accused of laxity in the choice of its personnel.

Investigations have shown that Geyer's statements on 8 November concerning his address in West Berlin and the West Berlin office were correct. Geyer had a furnished room, and claimed to be a writer. Paulsberg, the alleged chief of Gehlen's branch office, had an apartment at the address in the British Sector given by Geyer. During the weekend from 7-8 November, Paulsberg suddenly moved out, taking his furniture with him, and cannot be found. (2)

Sources: (1) Frankfurter Allgemeine, 10 Nov 1963
(2) ibid., 11 Nov 1963

AN NO. 35-85
JAN 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 NOV 53

SECRET

IN 34134

ROUTING

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP ☐

ROUTINE

ACTION: RE 6

1732Z 13 NOV 53

INFORMATION: DD/I, COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, EE 2, AD/CI, FI/RI 2

6938

TO: DIR

CITE: SROME

INTEL/CONTROL

1. ON 6 NOV HOETLE COMMUNICATED TO HASS BY LETTER THAT (COLONEL) HEINZ HAD SOME DAYS PREVIOUSLY BEEN EXPELLED IN DISGRACE FROM GERMAN I.S. FOR COLLUSION WITH JUG I.S. HOETLE ADDED THAT INVESTIGATIONS STARTED BY BONN AUTHORITIES ON BASIS ANTI GOVT PRESS CAMPAIGN PROMOTED BY HEINZ CLAMTESTINELY IN HAMBURG WEEKLY, "SPIEGEL," AND THAT ACCORDING INFO HIS (HOETLE) POSSESSION, THE NEW DIRECTORATE (GEHLEN) WILL RE-EXAMINE POSITIONS ALL MEMBERS SERVICE AND OF ALL THOSE FIRED ON HEINZ'S ORDERS REGARDLESS OF REASON. HOETLE CLAIMS HE WILL RESUME ACTIVITY SOON.

2. HASS EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY. HOWEVER STATED DID NOT FEAR FOR HIS POSITION. FATHER IN LAW OF PRESENT DIRECTOR MUNICH CENTER IS GEHLEN'S DEPUTY; THEREFORE, POSSIBLE ALL UNITS SUBORDINATE TO MUNICH WILL NOT BE TOUCHED AND THAT ACTIVITY WILL NOT BE INTERRUPTED BY HEINZ'S REPLACEMENT.

3. SOURCE: ☐

14 NOV C-3.

END OF MESSAGE

13	1	44
ABSTRACT	INDEX	
DATE 18 NOV 1953		

COPY NO.

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

14 December 1953

SECRET

DFB 32904

File # 100-24628

answer to CSDB 16195

Subject: Owen Lattimore

"This is to advise you that this information was furnished us in a letter dated 14 December 1953, from Assistant Attorney General

Warren Olney III of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice who advised that the data was received from a person who prefers to remain anonymous. Mr. Olney has been made cognizant of your specific interest in this matter, and it is suggested that you contact him for the identity and location of the source involved."

Note on cover sheet from STC: FYI, informally and not for attribution, Olney's anonymous source is thought to be a former CIA employee cognizant of our activities in this field, who is a personal acquaintance of Olney or one of his subordinates.

McGG

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FOR COORDINATION WITH DOJ
Criminal Division

Gelken - 201

SECRET

orig. EE/EE
EE/FI

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 1953

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Conversation with Dr. Hans Globke

Attached hereto for your information is a Memorandum of
Conversation with Dr. Hans Globke, held 11 Dec. 1953.

Dist:

3 - EE (#1 att) 2 CC (disposal in the original)
12 April 1953
30 Dec. 53

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CLASSIFICATION

5/c

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3403

15 December 1953

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Hans GLOBKE

DATE:	DEC 24 1953
DCOM	
INFO:	D/G
DCOM	1-10-53

1. [] and [] had a meeting with Staatssekretär GLOBKE in the Schaumburg Palais, Bonn, at 1000 hours on the morning of 14 December 1953.

2. Gehlen Organization.

Dr. GLOBKE confirmed that General GEBLER had been called to testify in his activities before the (EVC Committee of the Bundestag). Dr. GLOBKE had first attempted to forestall this meeting but was now pleased that it had taken place and could be considered a successful forward step. (GLOBKE had tried to get in touch with [] to inform him of the meeting before it took place but was unable to make a connection.) GLOBKE explained that Dr. Richard JAEGER of the CSU, the head of the committee, and his deputy, Fritz EILER (L.P.D.) had requested a meeting on the urging of the committee as a whole. The committee wished to be informed about the operations of the Gehlen Organization in general and particularly wished to investigate the accusation that the organization was active in internal West German political matters. A preliminary meeting was held on 10 December between JAEGER and EILER, on the one side, and GLOBKE, BLANK and GEBLER on the other. The committee leaders were satisfied with the explanations provided but insisted that the only satisfactory solution would be an appearance before the whole committee. This meeting before the whole committee then took place on 11 December. No specific details were asked about Gehlen operations. The committee was informed about the (Geyer) affair and General GEBLER briefed them on the nature and mission of his organization and its background. He emphasized its tasks in positive foreign intelligence and, according to GLOBKE, convinced the committee that he was not meddling in internal German politics, and led them to recognize the necessity for integrating his organization into the Government. The committee was also convinced that the membership of the organization was relatively clean and was not, as alleged, a collection of former SD officers. GLOBKE pointed out that during these meetings GEBLER was very helpful and took a very loyal and positive attitude. (GEBLER said to BLANK, GLOBKE used the expressions "absolut positiv" and "sehr gut".) GLOBKE was asked what BLANK's position was in regard to totalization of the organization. According to GLOBKE, BLANK is aiding the move for integration of the organization at the earliest possible date. The actual mechanics of the integration have not been settled but, according to GLOBKE, BLANK still wishes merely to have an evaluation staff in the Amt Blank and does not intend to try to take over part of the active collection program.

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BY CSN 43-25

It was GLOBKE's opinion that this discussion with the EVG Committee was a step forward because it had convinced certain important members of the Bundestag to take a favorable attitude with regard to the organization.

3. (Professor Eugen KOGON.) Dr. GLOBKE introduced a problem with regard to Professor Eugen KOGON and the European Unity Movement. He introduced the subject by saying that KOGON was involved in many activities connected with European Union besides his professorship in Darmstadt and his connections with a publishing house. Apparently at the present moment the German section of the (Europa Bewegung) has financial problems. A special committee has been installed over KOGON to superintend all business and financial activities. This special committee consists of three directors; namely, the journalist FRIEDLANDER, CDU Bundestag member (Dr. Paul LEVERKUMEN of Hamburg), and Josef MUELLER of Munich (Ochsen Fepp). The financial difficulties are such that KOGON approached Chancellor ADENAUER and asked for financial assistance from the Federal Republic. He informed the Chancellor that the indebtedness of the Movement amounted to 260,000 DM. Peculiarly enough, Dr. GLOBKE heard from another source that KOGON reported to the directors of the special committee that the indebtedness was 70,000 DM. For his information and that of the Chancellor, Dr. GLOBKE would like to find out some exact information to clarify this discrepancy. At the same time, GLOBKE has heard that "CIC" intends to sue KOGON for not carrying out certain editorial projects for which he was given advances. GLOBKE is not interested in damaging KOGON but, if there is a financial mess, he hopes that it can be cleaned up quickly and without publicity so that the European Union will not come into discredit. GLOBKE would like to ascertain from us if KOGON has debts to the Americans or if the Americans have financial claims on him or the Movement and, if this is so, discuss with us the possibility of handling the matter in such a way as not to damage the European Union Movement. (It is not clear whether KOGON is involved in his position as president of Verein Deutsche mit der Europäischen Bewegung or as president of "European Union", the German section of "Union Europeenne des Federalistes".)

4. Dr. GLOBKE was queried as to whether a copy of the Secret Agreement of Agreement had been passed to Dr. JOHNS of the NSC. He stated that this matter was being looked after and a copy of the Agreement was being prepared for transmittal to Dr. JOHNS.

5. Dr. GLOBKE was reminded that Dr. GOERTZ had reopened the subject of censorship with Dr. ADENAUER. GLOBKE admitted that this was a very difficult question and that the Chancellor was trying to cultivate a sympathetic viewpoint in some of the leading, leading members. GLOBKE admitted that the General Public could not continue to postpone facing this question indefinitely. In his opinion, a meeting of the Chiefs would

have to be arranged with Dr. Gerd BUCHHEIM and other vocal critics of censorship so that some arrangement could be made that would satisfy the normal security requirements of both the Allies and the Federal Republic.

6. CDU Ost-Bureau. Dr. GLOBKE was reminded that we had brought up the subject of expanded activity on the part of the CDU Ost-Bureau and had asked who were the appropriate people in this sphere. GLOBKE repeated that this was largely a matter for the Kaiser Ministry and that GRADL in Berlin was KAISER's man for such Exil-CDU matters. Since we had originally asked if HECK were a referent in this field, he flatly stated that HECK had nothing to do with this matter but confined his propaganda attentions to internal Federal Republic affairs. With regard to expansion, he merely stated that Exil-CDU wishes to become more active but needs money which they hope to get from SCHAEFFER through the Kaiser Ministry.

7. Passing reference was made to the possibility of a four-power conference in Berlin. We pointed out the John Foster DULLES statement that the Americans regarded the conference as an attempt to arrange a peaceful reunification of Germany, that we would insist on free elections, and under no circumstances would we give de jure recognition to the GDR Government. GLOBKE said that the Federal Republic was making plans to look after some 700 journalists in Berlin. He expected East Zone propaganda to be intense but had seen no present indications of it. He intimated that if they intensified propaganda we would probably intensify counter-propaganda, but that if the East Zone left things fairly quiet we would probably be fairly quiet also.

DISCONTINUED
REC'D 10/10/50

MR Luncheon with von WESSEL & Wieland 5 Jan 1954

This was the first conversation that I have had with Wieland in many months since he is stationed in Paris on General SPIDEL's staff. He pessimistic re EDO. Was pleased Foster Dulles recent efforts on behalf EDO. Reports relations among EDO military planning staff excellent. Wieland maintains no other contacts in Paris. We left this subject since he seemed as anxious as I to talk about the organization.

In the early days of my association with Zipper, Wieland was the asst to HORN who headed evaluation. Wieland avoided contact with Americans; was unfriendly and very cold. This may have been related to the various scenes that developed out of relations Rosemary W. and several members 7821 in 1948 parties.

Gradually we came to appreciate Wieland's ability and intelligence. He replaced Horn after H. left for Ant Blank. Wieland has mellowed much during the last two years. His outlook has improved with service in Paris.

Wieland spoke openly and at length on the personality of Utility. He was aware that Utility had just fired Morke as deputy. Wieland by no means ~~utter~~ blind to the shortcomings of Utility.

On issue of G18 or G-2, Wieland urged us hold the line with Utility and not permit him be carried away by the idea of "early legalization" under Blank.

Wieland and Horn have obviously become less congenial. W seems more Speidel man at the moment. Considers H stupid on issue of security and blind in his loyalty to OSTER (and, to some extent, to KIELMANNSEGG). Wieland obviously buys EK theory. Hated that only Brandt and Oster can carry pouches between Paris and Bonn. W openly said this couldn't be better if they actually working for East.

(comment: some weeks later I had dinner with Hensing in Bonn. He reported recent Wieland visit and also confirmed cooling of personal relations. W refuses work ~~work~~ under Kielmannsegg. Under no circumstances will he take Oster in G-2 office. Whether Wieland will become G-2 remains a question. However, even Horn is so convinced of W ability that he will in the end probably make the required adjustments.)

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 7815
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

240 Wieland

230.53 Romil

NWC-002786

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
BONN I.S.		2. RI FILE NO.	0043	005	007
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
		00IRA-02399		08 JAN 54	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
[] []					
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
14. GEHLEN, REINHARDT (GEN.) [] A DIRECT "R" OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REPORTED THE FOLLOWING ON 24 NOVEMBER 1953: HEINZ CASE DUE TO INTRIGUE GEN. REINHARDT GEHLEN, [] AND OFFICIALS OF BLANK OFFICE. DUE TO DISCOVERY GEHLEN INTELLIGENCE CENTER EASTERN GERMANY HIS POSITION ALSO UNSTABLE. IT IS AN INTERESTING FACT THAT GEHLEN ATTRIBUTES POWERFUL BURNING TO INTRIGUES HEINZ WHO SUSPECTED BE IN CONTACT WITH RUSSIANS. ALLIED SERVICES HAVE SLOWED DOWN CONTACTS WITH WEISBADEN AND WITH GEHLEN IN EXPECTATION THAT BLANK AND THE AMERICANS CLARIFY SERIOUS SITUATION. BURNING OF GEHLEN EAST GERMAN CENTERS HAS SACRIFICED MANY FIRST-GRADE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS AND CAUSED COMPLETE BREAK COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSEQUENT LOSS SOURCES OF MAXIMUM IMPORTANCE. AMERICAN SERVICE VERY MUCH ALARMED AND HAS ORDERED RIGOROUS INVESTIGATION OF FUNCTIONING OF ENTIRE GEHLEN APPARAT."					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [] [] [] []					

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

100-24628

VIA LIAISON

DATE: January 15, 1954

TO: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

FROM: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: OWEN LATTIMORE
ESPIONAGE - R
PERJURY

This Bureau has been advised that General Reinhold Von Gehlen, a former Nazi officer who was a top official in the German Intelligence Service during World War II, can obtain information concerning the subject from a source, such as Gerhard Eisler, as well as from sources available to him in Moscow, USSR. Von Gehlen, who can be contacted in Munich, Germany, reportedly is known to your Agency.

It is requested that, if feasible, you contact Von Gehlen to ascertain if he is in possession, at this time, of information concerning Lattimore and to determine whether he can obtain data concerning the subject from any of his sources, including Gerhard Eisler, and those known to him in Moscow.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI

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See ESDR-16195
EGLW-578

SECRET

20 January 1954

MEMORANDUM TO : COPS
FROM : EE/FI
SUBJECT : ZIPPER/Nazi Elements

1. During General Gehlen's 11 December presentation before the EEC Parliamentary Committee he used a graphic chart to show the extent and number of former SS and SD personnel within the ZIPPER complex:

	Headquarters Wage Scales		Field Wage Scales		
	I-III	IV-IX	I-III	IV-IX	Totals
Total	157	284	132	529	1102
Waffen SS	1	3	4	13	21
Allgemeine SS & SD	0	0	12	18	30
Police drafted into SD	0	0	5	9	14

NOTE: The top wage scale is I.

2. In terms of SS and SD percentage ZIPPER claims they are better off than most West German ministries.

Peter Sichel
EE/FI

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DATE 2003 2005

DRAFT

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EGLA

Not sent

TO: EE

SUBJ: Former Nazi and SS Membership in ZIPPER

REF: ~~EGLA 6880~~

1954?

1. Over the years there have been numerous allegations made by various individuals and factions within the West German government to the effect that ZIPPER's ranks are heavily weighted with former Nazi and SS-types. In view of the fact that Nazism in the German Government appears no longer to be a problem of such primary concern, it would seem that a report dealing with the incidence of these elements within ZIPPER might well be made at this time by way of finalizing the matter.

2. Study of POB's ☐ ☐ files which contain background data on nearly 600 ZIPPERites (about half of the known total of ZIPPER membership) reveal 76 ZIPPERites known to have been either former SS, SD, SA members, NSDAP members, War Crime offenders and/or a combination of same. The 76 who fall into the above category represent about 13% of the ZIPPERites whose background is known to us.

3. It will be remembered (EGLA 6880) that UTILITY gave us a copy of a chart used in his presentation before the EDC Parliamentary Committee, 11 Dec 53, to show the extent and number of former SS and SD personnel within the ZIPPER complex. A summary of these figures, which we considered a fairly accurate statement of the facts (since copies of ZIPPER personnel statistics are on file in UPTHURST's office), show that of 1102 ZIPPERites, 51 are either former Waffen Ss and/or Allgemeine SS and SD. For comparison's

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-2-

sake:

UTILITY figures of
SS, SD & SA

51 out of 1102 ZIPPERites = 5%

POB Figures of
SS, SD, & SA

50 out of 600 ZIPPERites = 8% checked

From the above comparison we see that POB's records show only a 3% higher incidence of SS, SD and SA-types than did UTILITY's statement. In fact, from a review of our findings we find nothing to seriously refute ZIPPER's claims "that in terms of SS and SD percentage they are better off than most UPGROWTH ministries."

4. By way of further comparison it is interesting to note figures recently compiled by OCA/Bonn from Berlin Documents Center records which show that the present Bundestag has 129 or 26.5% former NSDAP members. UTILITY in a memo dated 8 March 1950 to [] stated that:

"Of all full time coworkers of the staffs of our organization (including District Agencies), 28 percent of the 785 coworkers in question were former members of the NSDAP."

We may consider UTILITY's 28 percent figure to be a fairly conservative one in view of the fact that [] study (para 1) shows up only 13% ZIPPERites in all former Nazi categories.

5. This report deals with numbers and percentages in an attempt to be as factual as possible. There are, however, certain individuals still in the employ of ZIPPER whose records appear from a qualitative

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-3-

standpoint particularly heinous; and for said reason a brief synopsis of each has been attached. We feel it is a bit late in the game to do anything more than remind UTILITY that he might be smart politically to drop such types.

PGC

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FLEGEL, Arwed

@ Alfred FRIEDMANN

@ Hans MIGSCH

@ Hans NIETSCH

B. 8 Oct 1914

Occupation: Zweigstelle 4 (CI/CE)

1933	- Joined Allgemein SS
1935	" Waffen SS
1936	Sturmann SS
1937	Rottenfuehrer SS
1939	Uschaf SS
1941	HPTschaf SS
1943	Ustuf SS
1944	Ostuf SS

In 1935 FLEGEL chose the Waffen SS as a career and at the time of the capitulation held an important administrative position in the SS-Sanitatshauptamt, Berlin. Escaped from Neunegamme where interned with other SS leaders. Escaped with Heinrich SPRINGER who interested him in de CHELARD who hoped for revival of some form of National Socialism. De CHELARD wanted to collaborate with anti-Bewegung, an organization allegedly formed by some European intellectuals aiming at a United States of the World. FLEGEL went out of his way to establish fresh contact with his SS comrades to solicit their support for anti-Bewegung.

FRIEDE, Willy Heinrich

@PAX, Frank

B. 30 Sept 1917, Arendsee

Occupation: Org position (original) GVH; V-2835

1 Oct 1930 - Entered NSDAP
SS #J 1498
SS rank - Obersturmfuehrer, May 1939
HJ Membership 1929-31
SA " 1930-32
Employed by HJ (since about 1937):
HJ rank: Bannfuehrer
Holder of Golden HJ Badge und Totenkopfring

Since 1 Jul 44 Belonged to Reichsleitung, Einsatzstab des Reichsleiters
Rosenberg (Sonderstab "Wissenschaft")

Pre-Hitler organizer of Youth groups
Was groomed for deputy Gauleitership when Hitler came
to power.
Held high party rank - became inspector general of
W. German Hitler Youth. Considered one of most
successful Nazi youth leaders.
He has stated openly he was not de-Nazified and did not
desire to be, only read denazification being one of
inner compulsion.
After war soon met ZIPPER interests. FRIEDE considered
actually working head of ZIPPER Rome group under
Hans GEHLEN. Tasks:
1) Order of Malta connections;
2) CI work in former German SS circles;
3) Vatican connections.
List effective 10 April 51 included FRIEDE as Special
Connection S-1936. Active in Ruhr in framework of
GVL and a staff contact of Sec 122's @KLAUSNER.

Jan 53 POB saw original report of V-2835 who works in Dusseldorf/Duisburg
area under cover of Northwest Deutscher Rundfunk, correspondent or executive.

FIEBIG, Conrad

V-7038

@Konrad FIEDLER

@Konrad FISCHER

B. Sept 22, 1909, Breslau

Occupation: Section 161 (Dienststelle GVH); transferred to Sect 88C,
Stuttgart (old 33 KU, Stuttgart)

In May 1946 CIC submitted request subject's apprehension. Charges:
1st Lt in Allgemein Schutz-Staffel (Elite Troops, SS) and a Kriminal-
kommissar in Gestapo at Breslau.

FIEBIG also a Justice of a Sondergericht (Summary Court) and allegedly
was responsible for many mass executions (EGQA 49744).

SOMANN, Otto

@LANGE, Otmar

B.

Occupation - Org: Dienststelle 161 (GDR-Poland Ops)

1926	- SA-mann
1926-31	"NSDAP - Ortsgruppenleiter"
1931-44	SS Units - Oberfuehrer
1944	Inspecteur der SIPO und des SD in Wiesbaden

AWARDS:

Golden Party Badge
"Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Bronze und Silber"
SS Totenkopfring und bearer of SS Ehrendeger
Kriegsuerdienstdreuz I Klasse mit Schweren

WELLHOENER, Karlgeorg

@WOGÉ, Karl

B.

Occupation: Örg Dienststelle 11 (GDR-Poland)

1931	- NSDAP
1931-32	SA-Scharführer
1932-36	Allgemeine SS - Untersturmführer
1936	Sicherheitsdienst der SS - Hauptsturmführer
1937-40	SD, Berlin Div
1943	SS H/Stuf (Major)

EGNA-34261

EGNA-0034261

DISPATCH NO. 34261

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

JAN 29 1954

TO: Chief, EE
FROM: Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

DATE:
INFO: Chief of Station, Bonn
Chief of Station, Pullach

RE: American Press Interest in Gehlen Disclosures
Ref: EGNA-33410

1. We would like to call [] and your attention to the attached copy of a memorandum of conversation between Richard Gottalet and [] You may find this memorandum interesting in connection with Gottalet's statement that he had been misled off by [] In any case the attachment will be of assistance in presenting a somewhat more rounded picture of the event.

2. For Pullach: Copy of memorandum of conversation mentioned above was sent you in EGNA-3230.

List:

- 3 - EE (w/att)
- 2 - Bonn (w/s att)
- 2 - Pullach (w/o att)

27 Jan 54

1 att h/w

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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CLASSIFICATION

Ref 51-28A

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SECRET

19 November 1953

Memo of Conversation with Richard Hottelet

SUBJECT: Press Interest in the Gehlen Organization

*(Mr.) Reinhold
radio correspondent of CBS)*

1. On 17 November Richard Hottelet of the CBS arranged an appointment with [] and held a conversation lasting from 5:15 until 6:00 PM.

2. Hottelet said that he, as well as other correspondents, had collected material of their own on the Gehlen Organization and wished to know, in light of the increasing comments in the German press, how they should handle the subject and if they could check it out with American authorities. Hottelet asked me what I could tell him of the background of the Gehlen Organization. I told Mr. Hottelet that I had heard well of him, that he was undoubtedly a reasonable man and that I could obviously tell him nothing. It was established that I had officially given him an answer of "no comment." However, we agreed to discuss various hypotheses off the record.

3. The first hypothesis I outlined was that he and other able correspondents, including besides Amerjean, also British and German, had been stumbling over leads to the Gehlen story for some time. If they followed these leads they eventually would come to a dead end when the correspondents attempted to get in touch with responsible officials or leaders. Almost no serious papers had carried this subject through to a conclusion and most of the comments had appeared in the more sensational press. If it were true, as stated, that the Gehlen Organization was an incipient German intelligence organization surely this would be a matter of interest to and probable protest from many sources. Some of these would normally be American OIC, British FSS, French Surete, the SPD, the Amt Blank and the BfV who might be presumed to have vested interest, HICOG and USAREUR. The list would be quite large if one counted all of the organizations that might wish to investigate or take an attitude upon such a matter. If the supposition is true that an incipient German intelligence organization has existed for some time and if none of these very interested parties have complained and if inquiries lead to blank ends at all of these sources, is it not a reasonable hypothesis that this matter, if it is as stated, has somehow or other been coordinated with all the interested parties? If this hypothesis is sound CBS is not on the track of some scoop but is running into a matter that seems to have been rather thoroughly coordinated among the properly interested parties.

Att Hto eggs 34261

SECRET

RI COPY

~~SECRET~~
FG 9A-34261

32-6-7-3756

SECRET

4. The second hypothesis is to consider the accusation that this organization has been sponsored by the Americans. If we follow this supposition to its logical conclusion we must realize that on the American side would be involved at the very least the Department of the Army, Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency. If these three departments are involved in any matter over a long period of time it would seem obvious that the coordination between them would entail a frequent review of policy and a corresponding review of budget. Both policy and budget reviews on a long-existing project are common within the American Government structure. If this is granted to be true and Americans are involved but the correspondent believes there is something wild or dangerous about the scheme, then he is leaning to the sensationalist stand that the Americans involved are either knaves who are deliberately squandering Government money or fools who are having the wool pulled over their eyes by the incredibly astute Germans. Is the answer probably not some place in between the Americans are neither knaves nor fools?

5. The third hypothesis dealt with Mr. Hottel's expressed fear that an independent German intelligence organization might be a power factor that could get out of hand. I suggested that the hypothesis that this organization was to be a GYS did not lend itself to such a conclusion. If it is to be a Central Intelligence service it is obviously coming late on the scene. Amt Blank has already vested interest in the military field and the BfV has vested interest in the field of internal security. This would seem to insure that the necessary checks and balances are already built into the system on the German side. The fear of such a development was always possible but the checks and balances already existing plus the hypothesis that this matter was coordinated made this fear seem somewhat unreasonable.

6. The next hypothesis concerned what comments should be made by Americans in official positions. Suppose, I said, that this organization might be a future German service and suppose it might presently be supported by the Americans. Would it not, therefore, seem highly logical that no American in an official position would make any comment upon something that would one day be an entirely German matter? Any comment given under the present relationships between America and Germany would become a permanent part of the record of such an organization and would in the long run be neither good for the Germans nor the Americans. Mr. Hottel therefore should expect to receive only one answer, namely, "no comment."

7. The last point discussed was the touchy one of the purpose to be served, if any, by American correspondents pushing this story. I asked Hottel if he were under pressure by his front office to produce something on this matter and he admitted he had received no such instructions. I asked him if he felt he owed it to his public to produce this story and he conceded that he would feel this necessity only if it served the public interest. From our previous hypotheses I suggested that it might be concluded that the public interest would not be served unless given a complete

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story and that all an incomplete story might do would be to stir up the lunatic fringe of public opinion. Hottel agreed that on the basis of the various assumptions we had discussed he would think the matter over seriously before broadcasting anything on this matter. He pointed out, however, that the correspondents were in the difficult position of being on the track of what smelled like a good and fascinating story but had no idea how they should handle it. I asked him if he thought a background briefing of reliable correspondents was one way to handle this. He said that it would be valuable for them in order to guide their handling of material on this matter which was almost inevitably coming into their hands. I told him I would investigate the matter of whether such an off-the-record briefing was possible. He in turn, as a good correspondent looking for a scoop, suggested that correspondents not be invited to a briefing but any of them who pursued this subject to HICOG's upper reaches might be given a background briefing. I told him I would inquire into this matter and let him know sometime in the near future whether any such briefing was possible.

8. I mentioned this conversation with Hottel to Mr. Dowling and he stated that Don Cook of the New York Herald Tribune had brought up the subject with him. Mr. Dowling thought that the process of making no comment but being willing to thrash out various hypotheses and suppositions with certain chosen reporters might be an advisable way to get the leading correspondents on our side in this matter. My only opposition to such discussions or to briefings is that I dislike setting a precedent whereby reporters will beat their way to this office on matters which seem to be in our field. They would take up many hours a week.

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F12

AIR

EGLW-578

FEB 4 1954

* Gehlen 201

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: Chief of Base, Pullach/1
Chief, EE

Operational

Owen Lattimore

K A P O K

1. We recently received the following from ODENVY:

"ODENVY has been advised that General Reinhold (sic) von Gehlen, a former Nazi officer who was a top official in the German Intelligence Service during World War II, can obtain information concerning the subject from a source, such as Gerhard Eisler, as well as from sources available to him in Moscow, USSR. Von Gehlen, can be contacted in Munich, Germany".

2. We were requested to look into this matter. In answer we have stated that we were convinced that General Gehlen would have informed us of any information available on subject but that, nevertheless, "we would make discreet inquiries of our contacts to determine whether Gehlen has, or can provide, any information on Lattimore".

3. Naturally, in view of the political implications of a check on subject, a United States citizen, we expect you to make the approach in such a manner that it not appear as a requirement but as a discreet guide.

Distribution:

3 - Pullach (DIRECT)
3 - Frankfurt

1 - RI
2 - EE/FIG/Z

MCCG:by
2 Feb 54

EE/CE

Peter Sichel
EE/FI

EE/FI/G

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

RECEIVED
FEB 11 1954
AIR MAIL
15
EST
BR

GEHLEN
201

FEB 11 1954

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Owen Lattimore

1. Reference is made to your request, file no. 100-24628 dated 15 January 1954, for information regarding Owen Lattimore.

2. It is highly unlikely that General Reinhard Gehlen can obtain information on Lattimore from sources alleged in your memorandum to be available to him. Gehlen does not have sources available in Moscow, USSR and to our knowledge Gerhard Eisler is not accessible as a source. Furthermore, in view of the publicity of the Lattimore case, we are convinced that General Gehlen would have informed us of any information available to him on Lattimore. However, we will make discreet inquiries of our contacts to determine whether Gehlen has, or can provide, any information on Lattimore.

3. Due to the very sensitive nature of our connection with General Gehlen the information given by your informant is a matter of serious concern to us. We therefore request that you inform us, if possible, of the identity and location of the source of the misinformation provided in this report. We are particularly concerned with the question of the informant's knowledge of the connection existing between this Agency and General Gehlen. If additional investigation is necessary to fulfill this request, we would appreciate it if you would carry out such an investigation as expeditiously as possible.

CS DB-16195

EE/FIG/Z/C
5 February 1954

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - STC, 1 - RQM/RC, 1 - ~~EE/FIG/Z~~

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DATE 2005

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based on
DFB-32169

DFB-32169



SECRET

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

904
DFB-32904

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. 100-24688

1P

Date: February 19, 1954
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 R Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: OPEN LATTIMORE
ESPIONAGE - R
PERJURY

CSPB-16195

Reference is made to your communication dated February 11, 1954, in which you request the identity and location of the source who had advised that (General) Reinhard Gehlen could obtain information from Gerhard Eisler and from Moscow, USSR, pertaining to Lattimore.

This is to advise that this information was furnished us in a letter dated December 14, 1953, from Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice who advised that the data was received from a person who prefers to remain anonymous. Mr. Olney has been made cognizant of your specific interest in this matter, and it is suggested that you contact him for the identity and location of the source involved.

197 x 6
p. 2105. Mr. [unclear]
187

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI

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17 Feb. 1954
[] []

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 23 FEB 54

SECRET

ROUTING

1	FIG	4	AFB-EEB
2	EDRE	5	ONE
3	EDRM	6	EDFI

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ☐

ACTION: DCI (1)

FEB 24 1954

INFO : D/DCI (2) ADDED: DD/P (3), DD/1 (4), COP (5), EE (6-11), ONE (12-13), OCI (14-18)

☐ 6526 (IN 21115)

2327Z 23 FEB 54

ROUTINE

TO: DIR

INFO: SFRAN

PRECEDENCE

CITE: ☐

ASCHAM FROM ☐

CLEARED SWITZERLAND MULTIPLE CONTUSIONS NO FRACTURES.

FOLL TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS MAY BE TIMELY.

1. THERE WILL NOT BE ANOTHER 17 JUNE. WESTERN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE REPETITION OR EVEN MINISCULE DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD ABORT DISMALLY AND PRODUCE SEVERE CONDEMNATION IN BOTH GFR AND GDR.

2. INTENSITY GERMAN FEELING OVER TRANS ODER-NEISSE TERRITORIES FAR EXCEEDS THAT OVER DIVISION OF GERMANY. WHILE NO DESIRE FIGHT TO REGAIN INSIST LEGAL CLAIM BE PERPETUATED.

3. RE NIE 105 SMALL MINORITY EG UTILITY WHO AWARE MAGNITUDE SOVIET DESTRUCTIVE POWER CONFIRM MY WORST FEARS TO BLACKMAIL THREAT. SPECIFICALLY I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT WESTERN EUROPE WILL NOT FOLLOW US INTO GENERAL WAR OVER ANYTHING OTHER THAN DIRECT THREAT TO ITSELF; AS FOR BERLIN HIGHLY DUBIOUS THAT NON GERMANS WILL IN THREE YEARS CONSIDER IT WORTH INCINERATING SELVES FOR.

4. EXPECT BERLIN WILL BE SEALED OFF TO KEEP CURTAIN AS TIGHT

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B

SECRET

File: Gehlen 201

DATE 2001 2005 IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

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23 FEB 54

6526 (IN 21115)

PAGE -2-

AS POSSIBLE ON SOV ZONE. THIS MAY WELL BE FOLLOWED BY CREEPING
BLOCKADE, HENCE I DEPLORE FACT THAT WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS
STATEMENT CONFINED TO "ATTACK" ON BERLIN.

5. LINCOLN BIRTHDAY ANTICS MCCARTHY, JENNER AND CO HAVE
CAUSED RENEWING LOATHING AND CONTEMPT AMONG ALL CLASSES.
83-1 ROLL CALL ON CONTINUING SENATE COMMITTEE TAKEN AS PROOF
BY MANY THAT MCCARTHY HAS COMPLETELY TERRORIZED CONGRESS.
PRESIDENTS FINE SENTIMENTS RECEIVED VERY CYNICALLY IN ABSENCE
DECISIVE ACTION DISSOCIATE OR DISCIPLINE RIGHTWING DEMAGOGUES.

END OF MESSAGE

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VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. BGLA 7940

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CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

TO : Chief, EE
(Attn: ☐)
FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

DATE: _____

INFO: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Owen Lattimore

REF: BGLW 578, 4 Feb 54

In compliance with reference dispatch, ☐ took this matter up with UTILITY on 2 March 54. UTILITY was well informed on the case but stated clearly that ZIPPER has no original information to contribute.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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3 COM

3 March 54

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

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File: Gehlen 201
200 destroyed

✓ Gehlen 201
24 MAR 54

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Owen Lattimore

1. Reference is made to your request, file #100-24628 dated 15 January 1954, for information concerning Owen Lattimore and our reply of 11 February 1954 (CS DB-16195).

2. Our contacts have informed us that General Gehlen stated in answer to a query on Subject that he was well-informed via the press on the case but that he had no original information to contribute.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CS DB-18576

EE/FIG/Z/ ☐ :bw
24 March 1954
Retyped, 26 March 1954

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - STC
1 - RQM/RC
1 - RI
2 - EE/FIG/Z

100-24628-100
MAR 24 1954
FBI - NEW YORK

West German Intelligence
Organization (Bureau Gahlen)

26 March 1954

CIC L/29580 DME/bs

Gehlen, Reinhard

On 17 February 1954, the following information was obtained from Informant 6030, who obtained this information from a Sub-source of unknown reliability:

The renowned German Secret Service (Geheimdienst) chief, former German Army General (fm) Gehlen is again becoming active. Although, until recently, the existence of a German Secret Service led by Gehlen, has been officially denied by the West German government in Bonn, it has now officially appeared. Appearing before deputies of the West German Federal Diet (Bundestag) members of the West German Committee for the European Defense Community (KDC), Gehlen reported on the proposed tasks of his organization. This organization aims to report military occurrences with the East Zone of Germany, and is practically a German "intelligence." Gehlen mentioned no word of a "political intelligence." Members of the West German KDC Committee were favorably impressed by the statements made by Gehlen, former department head of the "Pressia Heere Ost" (Section for Foreign East Armies) within the former Supreme Command of the German Army (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht).

It is generally known that the Bureau Gahlen was established by the Americans in order for them to obtain from German agents operating within the Soviet Zone of Germany, information pertaining to the Soviet military operations. For this project, the establishment of an enormous network of agents was necessary. It is believed that the Bureau Gahlen has cost the United States approximately 30 to 40 million German Marks (Deutsche Marks) (Current exchange rate: 4.20 German Marks = \$1.00) annually. Should the German Peace Treaty materialize, the maintenance of such an intelligence apparatus, financed and conducted by the Americans on German soil, would be illegal in the face of German sovereignty. Presently, Gehlen is seeking a financial supporter who would replace the Americans. Further, he is attempting to convince high West German officials and Federal Diet members in Bonn of the necessity of incorporating his "service" into the West German government. Gehlen is also attempting to gain contacts in Upper Austria, and, to date, has limited his activities in Upper Austria to domestic political matters. It is believed that with sufficient financial backing, Gehlen would enlarge his activities in Austria.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

Sources: (C-3)
Sub-sources: (F-3)

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☒

Copy DATE 13 OCT 1954
6 copies

Page 1 of 1 page

DONALD M. NELSON, 430th OIC Det.,
Region "B"

Donald M Nelson

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR COORDINATION WITH Army

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file - Gehlen - 201

KUBARK/ZIPPER AREAS OF CONFLICT

9. Currently the following represent the areas of unresolved differences between KUBARK and ZIPPER:

a. UJ DUSK and related activities are producing intelligence which UTILITY is passing to UPTHROST and not passing to KUBARK.

b. UTILITY is no longer making any pretense of effecting coordination with us regarding his "Third Party" relationships both within and outside of Germany; he is carrying out routine clandestine exchanges of intelligence with other services and systematically developing liaison arrangements with other services.

Contracts
w/ foreign
intelligence

c. We have sought ZIPPER redacted with two or three paragraphs of

SECRET

German offices in Berlin that handle US intelligence material or are directly involved with US intelligence agencies.

d. ZIPPER is intentionally dragging its feet on a number of unresolved security cases such as UJ DREADFUL. Not only ZIPPER security but a considerable amount of US funds is involved in these cases.

e. UTILITY has, over a period of years, systematically taken into the "Headquarters intelligence costs" account of all cases and sinecures which have been a matter of sharp POB/ZIPPER difference of opinion. His subordinate staff can no longer be held responsible; only UTILITY is authorized to discuss these cases with [] []. Just how far UTILITY should be permitted to go in this manner has always been difficult to determine. Since his own personal ties (brother Giovanni, CHALLNER, AUNER, 20-odd "special connections") are involved, direct criticism by us produces a personal and subjective reaction by UTILITY. More serious, the extent of our knowledge of these cases is such that, confronted with the material, UTILITY would probably initiate an immediate crack down on the amount of information that flows into POB through routine administrative reports, travel vouchers, etc.

10. Our present thinking is that we will avoid any open friction with UTILITY over these issues until the political developments between now and 1 July are behind us. If legalization is possible under any circumstances during the summer, it would make no sense to quarrel with UTILITY at this time. On the other hand, we may not wish to continue to blink at all of these matters if KUBARK sponsorship for a prolonged period is indicated.

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GEHLEN 201

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : ☐ /ek
 UNIT : EE/FIG/Z
 EXT : 528
 DATE : 21 MAY 1954

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING			
1	FIG	4	
2	FIG	5	EE
3	CHRON	6	EE/ET

TO : SR REP ☐ FRANKFURT PULLACH

FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA

MAY 26 1954

CONF : EE 6

INFO : COP, A/DD/P/P, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, WE 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 01795 (OUT 96997)

2224Z 21 MAY 54

ROUTINE
 PRECEDENCE

TO ☐ ☐

INFO SFRAN SPULL

CITE DIR

REF DIR 44695 (OUT 82650)

1. FYI ONLY NO ACTION. OVER KUBARK OBJECTIONS WITH CONCURRENCE
 ADENAUER UTILITY VISITING ☐ ☐ PARIS 24 MAY. TRAVEL UNDER UNKNOWN ALIAS
 WITH NEW PASSPORT.

2. PURPOSE OF TRIP TO EXPLOIT ALL CHANNELS FOR GERMAN/FRENCH
 UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF EDC BY STRENGTHENING CONNECTIONS ☐ ☐.

END OF MESSAGE

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 DATE 2005

C. H. L. 201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION

PETER SICHEL
 EE/FI

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

B e r i c h t
über Gespräche des Leiters der Organisation mit
dem Chef des französischen Nachrichtendienstes
(SDECE), Generaldirektor Pierre B o u r s i c o t,
in Paris am 24. und 25.5.54.

1.) Zeitplan.

Montag, 24.5.

09.00 Uhr Ankunft Paris-Est.
Abholung durch Verb.-Offz. des SDECE.

09.30 - 12.30 Uhr Vorbesprechungen mit Verb.-Offz.
SDECE zwecks Festlegung der gegen-
seitigen Gesprächsthemen, Fragen,
Bitten und Wünsche.

Vorbereitung der bevorstehenden
Gespräche.

15.30 - 19.00 Uhr Erstes Gespräch im grösseren Kreis.

Teilnehmer:

Von französischer Seite:

Generaldirektor Boursicot.
Leiter des I-Dienstes.
Stellv. Leiter des I-Dienstes.
Abt.-Leiter SU und Satelliten.
Leiter des III-Dienstes.
Leiter der Auswertung.
Bearb. SU-u. Satelliten-Wehrmacht.
Leiter NVW.
Pers. Sekretär d. Gen.-Direktors.
Vertreter SDECE in Bern als
Verb.-Offz.

Leiter der Organisation.
Begleiter.

21.00 - 23.45 Uhr Abendessen beim Generaldirektor mit
anschliessendem Gespräch im kleinen
Kreis.

Teilnehmer:

Generaldirektor Boursicot.
Leiter der Organisation mit Begleiter.
Vertreter des SDECE in Bern.

Dienstag, 25.5.

10.30 - 12.30 Uhr 2. Gespräch im grösseren Kreis.
Teilnehmer wie am Vortage.

13.00 - 16.00 Uhr Mittagessen beim Generaldirektor.
Alle Teilnehmer am Gespräch.

21.50 Uhr Abfahrt Paris-Est.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

2.) Verlauf der Gespräche.

a) Erstes Gespräch - Thema: Weltlage.

Grundlage des Gespräches waren meine Ausführungen, welche in Stichworten in der Anlage wiedergegeben sind. Sie waren der Ausgangspunkt für eine eingehende Diskussion über verschiedene Fragen, wobei erwartungsgemäss die Lage in Südost-Asien und die Situation in Genf mit ihren Folgerungen Schwerpunkte bildeten.

Die Übereinstimmung der beiderseitigen Auffassungen, sowohl bezüglich der weiteren Entwicklung, der dem Westen drohenden Gefahren, der gemachten Fehler usw., als auch der dem Westen sich bietenden Chancen und der einzuschlagenden Wege, war bemerkenswert. Auch über die Forderungen der Stunde waren sich beide Gesprächspartner völlig einig. Mr. Boursicot wiederholte bei dieser Gelegenheit seinen Standpunkt, dass - ganz gleich, ob mit oder ohne EVG - das Zusammengehen der beiden Nationen Frankreich und Deutschland eine unumstössliche Notwendigkeit sei und dass für die Beziehungen der beiden Dienste zu einander weiterhin nur die alte Devise gelten könne: Eine enge Zusammenarbeit auf der bisher beschrittenen und bewährten Basis absoluter gegenseitiger Loyalität herzustellen.

Die Themen und die offene Gesprächsführung bei der Diskussion zeigten erneut, dass Mr. Boursicot und seine Mitarbeiter unseren Dienst als gleichberechtigten und im Rahmen der von den beiderseitigen Regierungen gesteckten Grenzen befreundeten Partner ohne Vorbehalte anerkennen.

b) Persönliches Gespräch am Abend.

Das Gespräch war zunächst allgemeiner Natur und berührte die verschiedenartigsten Probleme. Mr. Boursicot brachte zum Ausdruck, dass man zur Zeit keinerlei Voraussagen sowohl bezüglich der inneren Verhältnisse Frankreichs, wie auch der Entwicklung der aussenpolitischen Lage Frankreichs machen könne, dass er im ganzen aber doch hoffe, dass der EVG-Vertrag so wie beabsichtigt zustandekommen werde. Die Entwicklung werde stark beeinflusst durch die Ereignisse der in den nächsten Tagen stattfindenden Kongresse der MRP, sowie der französischen Sozialisten.

Im Laufe des Abends kam die Rede auch auf die Zukunft der Organisation. Mr. Boursicot gab dabei der Überzeugung Ausdruck, dass Deutschland noch in diesem Jahre - ob mit oder ohne EVG - seine Souveränität wiedererlangen werde und damit auch einen deutschen Nachrichtendienst, dessen Aufbau im übrigen ureigenste deutsche Angelegenheit sei. Ein vorsichtiges Sondieren ergab, dass auch schon vor Herstellung der Souveränität eine Überführung unseres Dienstes voraussichtlich keinem französischen Widerstand begegnen würde. Dabei ergab sich der Gesamteindruck, dass diese Frage - sobald es soweit ist - zunächst auf der deutsch-französischen Ebene vorbereitet werden muss, da ein Ansprechen der Franzosen von amerikanischer oder englischer Seite auf diese Frage hin zur Zeit nicht zweckmässig sein dürfte. Für mich ergab sich der Eindruck, dass die eleganteste Lösung wäre, nach entsprechender Vorbereitung auf deutsch-französischer Ebene die Franzosen zu veranlassen, dass sie ihrerseits die Initiative ergreifen und die amerikanischen und englischen Bundesgenossen ansprechen.

- c) Das zweite Gespräch im grösseren Kreis befasste sich mit den beiderseitigen ND-Erfahrungen im Einsatz gegen den Osten und im Einsatz des Ostens gegen die westlichen Nachrichtendienste.

Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Erfahrungen im wesentlichen gleicher Natur sind.

Für die Zukunft wurde vereinbart, Erkenntnisse über Personen, vor denen zu warnen ist, auszutauschen und bei ähnlichen Zusammentreffen auch die Erfahrungen auszutauschen. Gegenseitige Bekanntgabe von abgeschalteten-Mitarbeitern, soweit sie nicht aus ehrenhaften Gründen abgeschaltet werden.

3.) Zusammenfassung.

Die Atmosphäre einer freundschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen unserem Dienst und den Franzosen hat sich weiter verbessert, auch wenn diese Zusammenarbeit de facto technisch erst in den Anfängen steht. Die entstandene Beziehung kann eine tragfähige Unterlage für die unter Verbündeten in der Zukunft nötige Zusammenarbeit bilden.

Schneider

Aufzeichnung

über die vom Leiter der Org. vertretenen Gedanken zur welt-politischen Lage anlässlich seines Besuches in P.

I. Die derzeitigen Positionen in Genf

- 1) Der Ostblock ist zu einer gross angelegten Offensive gegen den Westen angetreten, die diesen in Schwäche und Unentschlossenheit antrifft. Sowjetischer Imperialismus und koloniale Emanzipation vereint verlangen Beteiligung an der Neuordnung Asiens oder zumindest Anerkennung des bisher erreichten status quo. Hierbei ist die SU vorwiegend an der Behandlung der weltumspannenden Probleme interessiert, während Rotchina versucht, den asiatischen Raum unter seinem Einfluss zu ordnen.

Vor der Genfer Konferenz war es noch nicht klar, welche Ziele die kommunistischen Partner im einzelnen verfolgen werden. Oberstes gemeinsames Ziel war die Verhinderung einer harten USA-Politik in Asien unter Ausnutzung der anti-kolonialen Haltung der asiatischen "Neutralen".

Für Genf ergaben sich etwa folgende Rollen:

Rotchina als Wahrer asiatischer Interessen.

SU als Freund der asiatischen Staaten im kolonialen Streit Asiens mit dem Westen.

Vietminh als aktiver Kämpfer gegen die westlichen Kolonialmächte.

- 2) Der Westen steht der sowjetischen Offensive unentschlossen gegenüber. Nachdem sich die USA aus Genf weitgehend zurückgezogen hatte, fiel England die führende Vertretung des Westens in Genf zu. Die Wahrung speziell britischer Interessen in Asien zwingt England jedoch eine Schlichtungsrolle auf, deren Erfolg noch nicht absehbar ist.

II. Die Zielsetzungen in Genf im einzelnen

Das Ringen um die westlichen und östlichen Einflussphären kann jedoch nur zutreffend beurteilt werden, wenn die Kräfte in Ost und West und die Möglichkeiten der Verwirklichung der Ziele einzeln untersucht werden.

- 1) Die weltpolitischen Ziele der SU sind die gleichen geblieben. Die Herbeiführung der Weltrevolution ist nach wie vor der selbst gestellte Auftrag der SU. Gewandelt haben sich nur die Methoden zur Erreichung dieser Ziele. Dies wurde nach Stalin's Tod notwendig, weil im Innern der SU die Kräfte überansprucht worden waren und sich nach aussen die Gefahr einer politischen Isolierung abzeichnete.

Als Folge davon wurden im Innern die Zügel etwas gelockert (Besserung des Lebensstandards) und nach aussen mehr Friedens- und Verständigungsbereitschaft gegenüber dem Westen gezeigt, ohne die erreichten Positionen zu gefährden. Die politische Taktik wurde wendiger und daher für den Westen gefährlicher.

Seit 1945 war die SU bemüht, ihr militärisches Übergewicht im europäisch-asiatischen Raum durch Ausbau ihrer Streitkräfte für eine kontinentale Kriegführung zu erhöhen. Diesem Ziel diente auch die Störung des Aufbaus militärischer Kräfte des Westens. Im asiatischen Raum brachte die sowjetische Politik folgende Ergebnisse:

Stärkung des Freiheitswillens und -kampfes der asiatischen Kolonialvölker, die politisch und militärisch von der SU unter Ausnutzung aller antiwestlichen Strömungen unterstützt wurden.

Störung der amerikanischen Bestrebungen einer wirtschaftlichen Hilfe, mit der der westliche Einfluss im asiatischen Raum erhalten werden sollte.

Zur Festigung der neu gewonnenen Gebiete in Asien bedarf es erheblicher Anstrengungen der SU besonders auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet: Hilfe im Ausbau der Industrien und Ausgleich auf dem Agrargebiet. In diesem Zusammenhang ist ein erweiterter Ost-Westhandel für den Ostblock besonders wichtig.

Die ständige Vertiefung der politischen Bindungen der Satelliten an die SU hat sich besonders nach Stalins Tod als notwendig erwiesen. Hierzu dient das Herausstellen der "Souveränität" der Satelliten und das Eintreten für selbständige kommunistische Staaten im asiatischen Raum. Es gehört zum Geschick der sowjetischen Politik, dass den verschiedenen Satelliten gegenüber verschiedene Methoden angewandt werden (Sonderbehandlung Rotchinas).

- 2) Der Westen zeigt gegenüber den grossen Zielen des Ostens keinen einheitlichen Plan, nicht einmal in der Methode des

Vorgehens. England, das gewillt ist, die "Tatsachen" anzuerkennen (Rotchina, status quo in Asien, Ost-Westhandel), erhofft die gleiche Haltung der SU hinsichtlich des Commonwealth. Es ist noch nicht bereit, sich einer Politik der Macht anzuschliessen, wie sie gegenwärtig noch durch die USA vertreten wird.

Frankreich hofft auf eine Ausweitung möglicher Differenzen zwischen Peking und Moskau über Ziele und Tempo der bolschewistischen Ausdehnung in Südostasien, nachdem es seine militärische Position in Indochina nahezu verloren hat. Nur die Aussicht auf ein militärisches Eingreifen der USA in Indochina könnte die Gegner dort eventuell zum Nachgeben zwingen.

Hinsichtlich der USA besteht die Gefahr, dass diese bei nicht erfolgreicher Fortsetzung der europäischen Politik ihr Interesse an Europa verlieren und entweder zu einer isolationistischen Politik oder zu einer Zustimmung zu einer Teilung der Welt in Interessensphären kommen. Da Europa die Hilfe der USA braucht, um sich gegen den Bolschewismus halten zu können, muss alles getan werden, um den europäischen Beitrag zur Verteidigung zu realisieren.

3) Eine besondere Rolle im Hintergrund der Genfer Konferenz spielt das Verhältnis der kommunistischen zu den nicht-kommunistischen neutralen asiatischen Staaten.

- a) Indien hat eine zunehmend steigende antiwestliche Haltung eingenommen und ist dem sowjetischen Einfluss auf wirtschaftlichem und kulturellem Gebiet stark ausgesetzt. Seine Haltung zum Kreml wird auch von der Hoffnung bestimmt, dass dieser der rotchinesischen Expansion in Asien Grenzen setzen könnte. Indien gibt sich dem offenen Trugschluss hin, dass es gegen die kommunistische Lehre immun sei. Tatsächlich wird es allmählich dem sowjetischen Einfluss und Druck erliegen, wenn es den Sowjets weiterhin gestattet, ihre geschulten und gut getarnten Agenten in seinem Lande arbeiten zu lassen.
- b) Rotchina steht vor einer schwer lösbaren Aufgabe, einerseits der Motor des asiatischen Freiheitskampfes zu bleiben und andererseits seine Stellung als Grossmacht zu konsolidieren. Hierfür benötigt es Ruhe und Zeit, um die umfangreichen Programme auf dem Agrarsektor, der Industrialisierung, des Ausbaues des Verkehrswesens usw.

durchführen zu können. Nur der Erfolg dieser Programme wird Rotchina eine gewisse Selbständigkeit gegenüber der SU ermöglichen. Es erscheint daher nicht gerechtfertigt, schon jetzt mit wirksamen Gegensätzen zwischen Peking und Moskau zu rechnen, die auf die Lage in Asien entscheidenden Einfluss haben könnten.

III. Östliche Stosskraft und westliche Sicherheit

- 1) Die politische Entwicklung der letzten Jahre zeigt deutlich, dass es keine regionale Sicherheit mehr gibt und dass regionale Interessen der bolschewistischen Stosskraft gegenüber nicht mehr verteidigt werden können. Das gilt für Europa wie für die kolonialen Räume.
- 2) Neben der militärischen Aufrüstung des Ostblocks gelang der SU die Bindung und die Zersplitterung starker westlicher Kräfte. Nach diesem Erfolg ihrer Politik versucht sie, der Welt einen sowjetischen Frieden im Molotow-Plan aufzuzwingen, um damit den westlichen Zusammenschluss (Nato, EVG) unwirksam zu machen. Dem gleichen Ziel dient die Spaltung Deutschlands durch Verleihung der sogenannten Souveränität an die DDR. Endziel für Deutschland ist die Abspaltung auch der DBR aus dem westlichen System.
- 3) Für den Westen kommt es darauf an, zu einer Politik des "Realismus" überzugehen und zu erkennen, dass der Ostblock nur mit Machtmitteln zum Einlenken veranlasst werden kann. Kompromisse mit dem Ostblock bieten keine Endlösung, sondern stellen nur einen Zeitgewinn des Ostens dar und vermindern dessen Risiko. Aber gerade die Erhöhung des sowjetischen Risikos ist die nächste vordringliche Aufgabe des Westens.

SECRET

EGL-A 9336

zip chrono

8 June 1954

Chief, EE

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational

Utility's Visit to Paris

1. Attached report of Utility's recent visit to Paris was passed to me with the request that it be handled with utmost care to ensure that no word of his having reported to us gets back to the French.

2. Certainly UTILITY passed on to UPTHRUST a similar, and perhaps more comprehensive, account of his discussions in Paris. Perhaps it was UTILITY's optimistic estimate of the favorable French reaction that could be expected in connection with early legalization of ZIPPER that caused UPTHRUST to initiate, within his own circles, a reappraisal of the possibilities of legalization of ZIPPER prior to the settlement of the treaties. In any case, it does appear that UTILITY is hopeful that, within the next few months, he will be able to put to a test M. BOURSIOT's frequent expressions of goodwill and willingness to support ZIPPER in the matter of legalization.

3. It is requested that this report be given limited distribution.

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COM - 3 w/1 attach

8 June 1954

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155/Kehren

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HABA-1425

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 4 August 1954

FROM : Acting Chief of Mission, []

SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational

SPECIFIC: Argentine Press Reports on German Intelligence

There are attached several clippings from Buenos Aires dailies of 3 August 1954 touching on the events in Germany following the disappearance of (Dr.) Otto JOHN and the intelligence activities of (General) Reinhold Gustav GEHLIN, probable successor to JOHN. It is believed that these articles may be of interest to Headquarters.

The AL dateline refers to Agencia Latina.

News agency in Argentina

4 August 1954

Enclosures:

2 - News clippings

Distribution:

3 - Hdqtrs w/enclosures

2 - Files

WGM/etc

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La Epoca 3 August 1954

Ordena Adenauer Una Vasta

Los Antecedentes de 70 Mil Funcionarios Investigaron

BONN, 3. (INS) — El canceller Konrad Adenauer ordenó personalmente una nueva investigación para descubrir posibles espías comunistas entre los 70.000 empleados del gobierno que con anterioridad fueron aprobados por la oficina del doctor Otto John.

John, jefe del Departamento de Seguridad de la República Federal, se plegó o fue atraído masosamente por los rojos del este de Alemania. Había sido el encargado de la seguridad de Alemania Occidental desde 1950.

La acción del canceller siguió al descubrimiento de que varios rojos del oeste alemán fueron advertidos con anticipación de que se proyectaban practicar registros en sus domicilios y oficinas por investigadores del departamento de John, que equivale en líneas generales al FBI norteamericano.

Al efectuarse los allanamientos, varios encargados de recibir correspondencia comunista con propaganda sobre la línea del partido, resultaron que no tenían en su poder material alguno de esa clase. Se está examinando la posibilidad de que John pueda haber ayudado a la infiltración de agentes soviéticos en el gobierno de Bonn.

La orden para la nueva comprobación de seguridad siguió a una conferencia que duró todo el día de ayer en Baden-Baden contra los líderes del partido cristiano demócrata de Adenauer y los miembros del gabinete. Hubo una división de criterios sobre la cuestión de John, mostrándose la mayoría disgustada respecto al informe rendido por el ministro del Interior, Gerhard Schroeder. Este dijo que John no conocía secreto alguno que debería revelado pudiera poner en peligro a la República Federal. También declaró que era imposible determinar si John se pasó al Berlín Oriental con un intento de traición, o si fue atraído por los rojos.

Reemplazante de John BONN, 3. (AL) — En circulos autorizados se reveló que el general Reinhold Gustav Gehlen sería designado reemplazante del Dr. Otto John al frente de los servicios de seguridad para Alemania Occidental.

En la actualidad el general Gehlen es empleado por Estados Unidos para la represión del espionaje comunista en la zona occidental.

El general Gehlen fue jefe de los servicios de "Inteligencia" en el frente oriental desde 1942 a 1945, pero fue hecho prisionero por tropas norteamericanas. Pocos meses después de su captura fue puesto al frente de un reducido grupo de oficiales alemanes del mismo servicio para analizar y clasificar informes secretos reunidos por Reich sobre la situación soviética. Al comenzar la "guerra fría" el Gral. Gehlen recibió una misión mucho más importante, pues debió hacerse cargo de una organización cuya misión específica era lograr informes sobre las actividades soviéticas. Como consecuencia de ello el personal a sus órdenes aumentó rá-

pidamente y la prensa alemana dice que Gehlen recibe seis millones de dólares anuales del gobierno norteamericano. La sede central de su organización se encuentra en Pullach, cerca de Munich, y siempre está bajo fuerte guardia.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Dr. ADENAUER F AMT FÜR VERFA

Ex-General Gehlen als neuer Leiter genannt.

Bonn, 2. August (AP) — Es scheint fast sicher zu sein, dass ein ehemaliger General der Wehrmacht der zur Zeit für die Vereinigten Staaten die Sowjet-Spionage bekämpft, nach dem Verschwinden des Dr. John an die Spitze der westdeutschen Spionageabwehr treten wird. Seit der Leiter des Verfassungsschutzamtes am 20. Juli nach Ostberlin verschwand, hat Bundeskanzler Adenauer immer dringender die Zuziehung und Mitarbeit des ehemaligen Generalleutnants Reinhold Gustav Gehlen gefordert.

Dr. Adenauer bereitet eine drastische Reorganisation der von John geleiteten Organisation vor, und es ist möglich, dass diese durch ein neues Amt ersetzt werden wird. Dreimal nach Johns Verschwinden wurden gegen den Westen gerichtete Erklärungen dieses Mannes nach Schallplattenaufnahmen über die Sender der Sowjetzone verbreitet. Die westlichen Zeitungen warfen die Frage auf, ob John Moskau wichtige westdeutsche und alliierte Geheimnisse verraten hat. Allerdings halten sich einige Besatzte in Bonn weiter an die These, dass John verschleppt wurde und nicht freiwillig flüchtete.

Leiter des Abwehrrdienstes der Wehrmacht in Russland

Aus zuständigen Kreisen wird Ex-General Gehlen, der bisher politisch wenig hervorgetreten ist, als der Mann bezeichnet, den der Regierungschef für die Leitung des westdeutschen Geheimdienstes ausgewählt hat, sowie die Bundesrepublik ihre Souveränität erhält und ihre Aufrüstung im Zusammenhang mit der gemeinsamen Europa-Verteidigung beginnt. Gehlen war von 1942 bis 1945 Leiter des Abwehrrdienstes der Wehrmacht an der russischen Front, wurde aber von den Nordamerikanern gefangen genommen. Diese stellten ihn an die Spitze eines kleinen Kreises ehemaliger Offiziere des Geheimdienstes, die wie er gefangen genommen worden waren, und beauftragten ihn damit, die Informationen auszuwerten, die die Naziregierung über Russland gesammelt hatte.

Als der "kalte Krieg" einsetzte, wurde Gehlen mit mehr als einer wichtigen Aufgabe betraut, die sich auf die Feststellung neuer geheimhaltener Einzelheiten über die Sowjetunion bezog. Diese Aufgaben brachte eine wesentliche Erweiterung seiner Organisation mit sich, die, wie es heisst, jetzt über 4000 Angestellte verfügt. General Gehlen hat den Sitz dieser Organisation nach Jillich bei München verlegt. Die deutschen Zeitungen meldeten, dass die Organisation Gehlen rund sechs Millionen Dollar jährlich von den Vereinigten Staaten bezieht.

Dr. J o h n

Von allen bisherigen Pressemeldungen ist absolut richtig, dass John die Nazis hasste. Infolge zahlreicher Liebschaften hatte er oft seine Arbeit etwas vernachlässigt. Er ist ein enger Freund des Ochsensepp.

- Dr. Josef Müller, langjähriger CSU Vorsitzender in Bayern und Justizminister. - Anzeichen einer Entführung sind bis zur Stunde nicht feststellbar.

Einer der früheren Kominternsekretäre glaubt Beweise für eine Zugehörigkeit des Dr. John zur "Roten Kapelle" zu haben. Stimmt dies, dann ist offensichtlich, dass J. V-Mann der Sowjets war.

Unwahr ist, dass am 20. Juli J. sehr deprimiert war, an diesem Tage sah ich ihn noch bei der Veranstaltung in Plötzensee und in der Bendlerstrasse.

// Dass Dr. Wohlgemut Kommunist war, war seit Jahren bekannt.

Innenminister Dr. Schröder wird sehr wahrscheinlich am kommenden Dienstag eine Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu dem ganzen Komplex John bringen.

Da John schon mehrfach seine Auffassungen geändert hat, ist, falls er nicht freiwillig ging, doch mit seinem Umfallen und Verrat zu rechnen.

(Josef Müller steht im Verdacht eine Doppelrolle in der deutschen Politik zu spielen. Siehe auch den Fall Dr. Philipp A u e r b a c h).

Als Leitender Mann der Lufthansa hatte John damals einen grossen Anteil am Aufbau der sowjetischen Luftfahrt, er hatte einen der besten Fachleute nach der SU entsandt.

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6 Aug 54

Der Fall Dr. J o h n.

An einem warmen Abend, in der zweiten Hälfte des Monats Mai, wurde in Köln in einer kleineren Gesellschaft Dr. John, der Präsident des Bundesverfassungs-Schutzamtes gefragt, welche Auswirkung die Flucht der zahlreichen Überläufer des sowjetischen Nachrichtendienstes für die SU haben könnte. Dr. John, ein grosser stattlicher Herr, blond, mit blauen Augen, frischer Gesichtsfarbe und immer sehr elegant gekleidet, goss sich hastig ein neues Glas Whisky ein und antwortete: "Ein sehr schwerer Schlag, der nicht ohne Folgen für die Politik, vor allem für die Aussenpolitik, bleiben kann. Auch dann nicht, wenn die Folgen nicht öffentlich in Erscheinung treten". "Und was wäre gewesen, wenn Beria ins Ausland geflüchtet wäre?" fragte einer der Gesprächsteilnehmer. "Ja dann - Dr. John machte eine Pause, trank in einem Zuge sein Glas leer - dann wären die Folgen nicht zu übersehen - es wäre ein verlorener Krieg, - aber bisher ist sowas nicht dagewesen, dass der Chef eines Nachrichtendienstes zu seinen Gegnern übergelaufen ist". Das sagte Dr. John unmittelbar vor seiner Amerikareise, 2 Monate vor seinem Verschwinden in den Sowjetsektor von Berlin. Damit hat Dr. John selbst die Folgen seines Verschwindens bei seinen Gegnern beurteilt. Natürlich kann Dr. John mit einem Beria nicht verglichen werden. Beria war nicht nur Chef der NKWD, sondern gehörte zu den führenden Männern der Sowjetunion. Dennoch, die Folgen des Verschwindens von Dr. John sind schlimmer, als der Mann auf der Strasse sich vorstellen kann. xkx

Als im Jahre 1950 das neugegründete Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz einen Präsidenten erhalten sollte, waren 3 Kandidaten für diesen Posten auserwählt. Dr. John hatte ursprünglich die geringsten Chancen Leiter der neuen deutschen politischen Polizei zu werden. Es waren die britischen Hinweise, dass Dr. John der Mann sei, der durchaus fähig wäre den Posten eines Präsidenten beim Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz zu übernehmen. John sei vielfach überprüft worden und seine Zuverlässigkeit ausser Zweifel. Er sei ein Mann des Westens und Musterdemokrat. Diese Beurteilung war in der Hohen Kommission, die bestimmte wer diese Stellung einnehmen sollte, entscheidend, die deutsche Ernennung war nur eine Formalität. Die Westmächte waren zufrieden denn die Person Dr. John garantierte nicht nur eine gute Zusammenarbeit mit der neuen deutschen politischen Polizei, sondern auch, dass vieles, was ihnen bisher in der deutschen Innenpolitik verborgen war, würde nun den westlichen Mächten bekannt werden, wenigstens den Alliierten, deren Mann er war.

Dieses ist nur ein Teil des Problems. Dr. John wusste nicht nur vieles über die Tätigkeit der westdeutschen Abwehr und Nachrichten-Dienste, er wusste auch viel über die Politik und die Absichten des britischen Nachrichtendienstes.

Er war der Hauptverbindungsman zu dem englischen Geheimdienst und nahm als einziger Deutscher an zahlreichen Geheimbesprechungen mit den Engländern teil.

Dr. John war aber auch mehrfach von den Amerikanern eingeladen worden, die Vereinigten Staaten zu besuchen, um dort die Tätigkeit des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes kennen zu lernen, um die Fragen der Bekämpfung der kommunistischen Spionage in Europa zu koordinieren und um die Schulung des Nachwuchses durch die Erfahrungen des amerikanischen und des deutschen Geheimdienstes zu besprechen. Im Frühling 1954 traf sich Dr. John mit seinen amerikanischen Kollegen, wie er nach seiner Rückkehr erzählte, unglaublich viel gesehen haben. Er sei nicht, wie ein gern gesehener Gast, sondern wie ein alter Freund und Bundesgenosse behandelt worden. Selbstverständlich hat er an wichtigen Besprechungen in der USA teilgenommen und wohl auch mehr erfahren als die zahlreich nach der USA reisenden Bundestagsabgeordneten. Es erübrigt sich, darauf ~~hinzudeuten~~ hinzuweisen, dass Dr. John auch mit dem Geheimdienst der USA in der Bundesrepublik aufs engste zusammengearbeitet hat.

Er kannte die Schwächen und auch die starken Seiten der Amerikaner in Westeuropa und war in viele ihrer Pläne eingeweiht. - Wenn auch der Kontakt mit den Franzosen nicht ~~sehr~~ eng war, wie mit den Engländern und den Amerikanern, so hatte er auch in den Nachrichtendienst der Franzosen genügend Einblick, um dessen Tätigkeit und Methoden in der Bundesrepublik beurteilen zu können, er kannte vor allem auch deren Aufbau.

Falls Dr. John seine Kenntnisse über den Aufbau, die Zukunftspläne und die Zusammenarbeit der Geheimdienste der westlichen Welt dem Osten bekannt gibt, so hat Moskau eine grosse Schlacht gewonnen. Für die Bundesrepublik ist das Verschwinden Dr. Johns nach Ostberlin ein ausserordentlich harter Schlag.

Die mit grosser Sorgfalt gehüteten Geheimnisse über die V-Leute des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz in dem Parteivorstand der KPD und anderen wichtigen kommunistischen Organisationen, die Aufdeckung aller Karten der Bundesrepublik im Kampf gegen den Kommunismus, die Bekanntgabe all derjenigen Stellen, die in der Bundesrepublik sich mit dem Sammeln von Nachrichten aus der Sowjetzone sich beschäftigen und ihre Hauptkanäle und Quellen - das bedeutet, die mühevollen Arbeit der letzten 4 Jahre ist vergeblich gewesen. Darüber hinaus wusste Dr. John genauestens, welche Russen für die Westdeutschen arbeiteten, sowie welche Personen, führende SED-Funktionäre, gegen die Diktatur eingestellt waren und nach der Bundesrepublik Nachrichten weitergaben.

Dies in grossen das, was der Osten bereits erfahren hat, oder erfahren wird.

~~In der Bundesrepublik herrscht ein grosses Durcheinander in der Arbeit der geheimen Nachrichtendienste. Ein grosser Teil der bisherigen V-Leute ist abgesetzt, verschiedene "verdächtige" Mitarbeiter werden überprüft. Die Geheimcode, besonders die mit Westberlin, geändert, die Zusammenarbeit der Westmächte auf dem Gebiet des geheimen Nachrichtenwesens stockt. In der Sowjetzone herrscht bei all denjenigen Personen, die mit dem Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz arbeiteten und nicht verhaftet sind, panische Angst. Es wird sehr schwer werden, künftig jemanden in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone zu finden, der der Bundesrepublik Nachrichten über die ostdeutsche Regierung, SED oder KVP zu liefern. Man wird es nicht tun, auch wenn man aus Feindschaft zur Diktatur heraus es wollte. Auch unter den Kommunisten der Bundesrepublik wird man in Zukunft sehr schwer Mitarbeiter finden können die, wenn auch vom Kommunismus enttäuscht, bereit sein werden, den westdeutschen Sicherheitsbehörden über Absichten und Tätigkeit der KPD zu berichten. Das Bundesamt wird in der nächsten Zeit Gegenstand zahlreicher Untersuchungen über die Tätigkeit des Amtes - für Dienstag ist der betr. Ausschuss des Bundestages bereits eingeladen - und zahlreicher Debatten sein. Schlimmer wird sich auswirken, dass ~~dass~~ alle diejenigen, die Gegner des Nazismus waren, nun verdächtig sind, nicht die genügende Abneigung gegen den Osten zu haben. Dr. John hat mit seinem Verschwinden nicht nur den Kommunisten, sondern auch den Nazis einen grossen Dienst erwiesen. Gross ist die Gefahr, dass in Zukunft die überzeugten Demokraten aus wichtigen Stellungen gedrängt und durch Nazis ersetzt werden, immer mit der Begründung: "Aus Sicherheitsgründen". Darüber wird in den aktiven Nazikreisen zur Zeit am meisten diskutiert. In diesen Kreisen rechnet man jetzt auch auf die Unterstützung der enttäuschten Engländer und Amerikaner.~~

15. 2. 54

Zum Fall J o h n

Tatsache ist, dass John seinen Weggang vorbereitet hat. Also in der vollen Absicht des Verrats. Wahrscheinlich aber hat er schon seit dem zweiten Weltkriege im Dienste der Sowjets gestanden. Darauf lässt vor allem schliessen, dass er eine enge Bekanntschaft mit Herrn von und zu Puttlitz hatte. Puttlitz war auf Verlangen der Engländer vom 18.7.46 bis 1.7.47 Oberregierungsrat der Landesregierung in Schleswig-Holstein. Puttlitz, seit 1924 im diplomatischen Dienst, arbeitete seit einer Reihe von Jahren für die Sowjets, wurde während seiner Tätigkeit in der deutschen Botschaft in London, 1934 unter Ribbentrop, in einem Londoner Klub Homosexueller aufgegriffen, von dem englischen Geheimdienst erpresst. Damals war Puttlitz mit John befreundet.

Puttlitz verschwand im Spätsommer 1947 spurlos aus Kiel und ging zu den Sowjets. Seitdem hat er eine beträchtliche Zahl Intellektueller aus dem bürgerlichen Lager für die Sowjets gewonnen. Westdeutschen Behörden war bekannt, dass Puttlitz zuletzt im März 1954 John in Köln besucht hat. Puttlitz, der zwei grosse Güter in Mecklenburg besitzt, ist heute noch zu einem erheblichen Teil deren Eigentümer, obwohl sonst gerade in Mecklenburg die Enteignung sehr hart durchgeführt wurde.

Tatsache ist weiterhin, dass John während seines letzten Besuches in der USA sich fast ausschliesslich mit den Amerikanern über Fragen der Verteidigung - er besuchte alle interessanten amerikanischen Verteidigungsanlagen - man zeigte ihm auch neue Waffen und berichtete über deren Effektivität - der Abwehr und Spionage sprach.

Zumindestens seit dem Spätsommer 1944 stand John im Verdacht für die Sowjets tätig zu sein. Die grösste Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht dafür, dass der ganze englische kommunistenfreundliche Kreis in Wirklichkeit, bewusst oder unbewusst, für die Sowjetregierung tätig ist. John hatte, ausser mit dem bekannten Arzt Dr. Wohlgemut mit einer grösseren Zahl SED Mitglieder Kontakt.

Der Skandal besteht darin, dass zahlreiche Persönlichkeiten der Bonner öffentlichen und behördlichen Stellen über vieles Bescheid wussten ohne etwas zu unternehmen. Die Korruption der englischen und amerikanischen Besatzungsbehörden, über die ich in früheren Jahren oft berichtete, ermöglichte fast nur Leuten dieses Schlages die Arbeit.

Der Apparat Gehlen bereitet sich nun darauf vor, möglichst noch im August das Erbe des Amtes für Verfassungsschutz zu übernehmen. Im Apparat Gehlen, wie auch im "BUNAG" und im "KYNA" werden gegenwärtig Umstellungen vorgenommen, im Zusammenhang mit dem Fall John, vorgenommen. Die vom Minister Schröder abgegebene Erklärung auf der Bundespressekonferenz vom 26.7. ist eine Albernheit und es wäre Zeitverschwendung sich näher mit ihm zu befassen.

John stand weiterhin in Verbindung zu dem Polizeipräsidenten nach 1945 in Schwerin, Hans Kahlke, während des spanischen Bürgerkrieges war dieser Brigadechef.

Aus der USA sind mehrere Experten, unabhängig voneinander, in der Bundesrepublik eingetroffen. Einer der ersten war Harry S. G. d. e. r m a n n, der vor allem in Hamburg Ermittlungen anstellte.

Die Landesämter für Verfassungsschutz, die in den Strudel der Ermittlungen einbezogen sind, dürften, da die Länder sich wehren, diese aufzulösen, bestehen bleiben. Diese Ämter können höchstens in Niedersachsen und Hessen als echte Schutzämter angesehen werden. Keinesfalls sind sie es in Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg. In Schleswig-Holstein ist vom Chef angefangen, zumindestens in der Zentrale, alles morsch, in Hamburg hatte z.B. bis vor wenigen Wochen die Ehefrau des Leiters der Beschaffungstelle, des Herrn von Beust, alle wichtigen Akten in ihrer Verwahrung. 80% der zur Verfügung stehenden Gelder werden ohne Quittungsbeleg ausgegeben, zumeist für Alkohol.

Eine ernste Abwehr - es gibt in der Bundesrepublik nahezu 40, in Westberlin zwischen 40 und 50 Geheimdienste - die vollkommen zuverlässig ist, gibt es in der Bundesrepublik nicht.

Unwidersprochenen Meldungen aus Bonn zufolge ist seit etwa 10 Juli ein leitender Beamter des Bundesverfassungsschutzamtes bereits nach Ostberlin gegangen. (Eine Bestätigung ist nirgends zu erlangen).

Noch ist nicht bewiesen, dass die zahlreichen Verhaftungen in Ostberlin und in der Zone im unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem Fall John stehen. Tatsache aber ist, dass die Absperrung Berlins von der Zone mit einer effektiven Kontrolle damit im Zusammenhang steht.

Ein grosser Teil der um John von der Presse gemeldeten Skandale dürfte stimmen. Tatsache ist aber auf jeden Fall seine Trunksucht und ein geradezu phantastisches Gedächtnis.

29.7.1954.

Der gegenwärtige kommissarische Leiter des Bundesverfassungsschutzamtes Dr. J e s s e ist 66 Jahre alt und steht vor seiner Pensionierung. In Bonn bemüht sich Kardinal F r i n g s, sein, jetzt seine Schützlinge in die Schlüsselpositionen zu bringen. Darunter wird heute deren politische Signung bei weitem nicht deren katholische Prave erreicht.

Alles deutet darauf, dass auch die ehem. Nazis, soweit sie noch nicht in Schlüsselpositionen sind, eine grosse Chance haben.

F a l l J o h n .

(Ergänzungen zu Presseberichten)

Karlshorst teilt der SED-Führung mit, dass man evtl. Auslieferungsersuchen der Westmächte ablehnen werde. Es seien bereits Vorkehrungen für Verhör Johns im Kreml getroffen.

Sowjetzonen-Prominez ausserte: Durch John sei nicht nur die westliche Abwehrtatigkeit aus dem Rahmen geworfen, sondern man hoffe auch wesentliche politische Argumente zu bekommen. John könnte z.B. klar sagen, ob die Amerikaner im Raum Kaiserlautern ausschliesslich Verteidigungsanlagen bauten oder nicht. Zweifel bei den Spitzen Ostberlins, dass John aus rein politischen Motiven gekommen sei.

Dr. Gerecke, früher Niedersachsen-Minister, in die Sowjetzone geflohen, äusserte sonderbarerweise im November 1951 zum hessischen Landesvorsitzenden der "Deutschen Sozialen Partei":

....Ich habe neulich eine fünfstündige Unterredung mit Dr. John gehabt. Er hat mir versichert, dass er mich für völlig okay halt...."

Mitarbeiter Dr. Gereckes wurden angewiesen: "Falls einmal etwas passieren sollte", dann nur auf eine Vernehmung "durch Dr. John persönlich" zu bestehen. - Nach der Flucht Dr. Gereckes wurde in seinem Frankfurter Hauptquartier erneut die Parole ausgegeben: "Nur von Dr. John persönlich vernahmen lassen!"

In Industriekreisen war es Mitte 1953 aufgefallen, dass ein ehemaliger führender Funktionär einer kommunistischen Tarnorganisation bei Bewerbungen als Referenz ausgerechnet Dr. John angab. - Der Mann kannte Dr. John noch aus der Widerstandszeit. Industrielle sprachen damals darüber dass John offenbar Personenblind vertraue, wenn sie ihm nur als Anti-Nazi bekannt seien. Man hielt damals noch den Gedanken für absurd, dass ~~xxxxxxx~~ evtl. auch andere Zusammenhänge möglich sein könnten.

Sowjetzonaher Informationschef Eisler fragte im Februar 1952 bei einem Gespräch: ".... Was halten Sie von Dr. John? Ist er ein konsequenter Mann in seiner Tätigkeit?" - Die Fragestellung erschien schon damals sonderbar, aber es war kein Zusammenhang zu konstruieren.

In Bonn hört man:

- a) General Gehlen, angeblich Johns scharfster Gegner (Chef des amerikanischen Abwehrdienstes in Deutschland) habe in der vergangenen Woche "eine dicke Akte John" dem Bundeskanzleramt zugestellt. Darin sei John schwer belastet. John hätte davon erfahren, und es sei ihm klar geworden, dass er am Ende sei. Dazu Aussendung aus gut unterrichteten Kreisen: "... Wenn John politisch sauber gewesen wäre, hätte er es eine Untersuchung und Auseinandersetzung ankommen lassen können..."

Vor Monaten sind im Osten Angehörige der Organisation Gehlen verhaftet worden. An deren Familien würden jetzt in etwa 80 Fällen Pensionen gezahlt. Dasselbe werde sich nun verstärkt wiederholen. Selbst der Beruf des politischen Agenten sei ~~xxxx~~ also mit Pensionsversicherung verknüpft und der so, antik entkleidet.

Aus britischen Ermittlungen (Special Branch) ergibt sich folgende Version, die im Gegensatz zur amtlichen deutschen Version steht: Fall J o h n müsse in grösserem Zusammenhang gesehen werden. Dabei sei John nur "eine Puppe im grossen Spiel des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes". Schlüsselfigur zum Fall John sei von Puttlitz, sowjetischer Agent. - Hintergrund: Erste Kontakte erfolgten in England 1944 zwischen von Puttlitz, / Hans Kahle, Oberst im h. an. Bürgerkrieg / Mr. Robson / Olivia Woodley / Ms. Quinell und John. Damals soll John die Namen seiner Kameraden vom 20. Juli preisgegeben haben. Durch diesen "Kameraden-Verrat" sei er von Puttlitz abhängig geworden.

(Fall John)

- 1 -

Puttlitz habe John in der Folge erpresst und zu seinem Werkzeug gemacht. So habe John u.a. 1953 den sowjetisch-holländischen Agenten Ehland, (der im ~~Fall~~ "Fall Hein" - Amt Blank eine Rolle spielt) mit Geld versorgen und ihm zur Flucht verhelfen müssen. Heinz habe in einem Brief vom 26.10.53 an John diese Behauptung festgelegt und weiter behauptet, John hätte Ehland gebeten, ihn (John) zu schonen". Dieser Brief des Heinz an John sei unter dem gleichen Datum verschiedenen hohen Persönlichkeiten der Republik zugeleitet worden. Sie hätten somit Kenntnis von dem Verdacht gegen John gehabt. - Britische Abwehr sei überzeugt, dass John "mindestens seit 1951" Kontakt unterhalten habe und (über Puttlitz) "in voller Kenntnis" in Abhängigkeit vom sowjetischen Nachrichtendienst geraten sei. Britische Vermutung: John habe durch tätige Mithilfe britische Diplomaten Mc Clean und Burgess in einem Agentenweg bei Thüringen ermöglicht - Brit. "MI5" (Secret Service) habe festgestellt, das mehrfach Treffen Puttlitz-John im Hause des "Edelkommunisten" Dr. Wohlgemut stattgefunden hätten. John hätte Verbindungen zu dem SED-Zentral-Komitee-Mitglied K.W. Meissner gesucht, um "Frontwechsel" vorzunehmen. - Weitere Klärung erhoffe man von einem Arrangement eines "Agenten-Treff".

Dessiers über führende Persönlichkeiten der Bundesrepublik, die durch John im BuVerfassungsschutzamt persönlich abgelegt und geführt worden seien, sollen im Original verschwunden sein. Gefahr künftiger Erpressungsversuche an diesen Personen von sowjetischer Seite.

Fahndung und Ermittlung werden auf deutscher Seite geführt vom Oberbundesanwalt (Dr.) Wichmann persönlich. Von Karlsruhe in das BuJustiz-Minist. abgestellt: Staatsanwalt Löbsdau. Ihm zugewiesen von der Sicherungsgruppe: Kriminalrat Vogel.

Die Akten "Rote Kapelle" sollen angefordert worden sein, weil dieser alte Komplex ~~hier~~ hier herein spiele.

(vom 29.7.54).

L, den 31.7.1954

6. Aug. 54

Miscellaneous Finance Data

8 Aug 54

Received from WENDT on 17 May 1954

88 Salary is DM 1845

66 Salary DM 1324

DM 500 to an unidentified Rote Kapelle Source

DM 500 for 88's representation

DM 25,000 88 received directly from Baxter (not the house loan) has been repaid.

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DATE 2005

240 GELLEN, R.

SECRET

EGNA 4/830

ECNA 4830

AUG 24 1954

Chief, PCB

Chief of Base, Bonn

CALL/Operational

ZIPPER

INFO: Chief, EE
Chief, OCH

1. Wellington Long, Bonn Newsweek correspondent told the undersigned that the Associated Press last week paid DM 3000 for a set of 12 pictures of UTILITY. Last Friday the United Press also purchased two pictures of UTILITY for DM 150 each. These UP pictures were allegedly taken within the last fifteen months. The source selling the first set of 12 pictures is said to be a former colleague of UTILITY who served with him on the Eastern front.

2. This is being passed on to you for whatever interest it may have.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

Distribution:

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24 August 1954

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General notes from:

DER SPIEGEL article/photo, 25 Aug 54; 240 GEHLEN, Reinhard

Sommer 1942-März 1945: Reinhard GEHLEN, Chef, Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost

Gruppe I: Frontlage der Sowjet-Union (der Heeresgruppen-Gliederung entsprechend, in die Referate Lage Nord, Mitte, Süd und A unterteilt). Sachbearbeiter der Einzellagen (Lage-Referent) war normalerweise ein Generalstabsoffizier (Major oder Oberstleutnant).

Leiter: WESSEL, Major i.G.
EISELE, Oberleutnant
FUERSTER, Oberleutnant
GRUENER, Hauptmann
HOEFER, Major (deceased)
SCHILLER, Hauptmann
SCHUELE, Oberleutnant

Gruppe II: Allgemeine Lage in der Sowjet-Union (Menschen-Reserven, Wirtschaftspotential, geographische Spezialstudien)

Leiter: HOEISEL (Klaus), Major
HALLER, Sonderführer (Z)
GOELLNITZ, Oberleutnant
NAUCK, Dr., Major
REME, Oberleutnant
RITTBERG (Graf), Hauptmann
RITTER, Oberleutnant

Gruppe III: Lage Südost (Balkan) und wechselte später aus der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost in die Abteilung Fremde Heere West über.


Leiter: ?
BUCHHOLZ, Oberleutnant

Gruppe IV (Lage Skandinavien)
" V (Dolmetscherguppe)

Others: KÖRNCHEN, Hauptmann
LETSCHERT, Oberleutnant
von der MARWITZ, Hauptmann
OGILVIE, Oberstleutnant
von VARNEWYK, Leutnant
WIESEMANN, Zahlmeister

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Note: these names have been carded: PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE PHOTOS FROM FILE.



„EIN MANN OHNE GESICHT“

„hatte die Züricher „Weltwoche“ kürzlich resigniert und ihren Lesern vermeldet, Geheimdienst-General Reinhard Gehlen lasse sich nicht photographieren: „... nicht einmal der größten deutschen Bildagentur gelang es, ein Bild des „Geheimen“ zu bekommen.“ Jetzt liegt jedoch eine Gruppenaufnahme vor, die im Frühjahr 1943 von der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost im Generalstab des Heeres im OKH-Stabsquartier Mauerwald bei Angerburg (Ostpreußen) gemacht wurde. Reinhard Gehlen war vom Sommer 1942 bis zum März 1945 Chef dieser Abteilung, die nach Kriegsende den Stamm des Nachrichtenapparates bildete, der heute von den Amerikanern finanziert und wiederum von Gehlen geleitet wird. — In Gehlens Generalstabs-Abteilung war die Arbeit in drei Gruppen aufgeteilt. Gruppe I: Frontlage der Sowjet-Union (der Heeresgruppen-Gliederung entsprechend, in die Referate Lage Nord, Mitte, Süd und A unterteilt). Sachbearbeiter der Einzellagen (Lage-Referat) war normalerweise ein Generalstabsoffizier (Major oder Oberstleutnant). Gruppe II befaßte sich mit der allgemeinen Lage in der Sowjet-Union (Menschen-Reserven, Wirtschaftspotential, geographische Spezialstudien). Gruppe III schließlich bearbeitete die Lage Südost (Balkan) und wechselte später aus der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost in die Abteilung Fremde Heere West über. Unter Gehlen entstanden noch neu die Gruppen IV (Lage Skandinavien) und V (Dolmetscherguppe). — Sitzend von links nach rechts: Major (später Oberstleutnant) Dr. Nauck, Wirtschaftssachbearbeiter Gruppe II, unbekannt; unbekannt; Oberst i. G. (später Generalleutnant) Gehlen, Abteilungschef, Oberleutnant Ogilvie, Sachbearbeiter

ter Lage Skandinavien; Major i. G. (später Oberstleutnant i. G.) Hoheisel, Leiter Gruppe II; Major i. G. (gefallen) Höter, Sachbearbeiter Lage Mitte, Gruppe I. Zweite Reihe (l. n. r.): Hauptmann (später Major) von der Marwitz, Kommandant des Stabsquartiers; Name unbekannt, Leiter Gruppe III; Major i. G. (später Oberstleutnant i. G.) Wessel, Leiter Gruppe I; Hauptmann (später Major) Graf Rittberg, Sachbearbeiter Personallage, Gruppe II; Hauptmann (später Major i. G.) Grüner, Sachbearbeiter Lage A, Gruppe I; Oberleutnant Letschert, Kartei-Referat; Name bekannt (heute Ostrone), Leiter der Registratur; Oberleutnant Eisele, Mitarbeiter Gruppe I; Name bekannt (heute Ostrone), Kartograph. Dritte Reihe (l. n. r.): Leutnant (später Oberleutnant) von Varnewyk, Gehilfe des Kommandanten Stabsquartiers; Oberleutnant (später Hauptmann) Remé, Mitarbeiter Gruppe II; Zahlmeister (später Oberzahlmeister) Wiesemann, Mitarbeiter Kartei-Referat; Hauptmann (später Major) Körnchen, Verwaltungsaufgaben; unbekannt; Hauptmann Schiller, Mitarbeiter Gruppe I; Oberleutnant (später Hauptmann) Ritter, Mitarbeiter Gruppe II; Oberleutnant Schüle, Mitarbeiter Gruppe I; Name unbekannt, Leiter des Photolabors. Letzte Reihe (l. n. r.): Oberleutnant (später Hauptmann) Buchholz, Mitarbeiter Gruppe III; Oberleutnant von Hagens, Mitarbeiter Gruppe I; Oberleutnant Forster, Mitarbeiter Gruppe I; unbekannt; Sonderführer (Z) Haller, Mitarbeiter Gruppe II; Name unbekannt, Sachbearbeiter Lage Nord, Gruppe I; Oberleutnant (später Hauptmann) Gollnitz, Mitarbeiter Gruppe II, unbekannt; unbekannt.



Der geheime Herr Gehlen

Nie sah man ein Bild von ihm, wenige kannten ihn, aber in den letzten Wochen war viel von ihm die Rede. Mehr noch von seinem Amt, das seinen Namen trägt und das von Geheimnissen umwittert ist. Im Zusammenhang mit der Affäre John wurde General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen schlagartig populär. Man erfuhr, daß er vor Otto John gewarnt hatte und man hörte einiges über den Nachrichtenapparat, den er im amerikanischen Auftrag aufgezogen hat. Fachleute behaupten, daß im „Amt Gehlen“ die wichtigsten Nachrichten aus dem Osten einlaufen, und zwar nicht nur aus der Sowjetzone, sondern auch aus den Satellitenstaaten und selbst aus Rußland. Mit Nachrichten aus Rußland weiß er umzugehen, darin hat er eine zwölfjährige Erfahrung. Im April 1942 wurde dem damals vierzigjährigen Oberstleutnant Gehlen die Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ anvertraut. Damit kam er zum erstenmal mit dem geheimen Nachrichtendienst in Berührung. Er fand sich schnell zurecht. Bald konnte er den Ablauf der Katastrophe an der Ostfront genau voraussagen. Das brachte ihm die Ungnade Hitlers und zugleich die Aufmerksamkeit der Amerikaner ein. Mit ihrem Geld und seinem Wissen baute er in den Jahren nach dem Kriege einen Apparat auf, der hoffentlich bald der Bundesregierung zur Verfügung stehen wird.

240 Gehlen



DER GROSSE UNBEKANNTE war General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen, Chef des von amerikanischer Seite finanzierten und im Zusammenhang mit dem Fall John häufig genannten Nachrichtendienstes, bis zum gestrigen Tage. Jetzt ist es der Bildagentur Associated Press gelungen, dieses Photo Gehlens, das ihn als Oberst im Kriege zeigt, zu beschaffen.

Front Page "The New York Times" 14 Aug 1954

John Edgar Hoover

Das ist General Gehlen



General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen (52), von dem BILD kürzlich ein Jugendphoto veröffentlichte, liegt jetzt auch „in voller Größe“ vor. Unsere Aufnahme zeigt den geheimnisumwitterten Leiter eines bedeutenden Nachrichtendienstes, der in Westdeutschland für die Amerikaner arbeitet, als Oberst im zweiten Weltkrieg. Gehlen hatte zuletzt

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(Security Classification)
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM USIS BONN
USIA

TO : / ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ WASHINGTON

September 1, 1954
DATE

REF

ACTION	DEPT
For Dept. 1PS-3	1PS-3 1M3-3 1C3 10P/E 1A/E 11/S 10P/C 1C1
Use Only REC'D	N F OTHER
4/9/54	51-10-8 C17-5 GCB-1 OSD-2 army 3
SUBJECT: <u>West German Press Reaction to the Personality and Activities</u> <u>of ex-General Reinhard Gehlen</u> navy-6 60-7	

Ex-General Gehlen and his Intelligence organization, reportedly sponsored and financed by the United States, became subject of press discussion for the first time in October 1953 when Sovzone security chief Ernst Wollweber started a gigantic propaganda campaign denouncing Western underground activities in the East Zone. Papers then reported in detail on the past and the professional qualifications of Ex-General Gehlen, stressing the fact that Gehlen's department in the German army headquarters had been the most effective body of all competing Nazi Intelligence organizations charged with counter-espionage activities in the East. During the last months of 1953, the press also raised the question of how the Gehlen organization could be put under German authority after the Federal Republic had become sovereign. While reporting that a number of former Nazis collaborated with Gehlen, papers did not by and large object to the ex-General's affiliation with former Himmler men, opining that the ex-General had been guided by purely professional and not political considerations when building up his organization.

Press attention focussed again on ex-General Gehlen and his organization after the defection of West German security chief Otto John. Gehlen was named as a possible successor. Sensational and conservative publications alike carried lengthy features on the Intelligence expert, pointing out what a "mysterious" personality Gehlen was. After a Swiss magazine allegedly offered 500 DM for a picture of Reinhard Gehlen, photos began to appear in the West German press which showed the ex-General in his youth and as an officer. WESTDEUTSCHE RUNDSCHAU, however, front-paged the most often published picture of Gehlen, stating in the caption that the photo did not look like Gehlen and that no one knew as yet what the former General really looked like. Most papers stressed the ex-General's extraordinary skill and qualifications. The only paper available which strongly objected to the existence of the Gehlen organization because it was "financed by the Americans," was the neutralist, fellow-travelling PULDAER VOLKSZEITUNG which wrote that Gehlen was the most representative example of foreign Intelligence activities on German soil which constituted a serious obstacle to an East-West agreement. Other papers, however, demonstrated a more objective attitude with regard to the "fact" that the Americans sponsored Gehlen. Some publications said that the organization cost about 25 million DM yearly, an amount which the Federal Republic would have been unable to spend during the first years of its existence. Gehlen's loyalty to both the Americans and the Germans was underlined by several papers.

PUR:PD: [initials] /EP
REPORTER

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GEHLEN 201

FOR COORDINATION WITH State

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(Classification)

The Protestant weekly CHRIST UND WELT professed to know that Gehlen was "no longer" financed by the Americans but had received funds from the Federal Chancery during the past months. The weekly stated that the organization Gehlen was therefore a purely German institution now. It favored the attachment of the Gehlen organization to the future Defense Ministry immediately after the establishment of that body. The position and the functions of Gehlen and his organization should be clarified and determined as soon as possible since the Soviets would undoubtedly increase their Intelligence activities since John's defection, and Gehlen in particular would be in a position to deal effectively with their activities.

The independent WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE, the news weekly DER SPIEGEL and the neutralist WESTDEUTSCHES TAGEBLATT wrote that Under Secretary in the Chancery, Globke and former Under Secretary in the Chancery, Otto Lenz, who became known for his attempts to establish a "Propaganda Ministry," planned to establish a State Security Ministry and were assisted in their plans by Reinhard Gehlen who thereby hoped to gain a foothold in the Federal Government. These publications maintained that Gehlen had consciously misinformed Federal Minister of the Interior Schroeder with regard to the John case. Schroeder was opposed to the establishment of a State Security Ministry, if for no other reason than that an Interior Minister could not favor the establishment of an omnipotent security authority independent of his ministry. Gehlen, Globke and Lenz were said to have attempted discrediting Schroeder by leading him to make statements with regard to John which would make him subject to widespread public criticism.

Most publications dedicating special features or articles to Gehlen and his organization were rather favorably inclined toward the ex-General and his future attachment to a Federal authority. Of this group of publications, only the illustrated weekly MUENCHNER ILLUSTRIERTE voiced doubts as to the eligibility of Gehlen to the post of Western Germany's highest security chief in view of his former "close cooperation with the Americans," his alleged "bad reputation" in most Western countries, and in particular the extreme publicity that had recently been focussed upon him.

However, a number of papers discussing the John defection, the necessity to reorganize the security system in Western Germany, and the possibility of centralizing all Intelligence activities under Gehlen after the Federal Republic had become sovereign, rejected the ex-General as a possible candidate. Most of these papers opposed on principle the concentration of too much power in the hands of one man. The Mainz ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (independent, generally pro-Government) contended against replacing "Britain's John" by "America's Gehlen." The nationalist AACHENER NACHRICHTEN said that Gehlen should under no circumstances be introduced to fill the void left by John's defection since "in a certain sense Gehlen's fight against John reflected the rivalry of the American and British secret services on German soil."

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for Joseph B. Phillips
Director
Office of Public Affairs

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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MAR 21 1963

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VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE

DISPATCH NO. 8660

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WE
FROM : Senior Representative, KUFIRE Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL: Otto John
SPECIFIC: Article in Dutch Weekly

DATE: SEP 7 1954

INFO: JP9

1. In view of the priority interest evinced in the case of Dr. Otto JOHN and in the belief that the article which appeared in the 28 August edition of the Dutch weekly "Elseviers Weekblad" may have slipped by unnoticed, it is forwarded herewith for your information. In an effort to save time, the writer will dictate a rough translation of those parts which appear to be of greater interest in an effort to summarize the meat of the article.
2. The first column can be considered unimportant build-up, but the following section may be of interest:

"However, except for the so-called official counterespionage services, there are still several other organizations about which the public seldom hears anything. A short time ago when Dr. Otto JOHN fled to the East, the world became aware with astonishment that the German Federal Republic is blessed with three intelligence services. First there is the official Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution: This Bureau is responsible for the protection of the Federal Republic against left- and right-wing elements. It has a net of agents in the East. Next to it there was - and is - the counterespionage service of the so-called "Bureau Blank", the future German Ministry of War and Defense. The Bureau Blank, which is directly responsible to Adenauer, is established in a former barracks in Bonn (huge brickkiln barracks) and has a staff of almost 1,000 former servicemen and officials. The CE service of the Bureau Blank was, until a year ago, under the direction of an adventurous old-timer in the espionage world, J. W. HEINZ. The Bureau Blank also has three offices in West Berlin and two in East Berlin where primarily military information from the East is collected."

Attachment (WE only)
28 August Edition of "Elseviers Weekblad"

3 September 1954

Distribution

- 3 - WE. w/att
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- 2 - Frankfurt
- 1 - OFFA
- 1 - JOHN file

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OPRA 8660
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Large Organization

"It was only through the JOHN Affair that the existence of the third, and by far largest West German espionage organization, came to light. In well-informed circles in Bonn one had long been convinced that the importance and danger of this service was real. The chief of this service is the former Brigadier (General) GEHLEN. In the GEHLEN organization there are presently more than 4,000 persons working, 3,000 in the political section and 1,000 in the military section.

Reinhard GEHLEN was one of the young, brilliant officers who had a swift career in Hitler's army. He originally came from the artillery but, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, he was assigned to the counterspionage section of the German high command. At the time of the capitulation GEHLEN was chief of the "Gruppe Fremde-Meer-Ost" and directed the espionage and counterspionage services of the German Army in Russia. He succeeded in escaping from the Russians with his valuable agent files and arrived in the West where he - largely because of his files - was received by the Americans with open arms. As early as 1947 he received instructions from the Americans to build up a new net of agents and American Headquarters in Frankfurt financed the so-called GEHLEN group, a continually expanding net of agents in and around Berlin, after the Russian blockade of Berlin. Since 1948 each year the Americans have placed at the disposal of GEHLEN 25 million marks for the expansion of his organization. GEHLEN Headquarters are in the village of Pullach, fourteen kilometers south of Munich. A barbed wire fence three meters high and electrified surrounds a huge area containing barracks, fuel, houses, stores and even a school.

Excellent Impression

"Reinhard GEHLEN is now in his middle 50's, slender, not too short, with thin blond hair and a small mustache. Even in civilian clothing his military bearing betrays him. Bonn journalists saw him for the first time when he was questioned in a secret sitting of the Bundestag dealing with the questions concerning EDO. He made an excellent impression on members of the Bundestag. For more than a year influential persons in Bonn behind the scenes have been working to make the GEHLEN organization an official service of the West German Federal Republic. The Americans would rather be rid of GEHLEN not only because his organization has gradually become too large and too expensive, but also because they suspect that he does not share his loyalty with certain persons in the immediate circle next to the German Chancellor. Apparently this refers to (Dr.) Hans GLOBKE

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3 September 1954

National

who, in the old days, was a loyal servant and Socialist and who was allegedly the founder of the national socialist race laws. Thus, it was Dr. GLOBKE who proposed to the Federal Chancellor that the GEHLEN organization be incorporated as the official counterespionage service of the Bureau Blank.

"After General GEHLEN, as mentioned above, had explained his program to the Bundestag on 16 December 1953 and had made his "excellent impression", an agreement was reached in March of this year between the Bonn government and GEHLEN to the effect that the GEHLEN organization would be taken over by the West German Federal Republic. The Federal Republic would provide 22 million marks for it per year.

"But Theodore BLANK, who initiated the plan for German divisions in the European Army, stubbornly refused to receive the GEHLEN organization. Too many GEHLEN agents were supposed to be former members of the infamous Gestapo and SD.

Adenauer's Decision

"The GEHLEN organization has not yet been accepted by the West German Federal Republic. But GEHLEN has time and he has friends with a great deal of power. About a week before the flight of JOHN to the East, General GEHLEN handed over to his friend GLOBKE a thick dossier with the title, "Otto JOHN." This dossier ended up on Adenauer's desk. After reading it, the Chancellor said "I don't want to see that man again." This decision, which was heard by a large number of persons, reached JOHN too and that may well have been one of the reasons which forced JOHN to flee to the East and which has induced the English journalist, Sefton DELMER, to write a series of articles under the title "Is Hitler Really Dead."

"In the mean while the agents of the GEHLEN organization, of the Bureau Blank, and of the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution are continuing their work in their buildings in East and West Berlin and so are the agents of the fourteen other secret services established in Berlin. At least two, perhaps even three of these services, are working for the East German satellites. They too have their offices in West Berlin. The West Berlin police have a section set up to handle special orders. This section, which is not established in the building of the West Berlin police headquarters but in a store on one of the busiest streets of West Berlin, has more than 100 specially trained and carefully selected officials working for it. The most important

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qualification for the members of this section is an absolute political integrity. We have received a great deal of the material that we have used in writing this article from one of the commanding officers of this section."

3. The remaining two columns are not believed to be particularly germane to the subject and are primarily journalistic. It is believed [

] may, if Headquarters considers the matter interesting enough, wish to make contact with the journalist who wrote the article, Hains/LIEPMAN. At any rate, the article itself and the sections translated above are forwarded for Headquarters' interest with information copies to The [] and Frankfurt.

[]

SECRET

7 Sept. '54
[]

~~Approved in - RSP~~
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Past Commander

Former

Former

American Legion
Veterans of Foreign Wars

Majority Leader
New Haven Board of Aldermen

National Surgeon General
Veterans Foreign Wars of the United States

September 8, 1954

Lieutenant General Reinhold Gustav Gehlen
Bonn
Germany

My dear General:

We have been reading with interest of your
associations and would appreciate very much
an autographed photograph of yours to be
placed here with leading military personnel.
May we be favored?

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Clarence R. Rungee
.....
(Dr.) Clarence R. Rungee

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Bonn / Rhein
Brückenhagen - Amd



Lieutenant General Reinhold Gustav Gehlen, H. Main Kasse

~~Hamburg - 7-11-45~~
Germany

~~Morgenthau 1052~~

VIA AIR MAIL

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C.S. Monitor

SEP 8 1954

'Man in Shadows' Spotlited

By J. Emlyn Williams
Central European Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn, Germany

During the recent controversy over the defection to the Soviet zone of Dr. Otto John, the name of former Lt. Gen. Reinhard Gehlen has cropped up constantly in almost every discussion.

He is either represented as the great opponent of Dr. John indirectly responsible for exposing the former President of the Office for the Protection of the Federal Constitution, or as his possible successor in that office.

Herr Gehlen's name has been

in the shadows for a long time. He has been the subject of fantastic rumors and legends. These have gained greater credulity than would ordinarily be the case with the head of a secret service organization because of the abnormal conditions existing here since 1945, and also because so very little has been known about him.

Virtual 'Unknown'

Until recently few people, Germans or others, had any idea as to what Herr Gehlen looked like—so much so that a Swiss illustrated magazine went so far as to offer 500 Swiss francs (\$120 approximate), for a picture of him. A little later—but not in answer to this advertisement—a picture was dug out of the archives. It showed Herr Gehlen as a colonel in the former Wehrmacht. This must have been about 10 years old, since he already had risen to much higher rank before the end of World War II.

The chief of a secret service organization naturally does not court publicity about either his person or his activities. But this much is known about Herr Gehlen. The son of a Prussian officer, he himself became an artillery officer in the Reichswehr. As a young lieutenant he was stationed with his regiment at Schweidnitz, which is now in the territory incorporated de facto in Poland.

In his early army days he distinguished himself as a horseman and an all-round sportsman and was very popular among his fellow officers. He was early recognized by his superiors as having more than ordinary ability, and when the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht was carried out later, Herr Gehlen became a captain in the Ministry of War.

Skilled Secret Agent

During World War II, he was for a short time the commander of his old regiment. But his real career began when in April, 1942, he became a member of the General Staff responsible for the "foreign armies—East."

It was his task to deal with military secrets and espionage and counterespionage in Eastern Europe, especially in the Soviet Union. Such a job required the weaving of a network of agents and careful and patient activity in many spheres.

His reputation for reliability and expert knowledge of his subject was well known to those who counted. And when the United States forces came into Germany and were looking for someone to assist them in their counterespionage work, they naturally turned to Herr Gehlen—especially since he had an organization more or less still intact to bring with him.

Today, this former lieutenant general of the German Army presides over the "Organization Gehlen"—as it is known to most Germans. Its headquarters are in a closely guarded area at Puchtal, near Munich, in Bavaria.

Heavy Cost Reported

There are many contradictory reports about the financial aid it receives from United States sources. The Communist press behind the Iron Curtain mentions a sum of \$3,500,000 a year, while here in Bonn the rumors run to 25,000,000 marks, or nearly twice that amount. Since there is no way of getting to any approximately accurate figure on this matter, it must suffice to say that an organization which has 3,000 political and 1,000 military personnel must require a lot of money to carry out its investigations.

Herr Gehlen is in appearance nothing like the film version of a secret agent. He looks like a Prussian officer, but would pass for a successful businessman rather than a controller of espionage and such activities.

In connection with the John case, there have been many press statements to the effect that the Gehlen organization had long superseded the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in the favors of the federal government. Further, that there were and still are some very prominent officials in

close contact with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who would like to see Herr Gehlen in charge of what was once Dr. John's job.

Coordination Sought

On the other hand, Herr Gehlen has been concerned specifically with military espionage, and is said to have no desire to be connected with other aspects which would concern civilian matters.

In any case, when this whole affair of Dr. John and his successor is discussed in the federal Parliament, it generally is hoped there will be some clarification of a situation in which there are so many different counter-espionage organizations here in the federal republic, and that some coordination can be achieved both in the interests of more reliable information and of economy. The achievement of a larger measure of sovereignty by the federal republic doubtless will react on this problem.

N.Y. Times

SEP 6 1954

Spy a Suicide in Berlin

BERLIN, Sept. 5 (UP)—The West Berlin police reported today that a Western agent suspected of being in the pay of the Communists had killed himself with poison in his Moabit prison cell yesterday. He was identified as Rolf Middelborg, 32. He was arrested Friday on suspicion of being a double agent and of giving the West German Government false information about Soviet zone production.

C.S. Monitor

SEP 7 1954

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John's Super-Spy Rivals Muscled Him Out of Bonn

By Joachim Joesten

"Beware of the devilry of secret service intrigues: don't ever drink from the poisoned cup of counter-intelligence, for that poison is lethal . . ."

This strange warning was conveyed in a letter addressed on March 30, 1953, by the then head of West Germany's military intelligence service, Lt. Col. Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, to the then head of the Federal Security Office, Dr. Otto John. Since then, both men have left office, the former by dismissal; the latter by defection.

It may seem surprising that West-ern Germany, having no armed forces of its own as yet, should possess a military intelligence service. Actually, Bonn has had an informal or preparatory Defense Ministry for about four years, an embryonic military intelligence service developed within the agency. Since 1950, it has been headed by Lt. Col. Heinz.

John's Empire

Also in 1950, there was established the Federal Office for the Defense of the Constitution, or Federal Security Office. Dr. Otto John became its chief. Although these two agencies were designed to serve widely different ends—one for the purposes of military intelligence, the other to combat subversives of the extreme right and left—they soon became involved in a bitter wrangle over jurisdiction. The battle was intensified by personal rivalries between Heinz and John.

To complicate matters even further, there existed, long before either of these two German secret services was set up, a hush-hush organization known as the "Gehlen-Apparat." All that originally was known about this hybrid outfit was that it had been set up by the Americans, with headquarters at Pullach near Munich; that it operated a far-flung network of espionage and counter-espionage behind the Iron Curtain; that it was headed by a former Nazi general, Reinhard Gehlen, and that it was financed out of United States Secret Service funds.

Gen. Gehlen unquestionably is one of the most intriguing "living legends" of the postwar period. For a long time, his personality and background were cloaked by such impenetrable mystery that reporters could not even come by the general's proper first name. So somebody called him "Gustav" and the name stuck.

It is still being widely used as a nickname, as in the catch phrase "Gustav Sie Gustav" ("Give my regards to Gustav") which is coming into fairly general use as a synonym of "Mind your own business." It was first employed as a challenge to supposed secret listeners on the telephone, since it is widely assumed in Germany—rightly or wrongly—that the Gehlen-Apparat has been engaged in wire-tapping, even within the Federal Republic.

Fierce Triangle

There was no love lost between Dr. John and Gen. Gehlen, any more than between the latter and Col. Heinz. All three—looking to the day West Germany would regain her sovereignty—fought fiercely for supremacy in a field where the Marquis of Queensberry rules have never been applied.

The downfall of Col. Heinz was of Dr. John's making, but with a friendly assist from the Gehlen organization. It came about last September, after Dr. John had painstakingly compiled a voluminous dossier, "F. W. Heinz" was

brought to Chancellor Adenauer's attention.

Heinz was incriminated on various counts: He had been an active Nazi and terrorist (which he never denied); he had been mayor of a town in the Soviet zone in 1945-6 (he used his office to spy on the Russians, said Heinz); above all, he had had traitorous dealings with a mysterious Dutchman, a double or triple agent named Jan Eland (blackmail, Heinz claimed).

After studying the Heinz dossier, Adenauer summoned his "Defense Minister," Theodore Blank, and ordered him to fire his intelligence chief forthwith. This was done effective October 1, 1953.

John Under Fire

No sooner had the Heinz case been settled than there appeared in a German magazine an article charging that Dr. John himself had been a friend of Eland's, had paid him hush money and had sent him off to Switzerland. Almost coincidentally with the publication of this article, Eland died in Zurich on November 3 under mysterious circumstances. An investigation of his death is still pending in Switzerland.

Again, a few months later, there appeared in the London Daily Express a series of articles written by its star reporter Sefton Delmer. He charged that the "Gestapo boys" were coming back in Germany with a vengeance. Mr. Delmer specifically named Gen. Gehlen and Dr. Hans Globke in this connection.

Informed observers, watching these fireworks, quickly put two and two together: Gen. Gehlen was gunning for Dr. John, and the latter (who had worked closely with Sefton Delmer in London in 1944-5) was firing back from both hips.

In spite of all the (rather silly) attempts that have been made, both in Bonn and elsewhere, to cloak or distort Dr. John's startling act, informed sources in Germany have never for one moment been unaware of the real background of his desertion: John, after having eliminated his weaker rival, Heinz, was himself being pushed to the wall by his stronger rival, Gehlen.

One week before Dr. John crashed through the Iron Curtain extension that bisects Berlin, Gen. Gehlen had banded to Dr. Hans Globke, Chancellor Adenauer's state secretary and chief of personnel, one of those fat, deadly dossiers marked "Otto John." It was placed immediately on the Chancellor's desk for his urgent personal attention.

Exactly what this dossier contained is not known yet, and perhaps never will be. It is taken for granted, though, that it dwelt heavily on certain alleged aspects of Dr. John's private life, which shocked Adenauer so much that he told Globke: "I never want to see that man (Dr. John) again."

The security chief, alerted by his own informants in the chancellery, took Adenauer at his word and departed for good.

Otto John was regarded as "Britain's man." After his successful escape from Nazi Germany, in July, 1944, he had gone to London by way of Spain and Portugal. In the last months of the war, he had worked closely with British intelligence officers and had made anti-Nazi propaganda broadcasts over BBC. His candidacy for the post as president of the Federal Security Office was warmly sponsored by the British occupation authorities.

Gen. Gehlen, on the other hand, was and is "America's man." After a brief spell of captivity after the

German surrender, he was set up in his old business in 1946, but under new management. Since then, the Gehlen-Apparat has mushroomed to extraordinary proportions. It has a staff of more than 1,000 persons—not counting informants and agents in the field—as compared to the 800 employed by the Federal Security Office in Cologne.

Gehlen Rules Uneasily

Now Gen. Gehlen is riding on top, but he is far from being a happy man. His organization has been falling to pieces in the past few weeks. It is not so much a question of Dr. John having betrayed the identity of Gehlen's agents in the eastern zone (he can hardly have known more than a few of them). Rather, there has been a stampede of Gehlen men who think that Dr. John knew all about them and that he is telling the Russians all he knows.

Nor is that all. On December 11, 1953, Gen. Gehlen, in preparation for his new role as "central intelligence chief" of Western Germany, appeared before the EDC Committee of the Bundestag. It was, of course, a small and select group of well-screened members of Parliament who were allowed to attend this exclusive briefing on the organization and activities of the Gehlen-Apparat. One of those present was a member of Chancellor Adenauer's own party named Karl Franz Schmidt-Wittmack. This gentleman went over to the Reds one month after Dr. John had done so.

There is only one possible conclusion: What the Russians, at this stage, don't know about the Gehlen-Apparat, just isn't worth knowing.

The Bonn Republic is not yet five years old, but it has already had three intelligence services, which have killed each other off, leaving both Americans and British high and dry.

Jul 1954

Memo. Utility ~~Comm~~ on H/606.

H/606.

Bremering

"Giblen may, under certain circumstances, be dangerous man"

Pointed out that ~~all of~~ many intelligent persons have this view. That not only Zypner and Fred Rye but also G. himself could & —

6 - You should not forget that I have ~~sup~~ you have — your files document signed by me in which I have ~~let~~ ~~so~~ unequivocally accepted implicitly with the West against the USSR and world Communism —

It is true that, if I were to see ~~Giblen~~ ~~embarked on~~ ~~as a~~ — almost certain shift toward Communism or Neutralism, I would go into internal German politics & would use all means at my disposal to keep you in the West — of that of, neutralism, ~~Giblen~~ ~~Neutralism~~ ~~in Communism~~, I will ~~not~~ ~~be~~ play a role of any kind with such ~~government~~.

[E] I, I have come to believe this because

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~~every~~ ~~with~~ ~~at~~ ~~from~~ your articles
and ~~to~~ statement here, during the years,
that - we know you been
involved w/ the political positions
you have ~~in~~ taken.

7 (Ja und auch länger -)

Buerensing Incident / CE Case

WATKINS / DETLESSEN

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OPERATION "E", Moscow, "Ogonek", October 1954.

by V. Krasnopol'skiy

MYSTERIOUS GENERAL

A slim, bald-headed army officer, dressed in a tight-fitting German general's uniform, sits stiffly on a wooden chair. His face bears the features of a typical Prussian militarist. Apparently, the photograph is taken from a group picture since one can see at his side a pair of feet wearing boots and behind him several breasts decorated with iron crosses. The caption states that this is a photo of General Reinhard Gehlen, that there does not exist a post-war photo of the general, and that he is now in charge of a counter-intelligence organization, financed by the USA.

On 20 August 1954, WELT, a Hamburg newspaper published his photograph and playfully added that this was the "mysterious" Gehlen, the "man without a face" as known by the "~~REINHOLD WATTS~~" and the German, as well as other, news publications. *Reinhold Watts*

When Gehlen, using a pseudonym, arrived in Bonn during the early part of August, the German press announced that he had visited Shneider, Minister of Interior at Bonn, had held discussions at the Federal Chancellery, and had frequented Blank's office, i.e. the Ministry of War, at Bonn. It also stated that Gehlen's organization would be incorporated with the government at Bonn and that Gehlen would be in charge of all intelligence organizations which sprouted in West Germany. *Schneider*

This news was designed to appease the nerves of several Bonn operators. For example, Zinn, Prime Minister of Hesse, complained that Bonn, West Berlin, and all of West Germany have been transformed into "spy jungles." It would be well if all of these intelligence centers and organizations would fulfill their functions. A check has indicated that spy gangs collapse, one after another. The GDR is not flourishing as Bonn is, and several Bonn operators have preferred to go over to the GDR. *W*

Who is this Gehlen?

During the war, Reinhardt Gehlen was in charge of that Intelligence Directorate of Hitler's Military General Staff designated as the "Foreign ~~Army~~ ^{Army} of the East" which was directed principally against the Soviet Union. The work of Gehlen's Directorate was coordinated closely with that of SD (Security Service), SS, and gestapo.

In 1944, after the shooting of Admiral ~~Kanaris~~ ^C Kanaris, Chief of Hitler's Military Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, ~~the~~ military intelligence including Gehlen's administration was placed under the complete jurisdiction of Himmler. Although Gehlen was a close friend of Kanaris, he knew how to get along with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, *Sch* Schellenberg and other high executioners of the Third Reich. After the fall of the Third Reich, Gehlen appeared in the American Zone. He was a "war prisoner" for only a short time. Already in 1946, he began, with American sanction, to create a huge espionage organization. From the very beginning, his lieutenants were chosen from lists of "specialists" which included Hitler's spy and gestapo agents. While other espionage centers were organized, Gehlen remained in the dark.

On 17 March 1952, Delmer wrote in the British DAILY EXPRESS, "Attention is called to the name 'Gehlen', a name which will cause much displeasure, -- Gehlen ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ the key to the spy network created by Kanaris, Himmler, and Schellenberg." In conclusion, Delmer noted that Gehlen apparently became the Chief of Intelligence Services of the future European Army.

This article did not create any sensation on the streets. As revealed by spies unmasked in GDR, Gehlen received 17 million dollars in 1951 and 25 million dollars in 1952 from the Americans. Other sources state that he has received 47 million dollars annually.

SPIES, COURIERS, SPOTTERS

The trials of West German spies unmasked in the GDR revealed that Gehlen's organization consists of a political directorate with 3,000 people and a military directorate with 1,000 people. Among the agents, there are couriers, radio personnel, spotters, spies for recruitment, investigators for determining the suitability of personnel for

espionage activities, guides for bringing recruited personnel into West Berlin, and finally sources (agents) for collecting and transmitting intelligence information. The latter, likewise, are classified according to their "specialty."

Fronts of various commercial firms are used to cover up Gehlen's organization. Forged documents are prepared by the "Secret Technical Services" in Stuttgart, using the name of the "Swabian Industrial Representative Company" as a cover. The Americans supply documents to many agents who become Gehlen's couriers to and from West Berlin and who travel not as ordinary passengers but on American transport planes.

Recently, NEWSWEEK, an American newspaper confirmed that Gehlen's Headquarters, the "General Directorate" is located in Pullach, a suburb of Munich in the American Zone and that it is surrounded with a barbed wire fence. American barracks and warehouses are used to camouflage the "Directorate". In addition to 40 CIC personnel, there are over 400 people working for the "Administration". CIC agents look after Gehlen's organization and control the expenses of their appointees. The administration has branches in Munich, Bremen, Karlsruhe, Darmstadt, and Shtoknits near Munich. These branches are subdivided into a network of sections in West Germany, West Berlin, and the Saar District.

Specialized schools are organized for training spies.

GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS TO ALL

At the end of August and the beginning of September, the East Berlin newspapers published information about the cases of several hundred of Gehlen's agents who were arrested on 2 and 3 August. One of these articles revealed how one of these agents was carrying a concealed document entitled "General assignments to all." This document was printed on microfilm hidden in an electric light switch.

Here is, for example, assignment 2 of the document: "Determine the results of allied aircraft buzzing of railroad lines, roads, bridges, large communications networks, etc. and observe the reconstruction work."

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(agents)
The 19th assignment asks to observe the effects of aircraft buzzing of power industries and chemical enterprises and also to note reconstruction work as a result of the buzzing.

The 15th assignment calls for the observation of losses of population because of aircraft buzzing.

The 10th assignment, which is of a cannibalistic nature, asks for the observation of the number of patients in hospitals and the outbreaks of epidemic diseases. In other words, this assignment is designed for bacteriological warfare. This activity of spies in time of war is called "Operation E."

Containing
Gehlen's agents do not hesitate to recruit minors for their vile assignments. Recently, because of the vigilance of railroad worker, a 16-year old student from West Berlin was arrested for distributing provocative leaflets ~~consisting of~~ instructions to pour sand in railroad-car axle-boxes, to destroy signal wires, etc.

boy
It was revealed that this boy was recruited by adult agents in West Berlin. When the ~~parents of the boy~~ parents of the boy, who did not know anything of the incidents, appealed to a West Berlin court to punish the agents responsible for leading their son to such a reprehensible crime, the judge dismissed their plea on the grounds that similar activities are not punishable by law.

ON THE EAST AND ON THE WEST

against
Gehlen's spy gangs are active not only against the GDR but also other People's Democratic Nations, chiefly ~~against~~ Poland and Czechoslovakia. For example, in the beginning of August, a great Gehlen organization consisting of several dozen people was discovered in Czechoslovakia. Also recently, a gang of Gehlen's agents was arrested in Poland. On 12 July, NEWSWEEK, reported that Gehlen's agents are operating not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe, the Far East, and the Near East.

Gehlen is especially active in France. His agents are trying to ~~strike into~~ *penetrate* pro-French circles and to

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expose them.

Gehlen has a strong administration in Western Germany. His agents spy on West German people who struggle against the division of Germany, try to provoke ~~them~~, and collect compromising forged documents. Commercial firms which try to restore their economic relations with GDR and People's Democratic countries are kept under observation. (C) all agents

In addition to this, the wide awake eye of Gehlen is always present at the Bonn Government. Some highly placed representatives of the West German regime are found to be his agents. Gehlen has his "residents" also in the Bonn offices which are competing with him. ~~General~~ ^{Chausinger} is an agent in Blank's office and Radtke, the Deputy Chief of the Office for Guarding the Constitution is an agent, using the pseudonym Radtke. The CIC penetrates into the Bonn Government through Gehlen. group

At the time of the Berlin Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Gehlen tried, with false documents, to compromise such West German officials as Ollenhauer, Pfele, Gerer, Friedensburg, and Lemmer by criticizing Adenauer's political developments.

Both of the Hitlerites--^ZLentz, Adenauer's former Chief of the Chancery, and Globke, the present Chief of the Chancery--are closely connected with Gehlen. NEWSWEEK states that Globke is the liaison agent between Adenauer and Gehlen. WELT AM SONNTAG reported, "Gehlen is acquainted personally with Adenauer...His reports are sent directly to the Federal Chancellor in Spaumburg Castle."

THE SECRET BECOMES CLEAR

The security organs of the GDR have dealt heavy blows to Gehlen's gang of spies and murderers. Sections of gangs with full complements were caught, and not only the regular agents, but Gehlen's intelligence informers were also arrested and sentenced. The "democratic" press published full accounts of the structure of Gehlen's organization and its activity, the addresses of the many intelligence networks of Gehlen, and the names and pseudonyms of his leaders. All of this increased the vigilance

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of GDR citizens and opened the eyes of many complacent people.

The numerous traps have caused a panic among the spies. Many of them have decided to cease their activity and keep quiet; others, including several leaders such as Prater, Kapanke, etc. have appeared voluntarily and repented before ~~the~~ GDR security organs.

This does not mean that Gehlen's gang is completely liquidated. The West German press has reported that Gehlen will be the chief of intelligence in the projected London Conference of the nine western governments.

The secret has become clear ^{as to} how the American and Bonn powers had tried to "save face" with the scandalized General-Spy. The ugly picture of the Bonn regime, which was forced to seek support from the American-supported spy gangs, has been unveiled before the eyes of the public. All the world sees how the ruling circles of USA have decided to depend on the rebuked spies of Hitler to help them prepare the *evil* ~~operations~~ "Operation E."

** * * * *

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CAPTIONS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS

1. The so-called "Genral Directorate" in Pullach, an American restricted area near Munich, is the main espionage center of Gehlen's henchmen.

2. Material evidence of Gehlen's espionage activities was exhibited in the press conference room. This exhibit consists of propaganda leaflets and inflammable materials carried by air balloons and bombs with time-clock mechanisms which are designed for blowing up and setting fire to GDR enterprises.

3. In October 1954, at a press conference in Berlin, (Professor) Albert Norden, GDR State Secretary, submitted new documentary evidence about American intelligence activities and West German agents. ^{about} James Starr and his brother William Henry Starr, American citizens, who escaped into the GDR, appeared at this press conference. William Henry Starr is shown answering questions of the correspondents.

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EGLA 10921

USA 10 921

-4 OCT 1954

Chief, EE

Chief, of Base, 'ul'ach

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Room

Operational/ZIPPER

Aschen Meeting with UTILITY

1. Aschen met with UTILITY at the home of [] for two hours on Sunday, 31 Aug 54. [] and [] were present.

2. The following is a summary of the main topics of conversation:

Political Situation in France

a. Aschen related his own impressions of MENDES-FRANCE based on a meeting in the U.S. during the early years of WW II and a second meeting in Washington some months before MENDES-FRANCE became head of the French government. Aschen had been impressed by MENDES-FRANCE's energy and drive during the first meeting; by his interest and apparent expertise in economic and fiscal matters in the more recent conversation which lasted several hours and took place in Aschen's Washington office.

b. Aschen specifically stated that KUBARK had no information of any secret deal between MENDES-FRANCE and the communists at Geneva. Aschen and UTILITY agreed that there was probably no secret deal at Geneva but that MENDES-FRANCE might have political aims or plans which involved a more compromising position vis-a-vis the Soviets than had been exhibited by some of his predecessors.

c. UTILITY noted that, according to information received from [] MENDES-FRANCE does support the early return of German sovereignty and early legalization of ZIPPER.

Press Relations

a. Aschen emphasized the importance of public opinion and the character of the free press in America. He described his own method of handling publicity in the U.S. press. As a general rule, KUBARK does not prepare handouts on KUBARK for the press. It does encourage the press to submit articles on KUBARK for consideration prior to publication. KUBARK action is then limited to labelling those parts of an article which, if published, would be detrimental to the national interest. KUBARK does not either confirm or deny substantive information in such articles.

b. UTILITY's views on this subject were not particularly significant; he expressed full agreement with Aschen's thoughts on this subject.

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29 Sept 54

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COMMENT: Actually ZIPPER has made great strides in establishing contact with the German press since the latter part of 1950.

Relations with the Legislature

a. Aschen described in some detail the relationship of KUBARK with the U.S. Congress. He discussed the manner in which the KUBARK budget is presented to a subcommittee of the committee dealing with the larger defense budget, emphasizing the demonstrated reliability and responsibility of the members of the committee. Although KUBARK, as an executive agency, is not required to reveal operational information of covert activities, Aschen has placed considerable confidence in the members of Congress involved who have, in turn, always treated KUBARK information properly.

b. The "no-year-reserve" was discussed with UTILITY. This sum, about 1% of the regular budget, was at the disposal of Aschen to cover unforeseen operations, usually of a covert political nature. The decisions to draw upon this sum were usually related to decisions by the NSC which were to be carried out by KUBARK.

KUCCOIN-type Activities

a. Aschen warned UTILITY about ever getting involved with any activities designed to influence internal public opinion since the government will always use internal press and public opinion media to support government issues which may be strongly opposed by the opposition.

The Newswatch Article

a. Aschen again emphasized the curious and free character of the press. The Newswatch article which recently described UTILITY and ZIPPER in derogatory terms was, Aschen pointed out, an example of this. Newswatch had, he said, submitted the article to KUBARK which pursued its usual policy of commenting only on information contrary to the national interest.

Security in Government

a. This was the most substantive aspect of the discussion. Aschen discussed the COYOTE philosophy, the unescapable responsibility of the head of an executive agency, the role of the investigative and information-providing organizations, the problems involved in defining "security risks" and the general nature of KUBARK's own safeguards. The security section of KUBARK, Aschen stated, has approximately 100 people and are responsible for conducting background investigations on prospective staff members.

b. Aschen expressed the opinion that exhaustive background checks are the best safeguard against high-level penetration. He noted that post facto examination of the background data on the most serious defection and espionage cases of the past few years inevitably revealed information which, properly evaluated, should have caused the individual to have been labelled a bad security risk. UTILITY agreed with Aschen's analysis and described some of the problems that have faced ZIPPER—lack of legal status, incomplete files, inadequate security system.

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58
29 Sept 54

with UFORJAHN, etc.

Legalization of ZIPPER

a. UTILITY explained his reasons for pressing for an early legalization of ZIPPER.

b. Aschen assured UTILITY that we share his desire for an early legalization.

Future KUBARK/ZIPPER Relations

a. UTILITY referred to his earlier letter to Aschen's predecessor and assured Aschen that this remained an accurate expression of his position. In many matters, UTILITY added, the future relationship of ZIPPER and KUBARK could become even closer than it is today. Explaining this statement, he noted that many persons who oppose ZIPPER's legalization are eagerly searching for information which would prove that ZIPPER's relations with KUBARK go beyond that which could be considered acceptable in an organization aspiring to become the OIS.

b. Aschen expressed full understanding on this point.

COMMENT: The question of ZIPPER depositing its signal plans, ciphers and microfilms of operational files with KUBARK in Washington was not specifically mentioned. However, [] had earlier briefed Aschen on this problem. Just a few days prior to Aschen's visit, UTILITY, citing political considerations, had made a decision that, for the present, this data would not be deposited with KUBARK.

c. Aschen told UTILITY of his satisfaction with KUBARK/ZIPPER relations and emphasized that his esteem and trust for UTILITY as an individual was evident in the fact that he was the only German that Aschen was seeing on this trip which was being handled with minimum publicity.

High-level Penetrations of UFORJAHN

a. Aschen, who had been rather extensively briefed on UTILITY's views on this subject, approached the matter through the JOHN case. He and UTILITY agreed that, regardless of who called the signals, JOHN probably did not know until the night of the 20th of July that his visit to East Berlin was destined to be a one-way trip. Beyond that point the case was anything but clear. Aschen related his own concern during WW II with the obvious fact that the German Resistance was obviously split in its loyalties between the Soviets and the Western Allies. Some discussion of specific personalities followed.

b. UTILITY noted that he had had various reservations about JOHN prior to his defection but had not been in possession of any positive information that JOHN was in touch with the Soviets.

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29 Sept 51

c. There was some discussion of the British role in the JMW case with UTILITY's deeply rooted suspicion of the British reflected.

d. UTILITY expressed his deep concern with high-level penetration of UFGROWTH. There was no detailed discussion. [] had, prior to the meeting briefed Aschen in detail; UTILITY had been informed of this immediately before his meeting with Aschen.

ZIPPER Relations with the RIV

a. UTILITY said that some change in the RIV was necessary. However, these should be limited to changes that did not involve the basic law.

b. In reply to a specific question by [], UTILITY labelled as untrue all stories which described his desires to take the RIV under his wing. He also reaffirmed his position that internal security and external intelligence (including counterespionage), should be separated.

Relations with the Executive

a. Aschen stressed the importance of the executive branch of the government having final authority for covert operations. UTILITY agreed and told Aschen of the present plan for a German NSC. This would leave the final authority in the hands of the chief executive. In this connection, UTILITY noted the plan to have a parliamentary committee, very small and very carefully chosen, established to ensure parliamentary support. Aschen thought this was a good solution as long as the final authority of the executive was clearly defined.

ZIPPER/KUMARK Cooperation in Other Parts of the World

UTILITY, who had shortly before been briefed by [] that Aschen had mentioned the possibility of Germans working against communism in [] made a general statement to Aschen that he was prepared to cooperate with KUMARK in any part of the globe where Germans could be effective and the fight against communism could be carried out. Aschen thanked him and expressed the view that there undoubtedly were such areas.

Financial Support

a. UTILITY told Aschen that UFGROWTH was making plans to assume financial responsibility for ZIPPER at the time of transfer.

b. Aschen told UTILITY that KUMARK was prepared to help out financially during the period of adjustment following legalization if such assistance should be necessary.

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29 Sept 54

3. UTILITY expressed appreciation and gratitude for the opportunity to visit with Acheson. Prior to the meeting, Acheson stated that he intended to use the opportunity to build UTILITY up a bit. The effect achieved was exactly that; UTILITY emerged in an excellent frame of mind, with his conviction reaffirmed that a long-range and close cooperation with ENBAER was both desirable and possible.

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Executive Registry
6-1318

DD/P 1-2865

9 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Article on General Gehlen Appearing in "Der Spiegel"

Attached is a copy of the 22 September 1954 issue of "Der Spiegel" which I mentioned during our conversation on 7 October 1954 and which you expressed an interest in seeing.

for E
Chief, Eastern European Division

1 Enclosure:
22 Sept 54 issue
of "Der Spiegel"

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

CONFIDENTIAL

ECIA-1174
20 OCT 1954

Chief, EE
(Attn: [])
Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COM

Operational

Museum of People and Places

GEHLEN 201

1. The attachments tell the story.
2. No reply from GEHLEN to the MOPP is contemplated before we receive the result of a Washington trace.

Encl. 2
Ltr and envelope

DIST
3 EE, 2/2 att
J. C. M.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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19 Oct 54

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EASTERN GERMANY

Oct. 29, 1954

In one of the published letters from Adenauer to the Western Powers, the War Chancellor demands confirmation for the fact that the preparations for the future defense contribution of the Federal Republic should not be hampered by the exercise of controls. This was then also agreed upon in the London and Paris agreements. In another letter Adenauer gives confirmation to the Western Powers of the fact that even after the coming into force of General Agreement No. 2, "every commander of (word missing) Western Powers continues to be entitled to take appropriate protective measures including the immediate use of arms" as soon as he deems this to be necessary.

Adenauer confirms thereby that the notorious emergency clause of the General Agreement is to remain in existence for decades.

KPD Executive Communique

Berlin, ADN, in German Hellschreiber to East Germany, Oct. 28, 1954, 1700 GMT--L

(Text)

Duesseldorf--The secretariat of the executive of the KPD considered Adenauer's Paris agreements and the new note from the Soviet Government on the peaceful solution of the European and German questions at a meeting on Oct. 27.

The secretariat states in a communique that the implementation of the Paris treaties would render the peaceful reunification of Germany impossible for a long time. The new note from the Soviet Union, on the other hand, opens the way for the German people to achieve the restoration of their national unity this year.

The communique stresses that Adenauer's assertion that the Paris treaties would establish the sovereignty of West Germany misleads the population, as the Occupation Powers have reserved to themselves all rights with regard to the reunification of Germany, the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the status of Berlin.

Adenauer's assertion that the agreement on the Saar is of a provisional character is also completely misleading. Article 6 of the agreement lays down expressly that any influencing of public opinion against the Saar statute and any support for political parties or associations which oppose the separation of the Saar from Germany is forbidden. In the "plebiscite" on the Saar agreement the population is only to have the right to decide between the retention of the present state of affairs or the Paris agreements.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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EASTERN GERMANY
Oct. 29, 1954

In conclusion the KPD executive points out that the decision on the implementation of these agreements will not be made either at conferences in London and Paris or in Adenauer's Cabinet in Bonn. The decision rests with the German people, particularly with the millions of workers whose will was expressed unequivocally in the resolution of the DGB congress against the rearmament of West Germany.

The KPD executive urges all workers, peasants, youths, and women to appeal to the Lower House deputies to refuse to approve these treaties and instead to press for Four-Power negotiations.

Schmidt-Wittmack Statement

Berlin, ADN, in German Hellschreiber to East Germany, Oct. 28, 1954,
1313 GMT--L

(Text)

Berlin--An ADN representative has asked the former Lower House Deputy, Schmidt-Wittmack, for his opinion of the London and Paris agreements. Mr. Schmidt-Wittmack states:

"The agreements concluded on the one-sided military pact between the Federal Republic and the Western Powers seriously endangers the reunification of Germany. The Saar agreement means virtually a renunciation of the Saar and contradicts all Lower House resolutions regarding the Saar.

"All nationally conscious Germans--above all those in the Lower House--now must have the courage to draw the corresponding conclusion. This conclusion can only be to appoint a new head of government. I will, moreover, express my opinions on these questions in the next few days."

- 0 -

RESISTANCE DELEGATION--A delegation from the GDR has gone to Vienna to attend the international festival week of the resistance movement in Vienna. Anna Seghers, Arnold Zweig, Bertolt Brecht, director of the Deutsche theater and National Prizewinner Wolfgang Langhoff, and Prof. Lea Grundig are members of the delegation. (Berlin, AND, Oct. 28, 1954, 0850 GMT--L)

NEW SPY STORY--A novel about the activities of the Gehlen espionage organization in the GDR will be published by the Berlin Kongress Verlag in the middle of November. The novel will be titled: "In the Beginning Was the End." It was written by a former leading collaborator of the Gehlen organization, Hans Joachim Geyer. (Berlin, ADN, Oct. 27, 1954, 0808 GMT--L)

RECEIVED
OCT 29 1954
U.S. AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND



REISEPASS

REISEPASS

RESTAURANT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005



Unterschrift des Passinhabers

Robert Graber

Es wird hiermit bescheinigt, daß der Inhaber die durch das obstehende Lichtbild dargestellte Person ist und die darunter befindliche Unterschrift eigenhändig vollzogen hat.

München, den 5. Nov. 1954
Stadtrat der Hauptstadt
Amt für Öffentliche Ordnung
im Auftrag

Nr. 7203699

PERSONENBESCHREIBUNG

Name *Graber*
Vorname *Robert*
(Nachnamen auch Geburtsnamen)
(Kufname unterstrichen)

Geburtsort *5. Juni 1904*

Geburtsort *Liegnitz*
(Stadt, Land) *Schlesien*

Größe in cm und Gestalt *174, schlank*

Gesichtsform *oval*

Farbe der Augen *blau*

Unveränderliche Kennzeichen *keine*

Beruf *Kaufmann*
Wohnort *München*

Nr. 7203699

BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND

Lebens. beschr.

REISEPASS

Nr. 7203699

REG.-Nr. *GA 1004/54*

NAMEN DES PASSINHABERS

Robert Graber

STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT

Deutsche (r)

Nr. 7203699

100 mm x 150 mm (3 1/2 x 6 in.)

NOT AVAILABLE COPY

RAUM FÜR SICHTVERMERKE

UP TO THREE MONTHS

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (41) 30 MAY 1956 DOVER

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (18) DOVER 1 JUN 1956

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (50) 13 JAN 1955 LONDON AIRPORT

23 JAN 1955

23 JAN 1955

Nr. 7203699

RAUM FÜR SICHTVERMERKE

UP TO THREE MONTHS

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (41) 30 MAY 1956 DOVER

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (18) DOVER 1 JUN 1956

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (50) 13 JAN 1955 LONDON AIRPORT

23 JAN 1955

23 JAN 1955

Nr. 7203699

GELTUNGSBEREICH DES PASSES

In-u.Ausland

Der Pass wird ungültig am 4. Nov. 1959

wenn er nicht verlängert wird.

Ausstellende Behörde

München, den 5. Nov. 1954

Stadtrat der Landeshauptstadt

Amt für öffentliche Ordnung

Nr. 7203699

VERLÄNGERUNGEN

1. Verlängert bis , den

Domestic

Unrestricted

2. Verlängert bis , den

Domestic

Unrestricted

3. Verlängert bis , den

Domestic

Unrestricted

Nr. 7203699

NOT AVAILABLE COPY

22 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Suggestion that UTILITY'S Daughter
Attend American College

Colonel Critchfield spoke to me about UTILITY's daughter attending an American college and suggested Smith. I told him that I supposed this could be arranged. One of my former law partners was President of the Board of Trustees at Smith but, doubtless, there are other and better ways of arranging this, if it is thought desirable. You may wish to mention it to the Director.

L
Chief, Eastern European Division

cc: CFI

C/EE-L ☐ -awn

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - addressee
1 - CFI
1 - EE/PI/G ✓
1 - C/EE
~~1 - [redacted]~~

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DATE 2005

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SECRET

Chief FI/RQM/OIS

6 December 1954

Chief, Contact Division, OO

K-1589; OO/C Case 17055

1. Clarence R. Rungee of 38 Dwight Street, New Haven is listed in the local directory as a naturopath; he has a hospital in another part of New Haven. We have not determined his local reputation in the field of naturopathy since it does not seem important in this case.

2. Rungee is not a native of New Haven but has been in the city for a good many years, and the International War Flag Museum stands for his private collection of flags--there is no museum as such. Ten or fifteen years ago, Rungee became interested in collecting flags, both American and foreign, which had some historical interest. This hobby he developed to such an extent, that he travels over the United States giving lectures to patriotic groups such as the American Legion, for which he receives either a fee or a percentage of the gate. It has been reported that he makes as much as five thousand dollars per show. He is apparently known quite widely throughout the country and his lectures are well-attended. In fact, he appears to be locally known much more for his lecturing than for his doctoring.

3. No information has come to light as to why Rungee should be writing high-ranking foreign generals for biographic material, but it is quite possible he wants to use the information in one of his flag talks.

4. In accordance with your request, no direct approach was made to Mr. Rungee. Contact Division is closing this case.

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DATE 2005

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SECRET

AIR

EGIA-1215
EGIA-1215

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attention: Chief of Base, Pullach
Chief, EE

Operational
Museum of People and Places

REFERENCE: EGIA-11174

Since there were no traces in Headquarters or COMNAV files on Dr. Clarence RUMBLE or his museum, we asked RIJUMP to make a discreet check. The results will no doubt amuse UTILITY:

a. Clarence R. Rumble of 38 Dwight Street, New Haven is listed in the local directory as a naturopath; he has a hospital in another part of New Haven. We have not determined his local reputation in the field of naturopathy since it does not seem important in this case.

b. Rumble is not a native of New Haven but has been in the city for a good many years, and the International War Flag Museum stands for his private collection of flags--there is no museum as such. Ten or fifteen years ago, Rumble became interested in collecting flags, both American and foreign, which had some historical interest. This hobby he developed to such an extent, that he travels over the United States giving lectures to patriotic groups such as the American Legion, for which he receives either a fee or a percentage of the gate. It has been reported that he makes as much as five thousand dollars per show. He is apparently known quite widely throughout the country and his lectures are well-attended. In fact, he appears to be locally known much more for his lecturing than for his doctoring.

c. No information has come to light as to why Rumble should be writing high-ranking foreign generals for biographic material, but it is quite possible he wants to use the information in one of his flag talks.

EE/FIG

10 December 1954

Distribution:

3-FRAN

2-EE/FIG/Z

3-POB--DIRECT

1-RI

EE/FIG/Z/L :jet

EE/FIG/Z

32-6-7

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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12 January 1955

TO : 801
FROM : 88
SUBJECT: "Orientierung No. 72"
REFERENCE: Your Memo No. 10690 of 23 Dec 54.

As already stated orally the concerned "Orientierung" quotes only an article of the "Rheinische Merkur". The author of this article is not connected with us.

Drafting this issue of the "Orientierung", it has been a matter of consideration whether the reproved paragraph should be omitted. Mr. FOERTSCH thought this not to be necessary because the nature of the various quoted newspaper articles is known to our people. It goes without saying that we are not interested in any respect to undermine the reputation of the American soldier, while the concept of German foreign politics is a close alliance with the United States. I think there is no danger that this quoted paragraph could be misinterpreted among our people.

As I pointed out in our last conversation, it is not our business to mix up with the matters of our future defense ministry. On the other side it is natural that all former German professional soldiers are emotionally beholding the present development of ideas in this sector. We should have a good democratic army under an effective parliamentary control, but an army which is trained to fight hard. I think it would only be necessary to take as leading principles the latest training regulations of the American Army instead of the quixotic ideas of some young men who may have the best will but no practical peace-time experiences in training and operations. I may point this out only as my private opinion because it may explain to you why so many former German officers of the older generation are worrying so much, even when they are not personally involved. I think we have only two years more time, then it will show whether or not in the long range Europe will get lost to Communism. Therefore, everything should be done not to waste this time.

Under no circumstances the development of the world situation since the last three years gives any reason for an over-optimistic prospect.

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File

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~~ORIENTIERUNG~~
29514

CONFIDENTIAL

EE/FIG 12

AIR

EGLW-1296

EGLW-1296

JAN 25 1955

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: Chief of Base, Pullach
Chief, EE

Operational

Der Spiegel Article on General GEBLEN

261

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy of an FDD translation of the Der Spiegel article on GEBLEN.

2. For your information, the request for this translation did not originate with EE. The following distribution was made: GDAID 5, GDIRIX 5, GDOATH 5, GDIRIT 5, GDIRCH 2, GDFLOWAGE 5, KUBARK 50.

Attn: Der Spiegel Article

Distribution:

3 - Pullach w/Att (DIRECT)
2 - Frankfurt w/o Att

1 - RI

2 - EE/FIG/Z

ES:had

20 January 1955

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DATE 2005

EE/FIG/

CONFIDENTIAL

EE/FIG/Z

32-6-7-

DFB 50809

FD-78
(2-2-60)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FORM NO. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT

NEWARK

REPORT MADE AT NEWARK	DATE WHEN MADE 1/28/55	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 11/15, 17, 22, 25 12/3, 5, 13, 15, 18, 21, 29, 31/54; 1/3 5, 10, 14, 17/55	REPORT MADE BY BENSON R. MOORE:mac
TITLE WILLIAM HENRY STARR, was JAMES SAMUEL STARR		CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY - R & GE	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Subjects reportedly in Russia. FRANZ NEUGEBAUER, allegedly kidnapped by subjects, reported to be in Poland of own volition. Interviews and information re subjects' former associates and contacts set forth.

-P-

DETAILS:

On December 12, 1954 the "Newark Sunday News" carried an International News Service story, datelined Berlin, as follows:

"Two American brothers began a journey yesterday into the oblivion of the Communist hinterland that is reserved for inept Red Agents.

"Soviet officials said WILLIAM HENRY STARR, 29, and JAMES STARR, 30, of Westville, New Jersey, had been granted political asylum and were en route to Russia.

"The two had planned to live and work in Red-run East Berlin, but their faulty work in a Red engineered kidnapping and their clumsy statements at

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report and makes no recommendation
for clearance or disapproval.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH

FBI

NK 100-31813
NK 100-32447

a later news conference apparently induced the Communists to move them far behind the Iron Curtain.

"Red officials were taking no chances the brothers might change their minds and make the comparatively simple journey from East to West Berlin.....

"American authorities said the brothers had been in close contact with American Communist Party officials before making the trip to Germany. American investigators are still working on the theory that the two acted for some time as Communist Agents in West Germany and West Berlin.

"American Officials said that the STARRs had made themselves useless for future work as Red Agents and that their news conference statements were so clumsy as to be of little use for propaganda."

On January 3, 1955 the "Newark Star Ledger" carried an Associated Press story which was datelined Vienna and was as follows:

"Radio Warsaw said yesterday a former West German Espionage Agent has asked Communist Poland for political asylum. The broadcast identified him as FRANZ NEUGEBAUER, allegedly one-time Deputy Chief in West Berlin of an American financed espionage organization headed by a former German General, REINHARD GÄHLEN. Officials in Vienna recalled that NEUGEBAUER disappeared from Berlin last September.

"The Warsaw radio quoted NEUGEBAUER as saying he fled to Poland because he did not want to take part in West Germany's war preparations."

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On September 24, 1954, Newark Confidential Informant T-1, of known reliability, stated that according to unevaluated information received in Germany from sources of unknown reliability on September 7, 1954, the subjects may have been involved in the abduction into the Soviet sector of Berlin of one FRANZ NEUGEBAUER, described by T-1 as being a Polish refugee and an agent of an American sponsored intelligence service.

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent PHILIP J. CARROLL at Westville, New Jersey:

On December 3, 1954 Mrs. GRACE STARR, 271 Elm Street, Westville, mother of the subjects, advised that she had received a letter on December 2, 1954 which was dated November 15, 1954 from BRIGETTE NAUJECK, (14-A) Ludwigsburg, Preyss Str. 2, Germany.

Previous correspondence between NAUJECK and GRACE STARR dated September 19, 1954 and October 10, 1954 indicated that NAUJECK had known WILLIAM HENRY STARR while he was in Germany and that NAUJECK was at loss to understand the subjects' defection to the Soviets. NAUJECK had also stated that she had written to the Russian Commander in Chief of the East German Sector and to the East German Press Minister in an effort to locate the subjects.

In the letter from NAUJECK dated November 15, 1954, NAUJECK pointed out that she had not received answers to her letters directed to the Russian Commander in Chief of the East German Sector and the East German Press Minister.

NAUJECK also pointed out that she had moved to Southern Germany because it was necessary for her to give up her studies at the Free University, Berlin and seek employment. NAUJECK also mentioned that her mother lives in the Russian Zone in Potsdam and is employed as a teacher.

NAUJECK indicated that she was aware that Mrs. STARR had been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and stated that HENRY STARR's landlady in Berlin underwent, and

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NK 100-32447

is still undergoing the same. NAUJECK continued by saying that she had offered the "F.B.I." all the information she could give and that she was under the impression that the "F.B.I." had some trace of HENRY and JAMES.

In this letter NAUJECK stated, "The strange thing is HENRY was introduced to me by a good girlfriend of mine whom I had met six years ago and since that time have only corresponded with, and now her name was given by the East German Press Professor in that conference as someone who had been working for the Communists."

NAUJECK identified the "good girlfriend" as one ELLE EILHAUER who had emigrated to the United States.

Newark Confidential Informant T-2, another governmental agency which conducts security type investigations, advised that in October, 1954 Mrs. ELLEN EILHAUER, of Dixon, Illinois, was interviewed regarding her association with the subjects and her knowledge of their activities. In view of NAUJECK's remarks in her November 15, 1954 letter to Mrs. GRACE STARR describing EILHAUER "as someone who had been working with the Communists", a resume of information furnished by Mrs. EILHAUER to T-2 is set forth:

Mrs. EILHAUER said she knew WILLIAM STARR as HENRY STARR but never met his brother, JAMES, and believed JAMES had remained in the United States. She dated STARR and last saw him for four days in Berlin during February, 1954 and she has not seen him, nor heard from him, since that time. She disclaimed any knowledge of his desertion to the East Sector, although she stated she was suspicious of the reason for his extended stay in Germany when she noted he was in possession of a German driver's license dated March, 1953. STARR claimed to be in the television business with his brother and three others in the United States and he claimed to be in Germany for the purpose of establishing connections for this company. He displayed no unusual interest in international politics nor in Mrs. EILHAUER's position. He expressed a desire for peace and co-existence with the Russians. STARR gave no

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NK 100-32447

evidence of pro-Russian or anti-American attitude. He stated he thought the Negro was treated unfairly in the United States but did not suggest Communism as a remedy. Mrs. EILHAUER stated that in her job with F.O.A. she did not handle any classified material and she categorically denied ever having given any official information to STARR and that all matters discussed with him were already public knowledge.

During the course of the December 3, 1954 interview with Mrs. STARR, Mrs. STARR advised that in December, 1954 she had received a letter from DULCIE MC CAULEY, 154 Burke Street, Darlinghurst, Sydney, Australia. Mrs. STARR did not remember the date the letter was sent or postmarked. In the letter MC CAULEY stated that she is working for the Burrough's Company in Sidney. MC CAULEY further stated that a girlfriend, name unknown, with whom she is acquainted, flew to Australia a couple of weeks ago because of her father's death. This girl told MC CAULEY that the F.B.I. had been coming to her house about once a week looking for MC CAULEY. In conclusion, MC CAULEY indicated that she intends to take a trip to Montreal, Canada in March, 1955.

DULCIE MAY MC CAULEY, who was deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in September, 1954, has been described as a former girlfriend of JAMES STARR subsequent to his departure from the United States.

Mrs. DORIS SENINGEN, 210 Westmont Avenue, Haddon Township, New Jersey, advised that she is identical with DORIS BRAUN who formerly resided at 440 Grant Street, Camden, New Jersey. She advised that she became acquainted with the STARR family approximately four years ago and had dates with WILLIAM HENRY STARR on several occasions. She recalled WILLIAM telling her that during World War II he served in the Merchant Marine and was befriended by the Russians when he was ship-

NK 100-31813
NK 100-32447

wrecked off the Russian Coast. She also said that on numerous occasions WILLIAM started to talk to her about Communism but she told him she was not interested and he would discontinue the discussion. Mrs. SENINGEN continued by saying that the night before the subjects disappeared, she accompanied the subjects to the apartment of DULCIE MC CAULEY located at 318 Penn Street, Camden, New Jersey, where DULCIE prepared a dinner for them. During the evening WILLIAM was apparently nervous but did not say anything about going on a trip.

Mrs. SENINGEN concluded by stating that DULCIE MC CAULEY had remarked shortly after the subjects had left the country that JAMES had borrowed \$200 from her.

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agents PHILIP J. CARROLL and JOHN R. BRETT:

(Mrs. MARIE WICKES, 615 Broadway, Westville, New Jersey, advised on January 7, 1955 that until a few months ago she had rented an apartment in a home owned by DANIEL STARR, brother of the subjects, in National Park, New Jersey. Mrs. WICKES advised that DULCIE MC CAULEY had rented a room in her apartment for a period of time but MC CAULEY eventually left National Park and moved to Camden because she and Mrs. WICKES could not get along. Mrs. WICKES said that she is an Australian girl and prior to 1946 she worked for the United States Navy in Erisbane, Australia. During this same period Mrs. WICKES advised that DULCIE MC CAULEY worked in the United States Navy canteen on the same base. Mrs. WICKES continued by saying that she came to the United States in 1948 and that the subjects visited her apartment frequently to see MC CAULEY. Mrs. WICKES said that she was left with the impression that the subjects were Communists but did not feel that it was any of her business. According to Mrs. WICKES, MC CAULEY went out with JAMES STARR frequently but that she did not see the subjects, with one exception, after MC CAULEY moved to Camden. Mrs. WICKES said that the one exception was about two weeks prior to their disappearance in 1953 but at that time they did not indicate to her that they were planning to go to Europe.

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NK 100-32447

AT CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY

Newark Confidential Informant T-3, of unknown reliability, but who knew JAMES STARR for a period of six months, advised on September 30, 1954 that during 1952 JAMES STARR had in his possession postcards from an unidentified organization, stating that meetings would be held at certain times and dates at either 5th and Birkley Streets or 7th and Birkley Streets in Camden, New Jersey.

Newark Confidential Informant T-4, of known reliability, reported on December 31, 1954 that the International Workers Order maintained their headquarters formerly at 5th and Borkley Streets, Camden, New Jersey.

The INTERNATIONAL WORKERS ORDER (IWO) has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

-P-

-7-

FOIA 12 768

21 FEB 1965

INFO: COM

Operational

UJ DRACO 6

1. We propose that plans be made for two UJ DRACO groups during the next year. The first group will come from the ZIPPER Evaluation Staff and includes KLOTZ (Economic), NORDMANN (Military), HIRTH (Military) and Dr. GRUENWALD (Economic Sifter). This group should have partly the character of earlier UJ DRACO trips with greater emphasis on KUCHAP discussions at Headquarters. UTILITY would like to send either ROSEIDEL or BERNHARDT on a strict duty status for several days to join the group in Washington for the KUCHAP discussions.

2. The second UJ DRAGO group this year should include only operational personalities and, if possible, extend to individuals like SWAGNER, the chief of the ZIPPER base in Bremen. This group would be scheduled for autumn 1955 at the earliest.

3. ☐ is submitting the basic letter on the first group proposed and should, if possible, be the escort.

4. I wish to emphasize the unanimous opinion among the POS staff that past UJ DEACO trips have left a deep imprint on those ZIPPERites who participated. Our continuing close relationship with individuals such as KUEHN, WOLLMANN, GUY, MAURER and SEIDEL is, we believe, not unrelated to this program.

5. I should also like to take this opportunity to remind you of past proposals that UTILITY again visit Washington either just before or just after the establishment of UPSWING. I have from time to time mentioned this to him and we should be prepared to follow through at the appropriate time. Such a visit would, I believe, be the opportune moment for Ascham to review the contents of our Bilateral Agreement with UTILITY.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

DIST
3 EE
3 COM

copy

18 Feb 55

32-1-7-

485-1

SECRET

5-895
DD/P 1-2549

MAR 18 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: Visit to the United States of General GEHLEN

1. On several occasions in the past Col. Critchfield has suggested that General GEHLEN visit Washington either just before, or shortly after, the legalization of ZIPPER. In addition to further strengthening our position in general with the German Intelligence Service such a visit would present an opportune moment for the DCI to review the contents of our secret Bilateral Agreement with GEHLEN. Col. Critchfield has now brought up the matter again in the form of a specific proposal and urged that preparations be made to follow through at the appropriate time.

2. It is requested that approval in principle be granted for this proposal at this time. If this approval is granted we will notify Col. Critchfield that we are in general agreement with the proposal and consider the most appropriate time to be shortly after legalization. We will also request that any firm plans be cleared with us well in advance.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT, Eastern European Division
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C
UNIT : E/FIG/Z
EXT : 528
DATE : 28 MARCH 1955

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	FIG	4	CHH
2	FIG	5	
3	CHH 010	6	

TO : SR REP: PULLACH, FRANKFURT

FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA

CONF : EE (1-4)

INFO : DCI (5), D/DCI (6), COP (7), A/DD/P/P (8), FI (9), FI/OPS (10), S/C (11-12)

DIR 45614 (OUT 75470) 1926Z 31 MAR 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SPULL

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

KAPOK

RE: ECLA 12768, PARA 5 - US DRACO

1. PROPOSED UTILITY TRIP APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE. BELIEVE MOST APPROPRIATE TIME SHORTLY AFTER LEGALIZATION. FURTHER FEEL SHOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS SECRET BILATERAL AGREEMENT FULLY CONCLUDED AND AGREEMENT FIRM.
2. WILL AWAIT YOUR FIRM PROPOSAL AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

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DCI

C/FI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Visit to the United States
of General GEHLEN

1. Colonel Critchfield, Chief of the Pullach Operations Base, has suggested that General GEHLEN visit Washington either just before, or shortly after, the legalization of ZIPPER. It is believed that such a visit would contribute considerably toward further strengthening our position in general with the German Intelligence Service and that the most appropriate time would be shortly after legalization. It is expected that by this time we will have concluded a secret Bilateral Intelligence Agreement with ZIPPER and the visit will give you an opportunity to discuss, among other things, the contents of this agreement with GEHLEN, in event you deem it appropriate.

2. The attached cable is to advise Colonel Critchfield that we agree in principle with his proposal.

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

Chief, Eastern European Division

Cable attached

EE/FIG/Z/ []
29 March 1955

[] :bwd

Dist: Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Chief, EE
2 - EE/FIG/Z

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162

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

DATE : 5 MAY 55

S-E-C-R-E-T
SECURITY INFORMATION

1	<i>F7</i>	4	<i>JP</i>
2	<i>F7</i>	5	<i>JP</i>
3	<i>Chen</i>	6	<i>JP</i>

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PULLACH

MAY 5 1955

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, CI, CI/OPS, WE 4, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PULL 0575 (IN 39889)1706Z 5 MAY 55ROUTINEPRECEDENCE

TO: SFRAN

INFO: DIR, SPARI

CITE: SPULL

RE: DIR 00503 (OUT 83815)

what is utility version para 1 ref?
did he in fact request meeting with

1. SPEIDEL APPROACH TO ☐ WAS BASED ON UTILITY
EXPRESSION DESIRE MEET ☐ AFTER UPSWING ESTABLISHED.

what purpose?

2. UTILITY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION ☐ OFFER ARRANGE
MEETING IN PARIS CIRCA 12 MAY. UTILITY FEELS IT INADVISABLE
TO MEET ☐ IN PARIS UNTIL HE LEGAL HEAD UPSWING; WOULD
APPRECIATE ANYTHING ☐ CAN DO TO FACILITATE FUTURE MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

logged

S-E-C-R-E-T
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

GEHLEN - 201

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ECQW-23971

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

MAY 13 1955

TO Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE

FROM Chief, EE

INFO: Chiefs of Mission,
Berlin, Bonn, Pullach

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/CART/LCIMP/PROVE
SPECIFIC ODEWY Report of 28 January 1955 on STARR Brothers

1. ODEWY's 28 January 1955 report on the STARR Brothers investigation reports a new address for Brigitte NAUJECK. (Mrs. Grace STARR, mother of subjects, received a letter from NAUJECK dated 15 November 1954 with the return address Ludwigsburg, Preys Str. 2, Germany. In the letter NAUJECK advised Mrs. STARR that she had not received an answer from the Russian or East German officials on her request for information on the whereabouts of the STARRs. She informed Mrs. STARR of her request to the East Zone officials in a letter of 19 September 1954. NAUJECK gave as a reason for her move to Southern Germany the fact that she had to give up her studies at the Free University of Berlin and find employment. She also added that her mother lives in the Russian Zone in Potsdam and is employed as a teacher.

2. In addition to the above, the following information in the ODEWY report might be of interest to you. A 12 December 1954 "Newark Sunday News" INS story stated that the STARR Brothers had requested and received political asylum and were enroute to Russia. The story continues by stating that their faulty work in a Red engineered kidnapping and their clumsy statements at a later news conference apparently induced the Communists to move them far behind the Iron Curtain.

3. A 3 January 1955 "Newark Star Ledger" AP story (Dateline Vienna) is quoted as follows: "Radio Warsaw said yesterday a former West German Espionage Agent has asked Communist Poland for political asylum. The broadcast identified him as Franz NEUGELBAUER, allegedly one-time deputy chief in West Berlin of an American-financed espionage organization headed by a former German General, Reinhard GEHLIN. Officials in Vienna recalled that NEUGELBAUER disappeared from Berlin last September. The Warsaw radio quoted NEUGELBAUER as saying he fled to Poland because he did not want to take part in West Germany's war preparations."

(Signature of Agent)

RONALD C. HARTMAN

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Chief, EE
(Attn: TC)
Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COM

Operational

18 May 55

UTILITY's Visit to the U.S.A.

1. UTILITY feels the following are the minimum conditions that must exist before his trip to the U.S.A.:

a. UPSWING established and its initial position in the government established.

b. The completion of action by the appropriate UPGROWTH office defining his authority as Chief UPSWING for negotiating agreements on intelligence matters with friendly services.

2. I believe that UTILITY's views on this matter coincide with ours.

3. UTILITY estimates that UPSWING issue will have been decided by 1 July 55. By 1 September he expects to have the initial relationship with UPGROWTH settled and hopes that his authority to negotiate with other services will have been officially determined. Thus, the last half of September seems a likely time for the visit.

4. If UPSWING affairs will permit him the time, UTILITY will travel to and from the U.S.A. by boat. If he is pressed for time, he may fly one way. His medical staff here has urged the boat trip as a means of getting him away from work for a few days.

5. In view of the publicity during the past year or two, travel in a true name passport would almost certainly attract attention. While we still have some months in which to plan this matter, would you explore the problems that travel with an alias might produce with U.S. officials. As I recall, we managed this in the case of Dr. KLAUSNER in one of the original UJDRAGO trips.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

DIST
3 EE
3 COM
2 PRU

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18 May 55

The 1000 ()

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Visit to the United States of General Gehlen

1. Several weeks ago we voiced our agreement in principle to a proposal by Colonel Critchfield that General Gehlen visit the United States after the establishment of the German Intelligence Service. Colonel Critchfield has now informed us that Gehlen considers the following as the minimum conditions which must exist before he undertakes a trip to the United States.

- a. The GIS must be established and its position in the government clarified and secured.
- b. A clear definition of his authority, as Chief of the GIS, for negotiating agreements on intelligence matters with friendly services must have been rendered by the appropriate office of the German government.

The above, I believe, coincides with our views on this matter.

2. Gehlen now estimates that the GIS issue will have been resolved by July 1, 1955. He expects to have the initial relationship with UPOBOWTH clarified by September 1 and hopes that his authority to negotiate with other services will have been defined by that time. Thus, it would appear at this time that the last half of September would be a likely time for the visit.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

/S/
[]
Chief, Eastern European Division

EE/FIG/Z/ [] : bwd

6 June 1955

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/EE
1 - RI
2 - EE/FIG/Z

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SECRET

BRITISH TO CRC

SECRET

K/0176

10th June, 1955

Marshal ZHUKOV

The following remarks about Marshal ZHUKOV appear on page 13 of the 9th edition of "TIME".

"When the chance came for a military course at Moscow's Frunze Academy he grabbed it. Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov thought him "somewhat slow", but sent him off to Germany to study under General von Seeckt. The black-haired young Russian was a strong figure among the shaven-headed, monocled Prussians, but Swordsman Zhukov could outface any of them, as he later could outface any Russian officer who served with him. From von Seeckt, chief theorist of the new German army that was already forming, Zhukov learned the strategy and tactics of the "breakthrough".

In addition on page 15 of the German Military Text Book, "Ubersicht uber Hoherer militairische Fuhrer der Roten Armee" (August 1944) is the enigmatic entry against 1928 "Besuch einer Kriegsakademie". The author of this book was "Colonel" GEHLEN."

We would be grateful for any comments you care to make.

DIST.	Action	Info
841		LA
831		13
801		13
CARDERD:		
File: <u>240 ZHUKOV</u>		

Comment by Org 12 July 55

240 Gehlen, Reinhardt

240 ZHUKOV, Georg

WILLIAMS' Daughter:

23. Could you obtain information, booklets, etc., on Radcliffe. ☐ suggested it as a good choice. Some time later this year a report on this will be submitted.

26 LA-14 730

6 Jul 55

Orig. Filed in []

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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26 LA-14 730

9 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Letter from General Gehlen

Attached is a letter for you from General Gehlen who expresses his appreciation for the manner of treatment given the members of his organization who visited the United States last month.

15/ BBL
Chief, Eastern European Division

1 Enclosure:
Sealed envelope for
Mr. Dulles *(was attached to*
EGLA-14464)
EE/FIZ/CWS:jrr
Rewritten Office of Chief, EE - mlg

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Addressee
1 - C/EE
1 - RI
✓ 2 - EE/FIZ

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

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Spy Service

In the dangerous underground game of Cold War espionage, the Communists have a built-in advantage: an estimated 10 million party members in over 60 different countries, all of them potential agents. The West has many more potential friends—the oppressed inside the Communist empire—but since most of them are inaccessible or terrorized by the police, Western strategists rely most heavily on professional intelligence outfits—the U.S.'s CIA, Britain's Military Intelligence, France's Deuxième Bureau, etc. Last week West Germany covertly confirmed what had long been widely suspected: Bonn, too, has its own apparatus of anti-Communist spies. *Büro Gehlen*, as the Germans call it, is now to become an official arm of the West German government.

Anonymous Prussian. Mere mention of the name Gehlen is enough to make U.S. intelligence chiefs in Germany clam up and try to look blank. For years both Washington and Bonn refused to confirm that the organization existed. But since the Communists themselves took to blaming "Gehlen agents" for acts of sabotage throughout Eastern Europe, enough facts have leaked out to suggest that *Büro Gehlen* not only exists, but that it may be one of the best intelligence networks in the business.

Something like 4,000 Gehlen agents, some of whom served as German spies in World War II, are at work in Europe and Russia. Some range as far afield as Cairo, Istanbul and Madrid. Their chief, former Brigadier General Reinhard Gehlen, 62, is a slight, light-clipped Prussian with a passion for anonymity. A Wehrmacht reg-

Gehlen rose in World War II to become head of the "Enemy Army-East," the super-secret intelligence staff that evaluated the reports of a vast network of German agents ranging the Eastern front from Leningrad to the Caucasus. Because his realistic appraisals of Soviet strength clashed with Hitler's wish-thinking, Gehlen often drew the Führer's fire. Once, the story goes, Hitler read a Gehlen paper and exploded angrily: "What fool dug out this nonsense?" But events proved Gehlen's gloomy reports right.

No Picture. When the Red army smashed into the Reich, Gehlen fled west, taking his files with him. He made three copies of each of his records and deposited them at three different addresses. Later, when the Cold War came, U.S. intelligence officers found the Gehlen files invaluable. Gehlen was flown to Washington and returned to Germany with the secret understanding that he would rebuild his intelligence apparatus and set it to work for both the U.S. and Western Germany. Reportedly, his terms included that he never would have to operate against the "German interest," and he himself would be the judge of that interest.

Washington does not admit that the U.S. has financed Gehlen's activities (the preferred phrase is that he enjoys a "favorable relationship" with U.S. intelligence agencies). *Büro Gehlen's* headquarters, a clump of houses surrounded by barbed wire, is south of Munich and not far from Dachau. Outside the main offices the Stars & Stripes fly alongside the flag of West Germany. Gehlen himself stays out of sight. He is married and has four children; he loves fast cars and still has a student's fascination for tricky paraphernalia, obsolete codes and invisible inks. The only available photograph of Gehlen was taken when he was a colonel, twelve years ago.



MASTER SPY GEHLEN
Deep in the shadows.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION BOARD
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

AIR

EDLA-14 998

22 DEC 1955

Chief, EK

Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COS

UTILITY's Daughter

Ref : EGDW-1213, 3 Dec 54.

1. I have discussed this matter with a number of our colleagues with first-hand knowledge of both Smith and Radcliffe. It is a fairly unanimous opinion that, for UTILITY's daughter, the latter would be the better solution. We have written directly to Radcliffe for catalogue and other available printed material that might be of interest to her.

2. UTILITY's daughter is currently working in the ZIPPER security office. Within a few days she will leave for Rome to spend a month with UTILITY's brother. She will return to Munich for several weeks in September before departing for Portugal to spend almost a full year with one of UTILITY's relatives who is a commercial attache in the German Embassy in Lisbon.

3. We have tentatively agreed that the entrance to Radcliffe should be in September 1955 and that she will complete one year before returning to Germany. She has no particular interest in receiving academic credit for her studies at Radcliffe and will select a number of varied courses that will give her a minimum understanding of the United States in a year of study. Her English is not at all bad and will, I believe, suffice.

4. This is intended only to bring you up to date on this matter. A special project will be submitted during the next few months after our plans are firm.

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DATE 2005

Distribution:
1-1 (DIRECT)
2005

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Orig: 21 July 55

SECRET

EGNA 7050

EGNA 7050

Chief, EE

Chief of Station, Germany

INFO: Chief, POB

CALL/Operational

British Comments on IS Matters

1. On 21 July the undersigned attended a luncheon given for the newly arrived replacement of [] [], French IS Liaison Officer. In addition to [] and the undersigned, CIC, U.S. Air Force OSI representatives and British Liaison officers [] and [] were present.

2. After a considerable amount of wine had been consumed [] made the statement that he was glad to be leaving Bonn because the Gahlen Organization was going to start running things and both he and his French bosses were aware that the BfV would become an even weaker and more ineffective instrument. [] said they felt the BfV would eventually be abolished and the French were becoming quite alarmed at the manner in which they were being treated and handled by the German Defense Ministry officials. [] said that with the exception of [], no one in the Defense Ministry was available to him anymore and even the French military officials have noticed a coolness on the part of their German counterparts.

3. The above comments by [] acted as a catalyst to get [] and [] started on the subject of U.S./German military relations. They said it was too bad that the U.S. had seen fit to ally herself closer with the Germans on military and intelligence matters than with their allies. [] stated that he and his colleagues had often discussed the problem of German remilitarization and they were convinced that a re-birth of German militarization, whether it be in Western Germany or in a united Germany would in the long run be a more dangerous threat to world peace than the Soviet army. Both [] and [] very bluntly felt that the Americans had sold their souls to the Germans because of their frantic and hysterical desire to thwart the Soviet military strength. They also felt that while it was mainly through U.S. initiative back in 1951 and 1952 that the Germans remilitarized, the time has now been reached where the Germans are rapidly getting the upper hand in these matters.

4. They consistently brought up Zipper and it was quite obvious in talking with them that they felt we had not been truthful with them as to the extent of our past and planned cooperation with this organization. [] already knew that UTILITY had met former American Colonel Truman Smith in Duesseldorf. Both [] and [] pulled my leg somewhat by saying that it wouldn't be long before Zipper defects to G-2 and that it was quite obvious that the U.S. Army was getting very cozy not only with German Defense Ministry officials but were paying increasing attention to German intelligence officials.

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30-6-24-1-1

251

SECRET

5. The British inferred by these statements that they were aware of friction between KUBARK and G-2 and it was apparent that they were watching this alleged feud with great interest. The Britishers and [] both said they regretted very much that during the immediate post-war period the U.S. did not expend more effort in trying to solidify the Allies, namely British and French, in intelligence and military matters. [] very openly stated that there is less cooperation between the British, the Americans and the French than certain Allied cooperation with the Germans. He was apparently referring to U.S. intelligence cooperation with the Germans. He seemed rather bitter and cynical about the subject and finally stated, "we better drop the subject since I might say things I would later be sorry for".

6. In answer to []'s comments that the BfV is becoming an ineffective instrument, [] stated that they had a great deal of confidence and faith in Hubert Schrübers and that he had known him for quite some time. He said Schrübers is young and energetic and would fight to prevent his office from being dominated by "certain outside agencies that your Americans have your fingers in".

7. These comments are being forwarded to help assess what some of our Allies on the working level think about U.S./German cooperation.

Distribution:

3 - ~~EE~~ (DIRECT) ✓
3 - COS
2 - RCB

25 July 1955

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SECRET

33-6-2/1-122-1

WITT'S U.S.A. Trip:

3. With legalization delayed until November at the earliest, the proposed trip is off until some time early in 1956. Incidentally, he has also stated that he is able to make this trip with a false document from beginning to end. Also, he wants to travel to Washington via Paris to see his friend [redacted] as a gesture of good [redacted] in confidence of [redacted] his trip.

SECRET

EGLA-15 171

For Knightly
2 Aug. 55
Gehlen

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DATE 2001 2005

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PULL 1646 (IN 41512) 27 August 1955

During Adm. RODGERS early summer visit to Pullach he invited GEHLEN to visit sixth U.S. fleet sponsored by U.S. navy.

Party to include GEHLEN; Seep OBERMAIER, Chief ZIPPER naval Evaluation Group; Lt. Cmdr RYCHLY, Navy Rep Munich; and Chief of Staff Comnavger.

GEHLEN to travel with German passport 8553501 under name @Richard GEHLER (SIC).

Extraction
Cable filed NAVAL MATTERS

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

GEHLEN-201

5 August 1955

NOTES FOR INCLUSION IN "LETTER FROM THE FIELD"

[] met UTILITY for the first time at an informal dinner at []'s home on 5 August 1955. UTILITY, by choice, was not accompanied by other senior members of his staff.

Although the conversations ranged over a wide number of subjects, including the political aspects of the establishment of UPSWING, the Geneva Conference, the current political situation, current PP operations, UPSWING's future PP charter, and the possibilities of a visit by Ascham to Germany and a later visit by UTILITY to the United States, nothing new emerged from this session.

UTILITY was blunt in his criticism of the U.S. position at Geneva. He expressed the opinion that in the realm of international politics one should never tell a Russian that one will not shoot him and should under no circumstances be as convincing in this position as President Eisenhower was at Geneva. This is, of course, the basic position reflected in recent political reporting both to us and to UPTHRUST. I thought the evening would be a good basis for continued good relations between UTILITY and the KUBARK Chief of Station in Germany. If the conversations were somewhat mild in character, it was only because the meeting came at a time when neither UTILITY nor [] had problems or any particularly interesting new developments to discuss with each other.

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DATE 2005

~~HA~~

File: 240 GATLEN

5-2417

1:8029

SECRET

8 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Some British Comments on U.S./German Military and Intelligence Cooperation

1. [] reports that at a welcome luncheon for the newly arrived French Liaison Officer at Bonn, which was attended by all Allied Liaison Officers to the German Internal Security Service (BfV), Messrs. [] and [] of [] made the following comments on U.S./German cooperation regarding military and intelligence matters: They regretted that the U.S. had allied herself more closely with the Germans on military and intelligence matters than with the Allies and were quite blunt in expressing their feelings that the Americans had sold their souls to the Germans because of their frantic and hysterical desire to thwart Soviet military strength. In pursuing this topic, it became obvious that they felt we had not been truthful with them as to the extent of our past and planned cooperation with ZIPPER. [] was aware that General Gehlen had met former Colonel Truman Smith. Showing their awareness of the friction between CIA and G-2, Messrs. [] and [] stated that it wouldn't be long before ZIPPER defects to G-2, and that it was quite obvious that the Army was not only cultivating German military but also German intelligence officials.

2. A copy of the dispatch is attached.

for []
Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachment: 1

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SOURCE: MET 103 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

EE/G/II/Z

AIR

SNL-1764

AUG 24 1955

Chief of Station, Germany
ATTN: Chief of Base, Pullach
Chief, ES

Operational

UTILITY's Daughter

REFERENCE: SNL-14998

We wrote for the attached catalogues before SNL-14998 arrived.

Since we have them in hand we are sending them along anyway.

APPROVED _____

Distribution

3-Germany

3-Pullach (DIRECT)

1-RI

2-EE/G/II/Z

ES:fd

18 August 1955

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DATE 2005

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BC
EE/G

EE/G

File-GEHLEN 201

PULL

1723

DIR INFO: FRAN

ROUTINE

PULL

2 SEPT 55

KYBAT

REF: PULL 1646

GROUP DEPARTING MUNICH 1100 HOURS 5 SEPT. UTILITY WILL RETURN MUNICH
DIRECTLY FROM PAKA BY NAVY FLIGHT. WILL NOT VISIT SPAIN.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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SECRET

MLW

FILE: 230.8

x - 240 GEBEL, Reinhard

Courier

EGHA-2552

SECRET

Chief of Base, Pullach

MICROFILMED

22 September 1955

Chief, ULS

FEB 14 1962 INFO: COS

DOC. MICRO. SER.

HOB
KE

Operational

Interest in General Gehlen's Background

1. CI Branch, G-2, USAREUR, has informed this office that Willi FRISCHAUER, 8 Belgize Square, London, England, has inquired of a newspaperman, Fritz KITTLOW, 162 Farmsener, Hamburg, concerning details of Gehlen's background. Gehlen was referred to in a letter from FRISCHAUER as R6 and his organization as the G6. FRISCHAUER wished information on Gehlen's war record and whether Gehlen was a Nazi.

2. The above obviously comes from intercepts. Inasmuch as G-2 is always reluctant to pass information from such sources that will get into German hands, it is requested you veil this when passed to conceal the intercept source as far as possible. Further, the information is the by-product of an unrelated operation.

3. This may of course be only a journalistic inquiry for an article or book or it may have some operational significance. G-2 stated that CIC records were negative on the individuals involved.

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DATE 2005

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2-HOB
2-KE
2-ULS

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21 September 1955

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RI COPY

22-6-1-5-117

GEHLEN 201

EGMA-357

EGMA-157

Chief of Base, Pullach

26 September 1955

Chief of Base, Hamburg

INFO: COS, EE

Operational/DAI

Paul PFIFFER, Chief LTV/Hamburg

Reference: EGMA-15853 dated 15 September 1955

1. Of possible interest in connection with reference is the comment made by Paul PFIFFER of the LTV in a discussion on 21 September 1955 concerning intelligence competition in Germany. PFIFFER stated that he knew UTILITY and was going to discuss the question with him.

2. All information of this nature is of interest to us.

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2 - PCH
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2 - EE Direct

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DATE 2001 2005

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1000V

32-612-616

E-6LA-16392/01

MUNICH REPRESENTATIVE
OF
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, GERMANY

In reply
refer to

VLR:cn
Ser: 00017-55
12 October 1955

~~SECRET~~ - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

From: Munich Representative of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
To: Director of Naval Intelligence

Subj: Visit of General GEHLEN, head of the German Intelligence Service, to the
U.S. Sixth Fleet

- Encls: (1) Copy of Memorandum received by GEHLEN aboard USS SALEM (CA 139)
(2) Copy of Plan of the Day of USS SALEM (CA 139) of Wednesday, 7
September 1955
(3) Itinerary of GEHLEN's visit to Sixth Fleet

1. From 5 September to 10 September 1955 General GEHLEN, Chief of the CIA sponsored German Intelligence Service (GIS), and the Chief of the GIS Naval Evaluation Section, Albrecht OBERMAYER, were guests of the U.S. Navy aboard ships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. During the entire visit GEHLEN used the pseudonym "Dr. GEHLER", but his aid used his own name, OBERMAYER. The identities of the German visitors were known only to higher officers of the Sixth Fleet and a few members of their Staffs. Within COMNAVGER, the entire visit was closely controlled and known only to Admiral RODGERS, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Germany; Capt. R. G. ARMSTRONG, Chief of Staff, COMNAVGER; Cdr. H. W. HARRISON Jr., Intelligence Officer, COMNAVGER; and officers of the Munich office of COMNAVGER. The COMNAVGER plane was used to and from the Mediterranean but the passengers were not identified to the crew. The visit was coordinated with the chief of the CIA's GIS sponsor unit.

2. It is believed that the visit was a complete success and that GEHLEN was greatly impressed and gained some understanding of the capabilities and tasks of modern naval forces. A detailed report of the visit is set forth in the paragraphs below. An itinerary of the trip is forwarded as enclosure (3).

3. Trip from Munich to Villefranche:

a. On 5 September 1955 Gen. GEHLEN and "SEPP" OBERMAYER arrived at Neubiberg AFB escorted by (CIA). The trio remained in the car, parked outside of the passenger lounge, until the plane arrived. Prior to the arrival of the COMNAVGER aircraft, the party was met by this officer, and upon the arrival of the plane, by Capt. R. G. ARMSTRONG, USN, Chief of Staff, COMNAVGER. GEHLEN, who does not like to travel by air, expressed gratitude for the pills against air sickness provided by Capt. ARMSTRONG. After a smooth take-off, GEHLEN

1 MAR
1972

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Navy

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

VLR:cn

Ser: 00017-55

12 October 1955

enjoyed a box lunch (inspite of the bumps caused by head winds). He remarked about the effectiveness of the pills and inquired about the possibility of getting a small supply for his planned journey to the United States in January. Obviously content with the world, GEHLEN talked about his coming CIA-sponsored visit to Washington, D.C., and his desire to return leisurely by ship. He also talked about a vacation he plans to take with his family next year; he likes camping and outdoor life.

b. While over France heading for Marseilles, GEHLEN talked about his eldest daughter (21 years old) and her return from Italy the day before. He stated that his daughter is at times a courier for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that during her last journey an inquisitive German Customs Official almost found the diplomatic pouch. GEHLEN was proud of his daughter's foresight in placing the pouch below a layer of soiled feminine "niceties" at the bottom of the bag. The official inspected the contents of the bag as far as the soiled "niceties" but terminated his inspection there. Use of his daughter for courier runs was necessitated by lack of personnel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to GEHLEN, the courier runs are not as dangerous now as in the days just after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was recognized by the Allies.

c. OBERMAYER made no secret of the written brief which he had prepared for GEHLEN on the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet activities in the Mediterranean and on the NATO Naval Commands. He had prepared a three (3) page essay on the history of a modern aircraft carrier which was carefully read by GEHLEN. Prior to the briefing GEHLEN asked the source of the material. In German, OBERMAYER answered "from open publications and the British".

4. Arrival and Evening of 5 September 1955:

a. Customs delays, identity and passport inspections were avoided at Nice by the arrangements made by LCDR E. W. HOLLOWAY, Flag Lieutenant to the Commander Sixth Fleet. LCDR HOLLOWAY met the plane with two (2) sedans and arranged a smooth passage off the field. GEHLEN admired the warm sunny weather and tropical scenery and talked about the history of Nice and Villefranche.

b. At the pier near Villefranche the COMSIXTHFLT barge awaited the party. The party went aboard the USS SALEM at 1735 and was greeted by LCDR R. G. HARTMAN, USN. The SALEM was so spotlessly clean and shipshape that the party "begged pardon" when shoes missed the runners on deck. GEHLEN was impressed by his first contact with the U.S. Navy, and especially with the attention devoted to him. He saved as a souvenir a memorandum presented him with the roster of ship's officers, ships stores, soda fountain and tobacco shop hours of operation, etc. A copy of this memorandum, which pleased GEHLEN very much, is forwarded as enclosure (1).

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c. That evening, in preference to attending the movies on the fantail, GEHLEN strolled the narrow streets of Villefranche in the company of the party. While waiting for the captain's gig to return aboard, this officer talked alone with GEHLEN.

5. Events of 6 September aboard USS SALEM:

a. On 6 September after breakfast, SALEM hoisted anchor and proceeded at slow speed to her rendezvous with the Sixth Fleet. After an inspection of ship's spaces, GEHLEN came to the subject of GIS accreditation. He anticipated no serious setbacks and foresaw no difficulties in gaining parliamentary approval of his organization. He realized that it would be dangerous if the GIS's accreditation were made a political issue, and considered it his personal achievement that the GIS is above politics. He said he has influential friends in both the government and opposition parties, but still anticipates lengthy parliamentary debates. He is prepared to make minor concessions as the debates progress. With binoculars in hand and seated in the command chair on the Admiral's bridge, GEHLEN was the picture of a man with confidence in his future, and appeared to be in command of the situation.

b. Prior to the last luncheon aboard the SALEM on 7 September, GEHLEN asked this officer if Admiral OFSTIE would like a short briefing on the GIS. This was left to his own discretion, and he appeared very pleased. Immediately preceding the luncheon a small Corsican fishing craft appeared whose Skipper asked help to repair his engines. GEHLEN followed the fishing craft incident with interest and was impressed that the cruiser stopped to render assistance to the Corsican craft. The lunch was a festive one and the atmosphere relaxed and friendly. Seated to the right of Admiral OFSTIE, GEHLEN missed a bite several times in his eagerness to provide quick and accurate answers to the Admiral's questions about Germany, its economic condition and future.

c. After lunch the party relaxed in comfortable chairs and engaged in social conversation. Afterwards, GEHLEN gave a dignified briefing on the GIS, and avoided any attempt at sensationalism. He presented matters accurately, including details of initial setbacks. According to GEHLEN, the last parliamentary recess found the GIS accepted in principal, but various technicalities including approval of the budget remain to be settled during the October-November parliamentary session. He anticipated no problems, however, which he could not overcome by the concessions he is prepared to grant. The GIS mission, as explained by GEHLEN, is the collection and evaluation of political, economic, and military intelligence. He explained that his Chief of Naval Evaluation, OBERMAYER, will be assigned the naval evaluation desk at the Ministry of Defense in addition to his present responsibilities with GIS. He stressed the need for centralization of all collection efforts for economy reasons and added that this trip made him realize the need for reliable naval intelligence. GEHLEN then talked about the "small but effective" future German Navy in the Baltic which was to be ready to frustrate

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any Soviet attempt at invasion of Denmark, and added that the German Navy may one day be worthy of a offensive mission in the Baltic. He talked about the need for close cooperation with the NATO intelligence community, and indicated that he had taken steps to establish liaison contacts with other countries. GEHLEN made it plain that he has close contact with Chancellor ADENAUER, and predicted that the Chancellor's mission to Moscow is bound to fail. According to GEHLEN, ADENAUER was cognizant of the fact that he might meet hard Soviet demands and hardly be accorded an opportunity to enter into serious negotiations. He therefore excluded from his party the Minister of Economics and his advisory staff. GEHLEN believed the Chancellor might succeed in negotiating the release of the German prisoners of war, but that Soviet propaganda would arrange for the credit to go to the GDR. It must be said that GEHLEN fascinated his small audience, and that he was aware of this fact.

d. In the late afternoon a briefing was arranged for the visitors in the presence of Admiral OFSTIE. The composition of the Sixth Fleet and some of its operations and operational areas were reviewed by Capt. R. L. SHIPLEY, the Plans and Operations Officer; logistic and supply problems were presented by Capt. E. D. STANLEY, Fleet Logistic Officer. GEHLEN displayed keen interest in the intricate supply problems and the U.S. Navy developed methods of refueling and replenishing at sea.

e. Escorted by Admiral OFSTIE, GEHLEN was shown the assembled fleet and both aircraft carriers. The Plan of the Day, forwarded herewith as enclosure (2), indicates 1415 as flight quarters to transfer passengers to the USS CORAL SEA. GEHLEN, with perfume from the ship's store and a box of cigars for State Secretary Dr. GLOEKE, was transferred with Capt. ARMSTRONG by the first flight. The party was sent away with friendly waves from the Sixth Fleet Commander and his staff. During the visit GEHLEN extended an invitation to Admiral OFSTIE to visit him in Germany.

6. 7-9 September - USS CORAL SEA:

a. The helicopter was met by Admiral EKSTROM, COMCARDIV 6, and his Chief of Staff. Shortly after he arrived on the Admiral's bridge, GEHLEN commented on the sharp difference between the SALEM and the CORAL SEA. GEHLEN remarked that the crew of the SALEM sweat to maintain her polish and dignity, that of the CORAL SEA to get a hard job done. His remark was appropriate, since the CORAL SEA was in midst of refueling from a tanker which was topping-off a destroyer on the other side.

b. With refueling underway, two cruisers and a submarine nearby, and refueling and replenishing ships on the horizon, GEHLEN was at a loss to find the right camera, although he had two (2) MINOX cameras (one loaded with black and white, the other with colored film); one (1) Minox light meter; one (1) Robot camera with telescopic lens; one (1) Leica with telescopic lens; one (1)

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Exakta loaded with colored film; and one (1) Minox fixed to his binoculars. He respected the desires of the Commander Sixth Fleet, however, and avoided taking pictures of electronic equipment.

c. After dinner GEHLEN watched the landing of jet aircraft aboard the darkened ship. As the first jet landed with a deafening roar and a terrific impact, and the heat of the jet thrust reached the bridge, GEHLEN jumped back against this officer, believing the jet had crashed. As other jets landed in precision he expressed his admiration for the tactics developed by the U.S. Navy, the efficiency of the entire crew, the technical superiority of the U.S. Navy, and the strategic importance of a modern aircraft carrier.

7. On the morning of 8 September GEHLEN was among the first to arrive at breakfast and was eager to observe the launching and landing of aircraft. During breakfast he thanked Admiral EKSTROM for the opportunity to witness carrier operations, which he described as the most interesting and exciting technical development he had ever seen. Throughout that day it was impossible to talk to him on any topic not pertaining to carrier activities. He listened attentively to all explanations by Admiral EKSTROM, his Chief of Staff, and Capt ARMSTRONG, and sought out every opportunity to learn more about air operations, the carrier's tasks, and naval aviation in general. Escorted by a Marine orderly, GEHLEN appeared to be in his own milieu, and he enjoyed every minute of it. The next event of interest was the transfer of a hospital case by highline from a destroyer to the carrier. Afterwards, GEHLEN was introduced to the film "Victory at Sea", parts of which were shown in the Senior Officer's country briefing room.

8. a. After the catapult launching of 6 jets on 9 September, GEHLEN asked this officer about the possibility of a U.S. Navy invitation to General HEUSINGER and ex-Admiral WAGNER to observe carrier and fleet operations. According to GEHLEN, these two individuals will be influential in the development of the future German Navy, and he felt that they should be made aware of the capabilities of modern ships and the vital strategic importance of naval aviation. GEHLEN asked the advisability of inviting State Secretary Dr. GLOEBKE for a similar visit as a guest of the U.S. Navy. Later, he turned to Admiral EKSTROM to learn more about the plans of the Sixth Fleet and the U.S. Navy's plans for its operational forces in this area. GEHLEN then talked about German military activities during WW II in the Black Sea area and the Balkans. He stated that the Sixth Fleet was preserving the moral of the peoples of Greece, Italy, and particularly Spain. He explained that even in Germany the presence of the USN forces in the Mediterranean is most assuring, and that most of West German planning in the Near East is based upon the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. That same evening at the dinner table and prior to the movies he spoke freely about his views on India, Turkey, and Greece.

b. GEHLEN twice invited Admiral EKSTROM to visit Germany, and offered to place a car at the Admiral's disposal.

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9. Arrival in Palma, Majorca: 0800 on 10 September-the arrival at Palma, Majorca, the 21 gun salute of the CORAL SEA, and the white dress uniforms impressed GEHLEN. Later he voiced his appreciation of the need for reliable naval intelligence in the countries of call of the Sixth Fleet and asked whether the Sixth Fleet would appreciate the receipt of GIS intelligence. This was the second time that GEHLEN indicated the possibility of arranging for the release of GIS collected intelligence to U.S. Navy operational commanders.

10. Strolling through the streets of Palma, GEHLEN talked about the Spanish people, their history and struggles, and displayed keen knowledge of the political and economic conditions in Spain. He commented upon the loyalty of the Spanish in general, and in the utmost of secrecy, he revealed that he has established a very friendly liaison with leading Spanish military personalities. At 1030 that morning the group departed Majorca for Munich aboard the COMNAVFOR aircraft.

11. It is believed that GEHLEN's visit was in every way a success. He was visibly impressed by the Sixth Fleet, very pleased by the attention and courtesies given him by Admirals OSTIE and EKSTROM, and very anxious to win the respect (and support) of the U.S. Navy for his organization.

V. L. RYCHLY

Copy to:

Copy No. 2 to COMNAVFOR

Copy No. 3 to CIA (6966 SDU) for Col. CRITCHFIELD's EYES Only

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IS-110-414

UNITED STATES SIXTH FLEET

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. GEBLER

Welcome aboard the Flagship of Commander SIXTH Fleet.

The attached list of Staff Officers, notice of hours of operation of the ship's stores and instructions concerning the Flag Mess are provided for your information.

The Captain's Cabin has been assigned for your use while aboard. Your room steward's name is VEBARES.

You are invited to eat all meals in the Flag Mess which is composed of the following members:

VADM R.A. OFSTIE (Commander SIXTH Fleet)

CAPT C.L. FREEMAN (Chief of Staff to ComSIXTHFLT)

CAPT R.L. SHIFLEY (Plans and Operations Officer, ComSIXTHFLT)

CAPT E.D. STANDLY (Fleet Logistics Officer ComSIXTHFLT)

LCDR T.E. BASS (Flag Secretary, ComSIXTHFLT)

LCDR E.W. HOLLOWAY (Flag Lieutenant, ComSIXTHFLT)

Please let me know if I can be of any assistance during your visit.

Very Respectfully,

/s/ E.W. HOLLOWAY

E.W. HOLLOWAY

Lieutenant Commander, USN

Flag Lieutenant

Enclosure (1) to MUNICH REP of
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ES-110-474
7

Sunrise: 0600
Sunset: 1855

USS SALEM (CA 139)
PLAN OF THE DAY
Wednesday, 7 September 1955

UNIFORM OF THE DAY: Officers and CPO's: Working Khaki
Other Enlisted: Undress White BAKER
Marines to correspond

Carry out "At Sea" routine except as noted below:

- 0000 - 2400 - SALEM AD Ship and Rescue Helicopter Guard
- 0500 - Prepare to TOP-OFF one Destroyer (Divisions concerned call own personnel)
- 0530 - Man stations for refueling destroyer
- 0545 - Destroyer alongside for fueling
- 0600 - (1) Reveille
(2) Early breakfast for observers going to USS WORCESTER
- 0630 - Breakfast
- 0700 - (About) Transfer Damage Control and Engineering Observers from SALEM to WORCESTER by #1 and 2 MMB or high line fore and aft. Rig debarkation net Starboard Quarters. UNIFORM - Officers and CPO's - Working Khaki with ties; Other Enlisted Undress White ABLE
- 0730 - Muster on stations
- 0740 (about) General Quarters for AA Firing (AA George and AA Surprise)
- 1130 - Noon meal
- 1240 - Man CIC and Gunnery Control Stations for competitive Target Designation and Acquisition Exercise
- 1300 - Turn to
- 1415 - (About) Flight Quarters to transfer passengers to CORAL SEA
- 1700 - (1) Evening meal
(2) (About) Observers return to SALEM by boats or high line fore and aft
- 1915 - Protestant Mid-Week Devotions (Crew's Lounge)
- 2000 - Movies on the Fantail

WATCH LIST

00-04 LTJG HOFFMANN-LTJG R.B. RYAN	ENS RUSSELL
04-08 LTJG MC NAUGHTON-LTJG LEAHY	ENS BLERICH
08-12 LTJG WHEELER-LTJG MOLTEN	ENS HOLDING
12-16 LTJG W.C. HALL-LTJG KELLEY	ENS ADKINS
16-18 LTJG FERNALD-ENS YOUNG	ENS CHAMIAN
18-20 LTJG HOFFMANN-LTJG R.B. RYAN	ENS RUSSELL
20-24 LTJG MC NAUGHTON-LTJG KELLEY	ENS HOLDING

NOTES

1. Allotments will be started and stopped at the Disbursing Office Today.

E. M. LUBY
Commander, U.S. Navy
Executive Officer

75-110474

Encl: (2) TO MUNICH REP, COMNAVCR Ser 00017-55

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Itinerary of GHELEN and his Naval Assistant, Albrecht "SEPP" OBERMAYER

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5 Sept: 1145: Departed Munich via COMNAVGER Aircraft from Neubiberg Air Force Base (Munich vicinity)

Escort: CAPT R. G. ARMSTRONG, Chief of Staff, COMNAVGER
LCDR V. L. RYCHLY, Munich Representative of COMNAVGER

Luncheon: Box lunch aboard aircraft

1700: Arrival Nice: met by LCDR F. W. HOLLOWAY, USN (Flag Lieutenant, COMSIXTHFLT)

1735: Arrival Villefranche

1740: Departed Villefranche via COMSIXTHFLT barge

1745: Embark Flagship USS SALEM (met by LCDR R. G. HARTMAN, USN, Ass't Fleet Intelligence Officer)

1815: Dinner in Admiral OFSTIE's Cabin

Billeting: GHELEN in Captain's Cabin
Herr OBERMAYER in Cabin 315

2030-2130: Sightseeing Villefranche

6 Sept: 0745: Breakfast in Admiral's Cabin

0830: Escorted by LCDR HARTMAN through ship's spaces

1200: Luncheon in Admiral's Cabin

1300: Gunnery exercises 3" and 5" guns

1500: Rendezvous of the Fleet

1800: Dinner in Admiral's Cabin

1945: Movie in Captain's Cabin

7 Sept: 0745: Breakfast in Admiral's Cabin

0830: Inspection of below deck spaces, incl. engine room

1015: Gunnery exercise, including A/C sleeve runs

1400: Departure by helicopter to CORAL SEA to observe flight operations

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1530: Refueling at sea

Billeting: GEHLEN: Cabin of CAPT D. P. SMITH Jr., USN, Chief of Staff, Commander Carrier Division SIX
Herr OBERMAYER: Cabin 0256

1800: Dinner in Admiral's Cabin

1900: Jet night operations and air strikes (darken ship)

8 Sept: 0745: Breakfast in Admiral's Cabin

0915: Observation of air strikes

1200: Lunch in Admiral's Cabin

1400: Inspection of ship's spaces: remote control drone gunnery exercise

1950: Highline transfer (Hospital case)

2015: Movie in Senior Officer's spaces

9 Sept: 0230: Replenishment at sea

0745: Breakfast

0800: Replenishment at sea

1200: Luncheon

1300: Air strikes including rocket, A/A firing on ~~all~~ and low targets

1800: Dinner

2015: Movie

10 Sept: 0745: Breakfast

0800: Departure by barge to Palma, Majorca

0830: Sightseeing in Palma

1030: Departure by COMNAVFOR Aircraft

1625: Arrival in Munich

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EGHA-2370

EGHA-2370

Courier

18 October 1955

Chief of Base, Fulloch

Chief, ULS

INFO: COS

Operational

Fritz ZIETLOW and ZILPER

REF: (a) EGHA 2332 - GEHLEN - 201
(b) EGHA 16116

1. The information contained in ref (a) was given to [] in a most informal manner. It is believed that if knowledge of the passing of this information was known to certain individuals in G-2 they would probably object.

2. [] queried the source of the info in ref (a) concerning any G-2 operations directed against Zietlow. The source assured [] that G-2 was running no operation against Zietlow or that involved him. This may seem a little bit difficult to believe, but [] is of the opinion that it is so. [] does not know the details of the workings of the intercept mechanics, but the fact that Zietlow is somewhat out of the normal sphere of [] responsibility tends to support the statement that they are running no operations against him. It would not be beyond the realm of comprehension that the British may have an eye on Zietlow, although no hint of this was given by the source of the information in ref (a).

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GEHLEN - 201

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Chief, EE

25 Oct 55

INFO: OOS

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational

General GEBLEN's VISIT to the SIXTH FLEET (U.S.)

1. Attached is one copy of a TOP SECRET report prepared by the Munich Office of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, on the recent visit of General GEBLEN to the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean.

2. It is my impression that this visit represents an important contribution to our over-all American effort to indoctrinate General GEBLEN and his staff.

3. Admiral OFSTIE, Commander of the SIXTH U.S. Fleet, visited General GEBLEN at his home near Munich on 7 October 1955.

4. One copy of this report has been retained at POB and will be made available to [redacted] on his next visit to Pullach.

James H. Critchfield

Att: 1

COMNAVFOR IS Report 00017-55
 dtd 12 Oct 55

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24 Oct 55

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 DATE 2001 2005

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translation

"Die Welt"; Sunday, 13 November 1955
No. 46 -- page 7

This story of facts enters Secret Service "No-Man's-Land" during and after the war. To the public, Reinhard Gehlen, chief of the "Organization Gehlen", and head of the most important German intelligence and counterintelligence organization, is a "man in the dark". It is the first time that we learn, from a well-known journalist, the story of his personal encounter with the General, around whom rumor has woven a web. Juergen Thorwald, the writer who became famous through the numerous books of contemporary history he has written since 1945, is one of the few outsiders who saw Gehlen with his own eyes and talked with him.

T H E M A N I N T H E D A R K

First Authentic Report on General Reinhard Gehlen

By Juergen Thorwald

Winter was descending upon us, the winter of 1951, when I first saw ex-General Reinhard Gehlen. The name of the man who, in the romantic shimmer of secret service adventure, has become the target of so much puzzled conjecture, was still unknown to the public then.

What preceded my first meeting with this man was a simple story: My book "Es begann an der Weichsel" (It Started At River Vistula), which was published in 1950, was the first to give, in some detail, a description of Gehlen and of his position of chief of the General Staff Department "Foreign Armies East" during the Second World War which was then known only to a few specialists. Gehlen wanted to meet the author of the book who was unknown to him, and to learn how he had come to know of Gehlen's important role during the Second World War.

Since I had not had the slightest notion of Gehlen's existence myself before I started writing my book, I should like to begin with devoting a few words to the circumstances involved. While I worked on the book which described the collapse of the German Eastern Front in January 1945, and the flight and expulsion of the German civilian population from the territories east of Oder and Neisse, I paid a visit to ex-General Guderian. The General had been the chief of the General Staff of the German Army during the tragic battles at the eastern front.

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At the time I called on Guderian, he dwelled humbly with his wife in one room of an old religious establishment in the little town of Dietramszell, between Munich and Bad Toelz. During an entire day he told me of his experiences in the fateful months in the winter of 1945; and in particular he spoke of the various desperate attempts he had made in December 1944 to dissuade Hitler from launching his senseless western offensive in the Ardennes, and to persuade him instead to assemble all available forces to reinforce the eastern front. While Guderian raked up the memories of all this, he, who suffered of a grave heart disease, felt once more the feverish excitement of those winter weeks long gone by. His face was hot when he, repeating the words then spoken on both sides, described the wild quarrels with Hitler, and how Hitler had simply refused to believe in the situation reports which mentioned the strength of the Soviet Armies. It was then that for the first time, as far as I was concerned, the name of Gehlen was mentioned.

Guderian's Story

"Thanks to the unequalled, outstanding work of Generalmajor Gehlen, who was the chief of my Department 'Foreign Armies East' at the time", Guderian said in these same words, "I knew of the troop concentration, of the plans, and of the strength of the Soviets almost in detail. Everything Gehlen reported at the time, proved afterwards to be correct, when things began to happen. Frequently before had I had occasion to observe the almost incredible carefulness and exactness of his intelligence work in regard to the Soviet enemy. Therefore, I never questioned his prediction that the Soviets would begin a great offensive against our eastern front in January 1945."

"On Christmas Eve 1944, I had again appealed in vain to Hitler in his headquarters, which was then in Ziegenberg in Hesse, to reinforce the eastern front and to protect the German civilian population", "Guderian continued, "and during the night which led us into the year 1945 I went once more to Ziegenberg. Gehlen had drawn for me exact maps, which were understandable at a single glance, , and which depicted the operational plan of the Soviets. But when I spread them out before Hitler, he swept them away. 'Who dug out that nonsense?' he cried. And when I mentioned Gehlen's name, he yelled: 'That man should be locked up in a mental institution!' I explained to him that Gehlen's work in the field of intelligence evaluation was probably the best that could be had on the German side. Should Hitler wish to put Gehlen into a mental institution, he might just as well send me along, too. Hitler quieted down, but did not change his opinion."

On 9 January 1945, in a mood of extreme despair, I drove to Ziegenberg for the third time. This time I brought Gehlen along with me. It was a real sacrifice for him. In all probability, baseless abuse would be heaped on his head. When Hitler entered the room, he merely cast a glance of furious contempt at Gehlen. He stared into Gehlen's face, grown haggard and yellowish-pale from gall attacks, and months of overstrain. His eyes showed the hatred of a man who ^{knew} well enough

in his heart that Gehlen was right, but who would not for all the world admit that he was right, since admitting would have meant his own end. Hitler did not interrupt Gehlen when he made the situation report upon my request. As usual, Gehlen made his statements with scientific exactness and with intellectual superiority. He ignored Hitler's stare. His report would have convinced any reasonable person. However, between Gehlen's realism and Hitler there was no bridge. I, too, was unsuccessful when I added the statement that it was now "five minutes to twelve". We returned to Zossen without results. The catastrophe set in during the night from 11 to 12 January 1945, and Gehlen's prediction found a tragic justification ..."

Gehlen Throws Out His Feelers

So I learned for the first time of Gehlen's existence from Guderian, without the slightest notion that Gehlen, with the help of the Americans, had long ago resumed his intelligence work in regard to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Guderian's statements concerning Gehlen were confirmed more than once during the conversations I had subsequently with other surviving witnesses of the conflicts between the leaders during the last months of the war in the East.

There is no doubt that, without my knowing or suspecting it, a sort of intelligence exercise of "how to approach an object" was carried out, before I met Gehlen in person for the first time eighteen months later, in late Fall of 1951. I have no proof, but I am sure that a few ex-officers who volunteered information which could be used as source for the second volume of my description of the East German catastrophe "Es endete an der Elbe" (It Ended at Elbe River), and allowed me to interview them in person, had received instruction from Gehlen to look me over and find out what kind of a person I was.

Finally I was "openly contacted" by a General who had played a not insignificant role in the battle of East Prussia, and who had been dismissed by Hitler because of his consideration for the civilian population. Many months before I had interviewed him concerning his East Prussian experiences. He asked me if I should like to talk with this same Generalmajor Gehlen whom I had described. I agreed. But even then I learned nothing at all of the role Gehlen began to play around that time.

Meeting Place Munich

An appointment was made to meet in the evening of a Thursday, in Munich, where I lived at the time. That night I had some work to do in an editors' office in Munich-Marlaching. It was there that I was to meet Gehlen. Since I had no idea of intelligence practices, I was to experience a few surprises in regard to this meeting.

It was already dark outside, when a polite, well-bred young man entered the ante-room. He said that the Doctor was waiting for me outside, in his car.

"The Doctor?" I asked.

"Yes", he smiled obligingly, "that is how I address my chief, with whom you have an appointment. He would like to dine with you in Schwabing ..."

I did not show my surprise about the discovery that in 1951, when many former officers lived in very reduced circumstances, a former General owned a car and played the host. I merely asked what I was supposed to do with my own car.

The young man -- incidentally, I still do not know who he was -- assured me that he would drive the car to Schwabing himself ...

When we came out on Harthausen Strasse, I saw no car there, except my own, and the Mercedes which was the property of the publisher Kindler. However, the young man took me another hundred meters along the street. There, under a tree, stood a dark Opel Kapitän with dimmed lights. The door on the driver's right side went open, and the inside light was switched on for a moment. The only person in the car sat behind the wheel, a slim man of about fifty years, in a dark-grey suit. He turned his face to me, pulled a grey glove off his right hand, and offered it to me.

"Gehlen", he said. Nothing else. But one single glance in the half-light at the unusually high and wide forehead told me that this was the man whom Cuderman had described in such convincing terms.

Talk At Night

The young man closed the door from the outside, and Gehlen drove on to the center of the city. There was a light evening mist. However, it did not take me long to discover behind us the lights and the broad radiator front of my own car. Everything really seemed to run smoothly like a well-oiled machinery. Soon, however, I had no more time to watch the street and the lights behind us, because Gehlen began abruptly to speak of the problems of our times, and to ask questions. And even during this drive, in the dark of the car, he spoke with such captivating clarity that, after hardly ten minutes' driving, I was aware, with wonder, that here I was driving through the Munich evening side by side with a certainly unusual type of General -- a type which lacked the single-mindedness and the gruffness I had so often encountered in numerous previous interviews.

When, after a short while, we sat opposite one another in the drawing-room of a one-family house which had apparently been requisitioned by the Americans, or perhaps still was, and which stood in one of the remoter streets of Schwabing -- while, of course, both cars had been parked in another street, around the corner -- and were served sandwiches by a silent male servant, I saw Gehlen's head and his figure for the first time in bright light. And this

sight confirmed the impression I had gained on the way. It would never have occurred to anyone who saw him for the first time, not knowing of his past, that he had been a general.

There was nothing about him of that helplessness and forlornness, nothing of that feeling of vanished ground under one's feet, and of being unable to find one's way in a changed world, which characterized so many officers in those times. He seemed to radiate steadiness, clarity, security, superior intellectual analysis of post-war times, combined with the practical ability to find his way in chaos.

He was of medium height and slim, but strong. His suit was inconspicuous and simple, negligently worn, one might say, in the manner of some Englishmen, or else in the manner of persons whose minds are active, whose occupation keeps them awake, and who are not particularly concerned with their outward appearance. He wore a grey suit with a grey pullover, and brown loafers with crepe soles. The tie was in a negligent knot. To mention it right at the start: his trouser pocket did not bulge with a heavy gun, as someone has said somewhere recently, nor did he wear a holster over his shoulder with a pistol under his left arm. Needless to say that he did not wear the dark glasses without which some people seem capable of visualizing an intelligence man. His left breast pocket contained a few revolving pencils, and a handkerchief.

Unnoticed in the D-Train

It is very probably because of his natural inconspicuousness in dress and manners, that a few months ago, at a time when Gehlen's name was on everyone's lips, Gehlen could, with a companion, step into a second-class compartment of a D-train which was filled with journalists -- of all people. Gehlen sat amongst them, read his newspaper, and listened to the conversation about himself, and heard one of them say that it was a "disgrace" that no one had as yet succeeded in getting hold of Gehlen in Bonn or in Munich, or at least in taking a picture. After several hours Gehlen descended at his place of destination; it had occurred to no one that he might be the person they wanted so badly. It was this outward inconspicuousness which kept my mind busy ...

At first sight, this inconspicuousness could even be applied to his face, if one took in only his thin blond hair, his light skin which rather abruptly was red on his cheeks, and the certainly not very elegant short moustache. However, if one looked at his forehead, and especially if one felt directed upon oneself the penetrating, searching gaze out of deep-set eyes, the sensation of inconspicuousness vanished. This glance was a strange mixture of the sensitive intellectuality of a man of learning, and of the wide-awake energy of an organizer, but also of the guarded versatility of a diplomat.

This, then, was Gehlen who sat over against me while I, in vain, meditated upon the question what kind of person the Eastern front General Staff officer and intelligence expert might have become, whom Guderian had so singularly praised. While Gehlen ate only a few morsels, and drank little, he went on with the general political-historical conversation he had begun in the car, and which confirmed that he felt no resentments whatever toward the past, or toward the victors.

Gehlen explained that the leaders of the Soviet Union, unless they should betray their own ideology and destroy the ground under their own feet, would never, and could never, abandon the plan of communist conquest or infiltration of all of Europe, and ultimately of the world. It was the mission of the western nations, he said, first to join forces, and then, overcoming war resentments and the historical national contrasts, to build up a power which would, by combative action, render impossible a sudden further expansion of the Soviet power.

Such equilibrium of political power, he continued, must not be the basis for another attempt to destroy the Soviet power and the Soviet nation through war. Even if it should be possible to conquer the Soviet system, the eastern nation, with its millions of nation-conscious inhabitants and with its enormous economic resources, would still remain an tremendous world power, or would at any rate soon regain that position. No -- the present power policies permit the carrying out of patient long-term policies for the peaceful reconstruction of historical Europe and Germany. True, he said, one must be flexible and patient, and one must learn to recognize, and to exploit, the phases in which the partner is willing to negotiate, the phases when he wishes to stake back, or when he feels the need for rest. Even the Soviet nation must needs go through such phases, in consequence of domestic economic problems, in consequence of the nationalism of the so-called satellite nations, and in the first place, in consequence of the -- while communistic -- more nationalistic developments in East Asia.

However, Gehlen pondered, the basis required for such long-term policies would be the never-ending pursuit of exact knowledge of the developments inside the Soviet Union in all walks of life. It would be only by such knowledge that protection could be granted against illusions and wish-dreaming with their fatal dangers, while the Soviet Government would never leave the ground of cold realistic thinking. Only such knowledge could safeguard the reality of our own political work, and would prevent us and our own primary need for security from dropping off into sleep because of such wish-dreaming.

When Gehlen had reached this point, I asked him: "Do you think the western intelligence services can carry out such services now, considering that during the war some of them defended Soviet aims which had in part been depicted wrongly?"

Gehlen looked at me. It was as if he gazed from out of a fortress of supreme knowledge.

"History", he said oracularly, "will probably determine one day, whether those intelligence services you have in mind have painted a wrong or a correct picture, and how much of it was right or wrong; or whether, and to what extent, governments were unwilling during the war to listen to realistic situation reports.

In The Service Of The USA

"An intelligence service truly devoted to its mission is never engaged in political affairs. Its sole mission is to draw an infallible picture of the situation, with all means it has at its disposal, and with scientific exactness, regardless whether the picture is pleasant or unpleasant. It will have convincing power only if the government to which it presents the picture, knows by experience that the service is incorruptible, not influenced by domestic politics, or otherwise, and pursues truth with iron determination. These prerequisites have not always existed in the past, and not everywhere, including Germany. However, that is what the future is for, namely to learn from the past, and I am sure that much studying and building up is being done at present ..."

The question was on the tip of my tongue to which corners of the world Gehlen's department "Foreign Armies East" might have been scattered which, if Guderian was right, had collected more knowledge about the Soviet Union than any other intelligence service of the western world. But Gehlen, diplomatically, prevented the question which would have gone right to the core of the work he was performing just then. Instead, we talked about how I had come to write my book, and how to present correctly his role during the last tragic weeks of the Second World War in the East; and did I think I might one day want to write the history of the German counterintelligence, including perhaps its fate after the collapse.

And that brought our conversation to an end. When we parted, a sort of shyness prevented me from asking frankly what Gehlen had done with his life after the war, and whether he had found a good position in some business, as his appearance seemed to indicate. At any rate, I made a mental note of what he had said about future policies and the missions of western intelligence services, and today, when it has come true that a policy of wide-awake realistic flexibility is necessary, I find far-sightedness in what he said as well as a definite warning against the illusions of these times.

Our cars drove away in different directions, in a thick fog.

Two weeks later I learned from a not exactly taciturn politician in Bonn that Reinhard Gehlen had long ago turned his department "Foreign Armies East" over to the Americans, nearly intact!

Next instalment:

Birth of the Organization Gehlen.

Picture of Gehlen Among A Group of Soldiers.

Legend:

All Pictures of General Reinhard Gehlen
Are At Least Ten Years Old

This picture shows Gehlen (the person who stands alone in front) surrounded by his soldiers during the war. There exists no picture of Gehlen taken after the war. Even the great photo agencies did not succeed in taking his picture, although they had promised high rewards.

Picture of General Guderian

Legend:

Five Minutes To Twelve

showed the clock when General Guderian called on Hitler to obtain from him reinforcement for the eastern front. In vain. Gehlen's work, which Guderian had termed "unequalled and outstanding", had been futile.

Picture of Hitler

Legend:

"That Man Should Be Locked Up
In A Mental Institution"

said Hitler when he was shown Gehlen's report about the plans for an offensive of the Soviet Army. Hitler refused to believe -- but Gehlen was right. (On the left side, behind Hitler, Fieldmarshal Keitel, on the right side General Halder.)

Translation

"DIE WELT",
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No.47 - page 9

T H E M A N I N T H E D A R K

Factual Report About General Gehlen

By Juergen Thorwald

It was one of the first wintry days in 1951. A dark Opel-Kapitaen was rapidly crossing the streets of Munich, in a light evening mist, driving toward the center of the city. A little later, the two passengers of this car sat facing each other in a little villa in Schwabing. This was the first meeting between the mysterious General Reinhard Gehlen, chief of the largest German intelligence organization, and the well-known writer Juergen Thorwald. Thorwald wrote this report on the basis of this private conversation, and the subsequent encounters. It throws a light upon the life of Gehlen, the mysterious "Man in the Dark".

Gehlen was born in Erfurt on 3 April 1902, as the son of the publisher Walter Gehlen, afterwards director of the Ferdinand-Hirth Publishing House in Breslau. He attended the classical Gymnasium in Breslau, and passed final examination there in 1920. That same year he became a "Fahnenjuaker" (officer-aspirant) of the First Battery of the Artillery Regiment 6 in Schweidnitz.

This decision was unusual in those days; Germany was being disarmed, the officer's career offered scant prospects. It was even more remarkable since Gehlen, like his brother who became a scholar, possessed all the qualities required for a scholarly profession. His father, who had been a professional officer before he became a publisher, had no doubt influenced him in this respect. In 1920, his father could not possibly know to what extent the planned Reichswehr would be reduced. It was only in 1921 that it was decided to fix the number of military personnel at 100,000 men.

At any rate, in the course of the following years young Gehlen went through all the phases of the officer's career in the Reichswehr. On 1 December 1923, after two years of service with troops, and after having attended the Infantry and Artillery School for a year, he became a Lieutenant. In 1926 he was ordered to attend the Cavalry

School in Hannover, where he was promoted First Lieutenant in 1928. In 1929 he returned to Schweidnitz as an Adjutant of the Artillery Detachment stationed there. He remained in this position until 1933, when he was detailed to a General Staff training course. This order was a special honor at the time, before the sudden inflation of military personnel due to rearmament and Second World War. It is certainly a matter of dispute whether or not the methods of selection were one-sided, which Generaloberst von Seeckt had established. At any rate, these methods asked for considerable intellectual faculties. Rarely were more than sixty or seventy young officers of the entire Reichswehr, in one and the same year, admitted to General Staff training which was then still disguised as "Fuehrer-Gehilfen-Ausbildung" (training of leaders' assistants). One of them was Gehlen.

Military Academy in 1934

When the Military Academy in Berlin was reopened in 1934, Gehlen was one of its first students. In 1934 he was promoted Captain. In 1935 he was attached to the General Staff of the new German army, in the position of Adjutant to the Oberquartiermeister I (Deputy Chief of the General Staff). That, too, was an honor, since most Military Academy students were transferred back to the troops. From 1936 to 1937 Gehlen worked under von Manstein who was then a General in the General Staff's Group Fortification. He then served with troops, like all other General Staff officers. Gehlen completed this assignment in Liegnitz as a Battery Commander in Artillery Regiment 18.

When the Second World War broke out, the hurried, sometimes improvised establishment of reserve divisions brought Gehlen back to General Staff service. He became First General Staff Officer of the 213th Infantry Division, which belonged to "Wehrkreis" (military area) VIII in Silesia, and which formed part of what was called the "Third Wave" during the Polish campaign.

Immediately after the Polish campaign, Gehlen (who was now a Major) was sent back to Group Fortification in the General Staff. During the French campaign he was the Liaison Officer of von Brauchitsch, High Commander of the Army, for the Army of Busch as well as for the Armored Groups of Hoth and Guderian.

Halder's Adjutant

Before the war in France was over, Gehlen had become the Adjutant of Generaloberst Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and six months later he was the head of Group East of the Section Operation in the General Staff, under General Heusinger. While he was there, he was promoted Lieutenant Colonel. For the first time he was confronted with the problems of the East which were to play so great a role in his future life. Up to that time, however, he had never had any connection with the Intelligence Service. His appointment to Chief of the 12th Department of the General Staff in Spring of 1942, upon Halder's instigation, came as a surprise even to Gehlen. This

department is better known under the name of "Fremde Heere Ost" (Foreign Armies East).

Ever since it had been established, the department "Foreign Armies East" -- its counterpart was the department "Foreign Armies West" -- had had a mission which, in a way, was of intelligence nature. The real military German intelligence service, "Abteilung Abwehr" (Department Counterintelligence) in the High Command of the Armed Forces, under Admiral Canaris, supervised through its sub-department I the procurement of intelligence concerning the military strength and the military plans of the enemy. This intelligence was not evaluated there. The material collected was passed on to the General Staffs of the various branches of the armed forces. These General Staffs then instructed Io-Sections, for example "Foreign Armies East" and "Foreign Armies West", to compile this intelligence in coherent situation reports.

In addition to, and in competition with, the Intelligence Service of the OKW under Admiral Canaris, the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt der SS" set up its own extensive intelligence service, i.e. Section 6 under SS-Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg.

At first, Reichssicherheitshauptamt was compelled to restrict these activities to political intelligence, since the Military Intelligence Service of Admiral Canaris blocked its way. However, it was their intention from the start to get Canaris out of the way at the first opportunity, and to push Section 6 to the top of an extensive political-military-economic Intelligence Service. However, these efforts were doomed to fail because of the ideological fanaticism, the one-sidedness, and the dilettantism with which the task was tackled. This intelligence service, for the establishment of which they were straining every nerve, could not become the ideal successful intelligence service which would procure sober and absolutely objective information, simply because it looked through the colored spectacles of its own ideology. On the other hand, it was just this fact which gave it a chance in Hitler's eyes, a better chance than the champions of incorruptible objectivity would have, since he, too, wanted to see the world only through his own colored spectacles.

The Department "Foreign Armies East" had every reason to know this, even before Gehlen became its chief. Hitler's first steps on the military grounds had been uncertain; when several victories convinced him that he had been right, his uncertainty turned into a dangerous certainty of his infallibility, and thereafter he wanted no more exact situation reports. This had become very clear when the Soviet Union was attacked. Actually, the blame was not his alone. Generaloberst Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, knew quite well that his Department "Foreign Armies East" had not worked satisfactorily until the end of 1941. Halder's strange fate had led him, since the putsch in 1938 against Hitler had failed, via many victories accepted by him with mixed feelings, into futile opposition against the attack upon the Soviet Union; he felt that the Department "Foreign Armies East" had provided him with quite inadequate and unconvincing material, which was not strong enough for him to use for

his opposition. His opinion was that the department, including its chief, was antiquated.

When in winter 1941/42 the disaster set in for the German army in the East, when the first signs of the collapse became discernible and justified Halder's pessimism, he decided upon a thorough reorganization.

The Birth of Organization G.

Halder had not yet abandoned all hope that he might convince Hitler of the fatal dangerousness of his boundless military adventures by confronting him with strong facts. A new department "Foreign Armies East" was to furnish him facts and arguments. Halder put forty-year old Colonel Gehlen in charge of the organization of this department; he knew why he selected a man who knew nothing whatever about intelligence activities. He knew Gehlen. He knew the qualities which had made this man an outstanding figure even then. Not only was Gehlen energetic, and had the qualities of a great organizer; he also possessed all the talents of an incorruptible, cool, scientific systematist; he had the intellectual farsightedness of a man whose thoughts went beyond military affairs into the fields of economy and politics. Last, but not least, he possessed that touch of empathy and intuition which is indispensable in intelligence work. If Halder has ever shown psychological insight, it was in this instance.

I do not know what Gehlen thought of Hitler and his national-socialist policies during the first years of the war. He was probably as indifferent as many other officers who afterwards became the victims of the 20th of July. At any rate, when he assumed his new duties, his intellect, cool as it was, had already clearly distinguished between illusion and reality. He, an old and close friend of Stief and Fincke, knew what to think of Hitler's policies and Hitler's warfare. His last illusion, if he had had any, must have been the one which made him accept the mission. It was the hope nursed by Halder and many others, that they might still persuade Hitler, through the force of circumstances, to turn back and desist.

Shortly after he had taken over, Gehlen had spoken to a young officer who had been detailed to his staff shortly before, and what Gehlen said is characteristic of what he had in mind in regard to the East, which was to be his future domain. His words were characteristic also for the plans he had for his department and his work.

The young man's name was Heere. He was a Major, and he had just gone through the ordeal of the heavy winter battles near Stalino with the German Mountain Corps. According to Heere's notes, Gehlen asked him: "You probably expected to be given another assignment?"

"Yes, Sir".

Hitler's Illusions

Gehlen: "I'm sorry. My General Staff officers must be young, and they must have had battle experience, and they must know Russia. You can count those who are eligible on the fingers of one hand... The Department I have taken over here has done careless and thoughtless work."

"It will be our task", Gehlen continued, "to obtain an objective, comprehensive, and convincing picture of the situation, and to draw this picture with such exactness that no one in Supreme Headquarters can overlook its import. That is our chief task, which has first priority, and we can carry it out only with fresh and vigorous personnel."

And: "The result of our first task will make it mercilessly clear to us that it was a perilous illusion to believe that our military forces could defeat Russia. We must get used to speaking openly. The Fuehrer's idea of conquering Russia by force, with the aim of incensiderate exploitation as if it were a German colony, cannot but bring ruin upon us. The work of our Department will make it clear to us, with scientific exactness, that there is but one chance for us to settle the problem of the Soviet Union satisfactorily. We can remove the Soviet system only if we succeed in making allies of the Russian population. What you saw when you advanced, pictured the situation throughout the country: namely, that the population is singularly inclined to welcome us. They were spontaneously willing to help us. However, the instructions of the Supreme Command of the Army forbid us to use this willingness for our purposes...Everything depends on whether or not we shall succeed in making the results of our work so convincing that the Fuehrer will realize that there is absolutely no hope for his policy of power, and will accept the fact that this war can be brought to a good end only in cooperation with the Russian masses...which end must not mean that Russia is going to be a Utopian colony of Germany...".

These words prove that Gehlen, who had just emerged from the anonymity of General Staff officer, did not think of the mission he had just started on merely as a special mission. Despite the frequent stomach troubles of the chronically overburdened worker, he soon mastered the task Halder had pegged out for him.

Agents in the Ural

He selected young able-bodied organizers. He knew how to make effective use in his department of persons who knew Russia, persons who were technical, economic, agricultural, and political experts, some of whom had been misassigned in some orderly job in a staff office.

When Gehlen discovered that there was only a very thin stream of intelligence flowing in from the department "Counterintelligence" of the High Command of the Armed Forces, far too thin for him to obtain

a true picture of the situation in the Soviet Union, he used his own initiative. Canaris, wise and skeptical, foresaw that he would not hold his office very much longer; he not only gave Gehlen authority, but helped him, too. Canaris realized that the endeavors of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt to have him relieved and to take over his agency, would be successful in the end. He thought that shifting his intelligence activities in the East over to the department "Foreign Armies East", whose previous work had largely consisted of mere intelligence evaluation, might be the only way to stem what was evolving.

As time went on, Gehlen succeeded in collecting his own information about the Soviets. Other officers were appointed to positions in the counterintelligence agencies of the East front armies which had often been inadequately filled. "Frontaufklaerungstrupps" (frontline reconnaissance units) were established in Army Groups, whose sole mission was to establish exactly how strong the enemy was, and what he planned to do.

Every prisoner was interrogated; combat patrols were sent out to capture certain persons; every Soviet soldier's pay-book, every Soviet newspaper, every Soviet APO letter, every imprint on captured weapons and installations was studied. The total information, when evaluated, produced an amazing amount of intelligence material. Systematic collecting and studying of all available newspapers, of world radio news concerning the Soviet Union; the interrogation and employment of civilian Soviet specialists on this side of the German front (it was the first time that this was done); the evaluation of aerial photos, and the employment of Russian anti-Soviet agents which reached as far as the Ural -- all this made the compilation of situation reports possible of a kind never known before.

Gehlen adjusted his reconnaissance activities to the Soviet system, and extended them over long periods. Realizing the difficulty of finding collaborators in high Soviet Party or Government offices, who would collect highest level information, he sent young anti-communist Russians back to the Soviet territory with the instruction to work their way up in the Party and to report back after ten or fifteen years or so.

It seemed at the time that he could not have more than a ten-percent chance to succeed. That his chances were actually much better, became evident many years after the war when such men in high functions actually gave signs of life.

Canaris' Downfall

In May 1944, when Schellenberg finally reached his goal of getting Canaris out of his way and taking over the military intelligence service, Gehlen's department "Foreign Armies East" had long before become an independent Intelligence Service which covered the entire eastern area.

This was the secret of Gehlen's success: organizational skill; creative imagination in weaving the intelligence net; the ability to win honest friends, and their confidence, among the anti-Soviet Russians of those years; and the systematic assembling of minute mosaics which had been neglected before, and which now revealed pictures of the over-all situation. In his methods he broke definitely with the system of one-sided military aspects, and included everything of a political, economic, industrial, and even philosophical nature. Gehlen's situation reports were justified, as early as in 1943, by subsequent events, with a precision which had an alarming effect upon experts.

Next issue:

Flirtation With Death

Gehlen Makes Conditions to Americans

Picture of Gehlen

Legend:

A Penetrating Eye -- An Energetic Chin

are the distinguishing points in Gehlen's face. This picture was taken during the war, it is one of the very few snapshots taken of him, and it already shows the clarity and self-assurance, the supreme intellectual analysis, all the qualities which have always been mentioned by Gehlen's coworkers.

Picture of a Schoolclass

Legend:

A Slim Youth of Eighteen

This picture was taken in 1920. A reader of WELT AM SONNTAG kindly sent it us. He was Reinhard Gehlen's classmate during nine years, in the Koenig-Wilhelm-Gymnasium in Breslau. Gehlen is the first person in the first row, on the left side.

Picture of Canaris

Legend:

Admiral Canaris

lent G. a helping hand. When the SS felled Canaris, the Gehlen organization had already taken over many of Canaris' missions.

Picture of Himmler

Legend:

Himmler Interferes

Himmler tried to increase his influence over the military Intelligence Service of which Admiral Canaris was the head, through the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Department 6, under SS-Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg.

Translation

"Die Welt",
Sunday, 27 November 1955

T H E M A N I N T H E D A R K

Factual Report on General Gehlen and
His Organization

By Juergen Thorwald

III. FLIRTATION WITH DEATH

When Gehlen took up the position of chief of the Department "Foreign Armies East" in 1942, he thought that his mission should not consist of mere collecting incontestably clear situation reports on the strength and on the intentions of the Soviet enemy, the deadly grimness of which, one hoped, might still deprive Hitler's military adventurousness of its basis.

Halder, whose thoughts had been trained along purely military lines, might be satisfied with the idea that he might succeed in deviating Hitler's mind from further offensives in the East, which would then make it possible to start on a defensive action according to plan. However, this was no solution for the unprovoked fighting in the East, considering what might happen afterwards.

Halder, Too, Was Overthrown

Gehlen, whose mind already reached further, beyond purely military matters, joined men who had discarded all thoughts concerning the appropriation of Soviet soil on the part of the Germans, and who wished to conclude an alliance on a confidence basis with those millions of Soviet citizens who were ready to rebel against Stalin. Gehlen was aware that these endeavors (he knew that in this idea men like Wagner and Stauffenberg agreed with him) could be successful only if put into practice swiftly, as long as the East was still aware of the German power, and as long as Stalin's government had not recovered from the first shock. Hitler's and Himmler's policy of "destruction of subhumanity" had already greatly shaken hope and confidence in the occupied territories. Should this policy of contempt and murder be continued, it could not but result in a wave of hatred, never to be overcome, instead of in the readiness of millions to believe in the Germans as their helpers in their fight against the government in Moscow. It could not but drive the masses toward Stalin, and it could not but provide Stalin with an opportunity to take the lead in a war of liberation against the Germans. Gehlen foresaw that this development would make Stalin a national hero, and that the Soviet population would gather around him -- not in communistic unity but -- in a patriotic fervor like they had never known before. Not only was it necessary to bring Hitler to his senses in

regard to military affairs; it was also necessary to abandon the idea of Germanic colonization, and the absurd conception of Russian "subhumanity".

When Gehlen had assumed responsibility, he did everything in his power to support strivings to that effect. His decisions were of a very stimulating nature. There was an interrogation camp for captured Soviet officers in Loetzen which was under his command, and where Soviet prisoners were indiscriminately treated on an equal basis; numerous Russian and Ukrainian persons emerged from this camp who soon played a leading role in the various attempts at establishing Russian troops and at organizing liberation movements. It was his department which picked out General Vlassov in Loetzen, brought him to Vinitza, and tried to prepare the road for him to become the head of a Russian liberation movement against Stalin.

I do not know exactly how long Gehlen believed in the possibility to put such ideas into practice, under the prevailing circumstances. On the one hand, considering the speed with which he obtained knowledge of the reality of Soviet life, he must soon have realized the difficulties with which the former Soviet citizens were confronted because of the dissimilarity of thought among Greater Russians, Ukrainians, separatists, or Caucasians. They may have overcome the difficulties in the end. However, it proved hopeless to convince Hitler of the deadly grimness of the situation, at least of the military part of it.

Halder's hopes were completely frustrated. Halder was overthrown. Gehlen realized that there was no chance any more of changing Hitler's thinking, dominated as it was by obsession and obstinacy. And there were already signs of the birth of a new Russian nation under communist-nationalist banners, welded together in the struggle for liberation, and proud of their common successful fight against the German intruders.

Gehlen, pivot of an intelligence service through which he obtained a picture of the truth which became clearer by the day, lost any illusion he may have had within the shortest possible time. I have reason to believe that in 1943 he was still following a trend of thought which was being pursued by several of those men who afterwards became victims of the 20th of July 1944. This trend of thought had to do with a radical change of policies in the East, and with starting an untrammelled liberation movement against Stalin after the forcible disposal of Hitler, Himmler, and Rosenberg. He clung to the hope that in this way, in the East, he could attain a semblance of peace within a reasonable time; that he could explain to the world that the Germans had turned their back upon Hitler's policies of acquisition; and that they might become strong enough in the West to bring about a peace which would not necessarily require unconditional surrender.

When I had my second, long conversation with Gehlen in 1953, in the course of which we talked of his connection with Vlassov, this point was touched only in passing. However, I am sure that Gehlen realized very soon that such hopes and plans were unreal. At the end of 1943, it was irrevocably too late for any successful political change in the East. Gehlen would no longer lend himself to awaken hope in Russians or Ukrainians while there was nothing in German leadership to justify such hope. He thought that it would be a crime to get anyone of them

into a position which could not but stigmatize the person as a traitor, and as a German hireling. He tried to help all those who had openly joined the Germans at the times when there had still been a hope that the political attitude of the German leaders toward the East might change. He certainly did so when it became necessary to bring as many of them as possible to the West.

The SS Against Gehlen

Gehlen's skepticism, and his smiling sarcasm concerning the talk about the dangerous power in home policies which, it was believed, may accumulate in the person of an intelligence service chief, date back to those times. The weapons of any large intelligence service, truth and reliable information, are desirable for the truly powerful only if their power is combined with wisdom and insight. Therefore, by 1943 Gehlen had realized that even the most perfect achievements of his department were no longer of influence upon the fate of Germany in the Second World War.

"The legendary General Gehlen", one of Schellenberg's closest coworkers told me, years after the war, shortly before Schellenberg died, "wanted Hitler removed just like the 20th-of-July group wanted it. We were sure of that. Had not Guderian, in those first days after the 20th of July, protected quite a number of members of the General Staff against whom there was no immediate proof, by swearing to their faithfulness to Hitler, we might then and there have succeeded in getting Gehlen at least removed from his position. Had the war lasted only six more months, it would have happened at any rate. However, Gehlen must surely have possessed too reliable information as that he could still hope, in mid-1944, for a successful attempt at Hitler's life. He certainly knew that the masses in Germany, and the soldiers and young officers still believed in Hitler, not in some unpopular General Staff officers, Fieldmarshals, or long-forgotten old politicians...I am convinced that it was this which prevented him from joining the groups of assassins, although some of them were very close friends of his. He hated illusions and day-dreaming. He accepted the defeat already as an inescapable certainty...We still clung to illusions. He had none. He saw only the naked reality. We knew that. At least we guessed it, and that was one more reason to remove him. But there was no more time for it. Developments were going over our heads..."

The man who said this did not know that I knew Gehlen. But he did know of Gehlen's role. His frank words were probably a correct description of Gehlen's development during the last years of the war. He did his work to the very last with his usual exactitude. However, his hope for some sort of effect upon the leaders, if he still nursed any such hope, cannot have been but very slight. In those days when Guderian was doing his very best to obtain reinforcement for the eastern front, the last one outside the German borders, his hope was directed upon the reinforcement of this frontline and, as far as it was still possible, upon the military protection of East Germany at the sacrifice of the western front. He would have no illusions about what was in store for East Ger-

many should the pendulum of Hitler's conquest policies swing back. However, Guderian's endeavors were, at the best, desperate attempts at rescue which could not change the general fate of Germany.

Not later than in mid-1944 did Gehlen begin with making extra copies of all reports, files, studies, and material in archives which had bearing on the Soviet Union, and to store them safely in secret airraid shelters in fortified Upper Bavaria. The contents of the archives of the department "Foreign Armies East" were reproduced so that it was practically impossible to destroy them. Gehlen's purpose was not at all of a personal nature, as has sometimes been asserted in the course of the past years. He never thought of saving his own skin, or maintaining his living standard, or maybe obtaining some nebulous career, by offering the invaluable material of his archives to the Americans.

Plans for A Courier Service

Gehlen's objectives were of a different nature. What he wanted, in view of the disintegration, expected with certainty, of the alliance between Russia and the western powers, was to do his share in informing the governments of the western powers, America in the first place, of the real aims of the Soviet Union, and of the display of its power, with the aid of the material accumulated in his archives and staffs. The logical consequence would be to realize the necessity to restore Central Europe, and, naturally, also Germany. Gehlen had no illusions about the speed of such development. He had even less illusions about the willingness of the West to accept his offer. And, incidentally, Gehlen's officer's training under a national system could not simply be cast off. He realized that nationalists might easily misinterpret his behavior as that of a traitor.

When I talked with Gehlen in 1953, I asked him about this side of his actions at the time. The simple answer he gave me made me guess his inner struggles in 1944/45.

On or about 19 April 1945 the department "Foreign Armies East" was transferred from Camp Maybach near Zossen to Upper Bavaria, in the vicinity of Miesbach, and so the safety of Gehlen's triple archives was as good as guaranteed. He then divided his department into several sections, and assigned to each section key staff members whom he had let into his plans. They had instruction to let themselves be taken prisoners by the Americans, not to conceal their identity, and to make no precise statements. A sort of courier service was installed, by which they could remain in touch even after the arrest. On principle, exact statements were to be made only when Gehlen would give the word.

Farsighted American General

While the tanks of the American General Patton rolled through Bavaria, Gehlen and the closest of his staff lived in two alpine farms somewhere near Miesbach. Gehlen himself lived in the so-called Elends-Alm. He intended to give himself up as soon as the first troubles of occupation

would be over. The Americans did not climb the mountains. Only after some time did they search some of the mountains for SS-troops possibly hiding there. Only once did they come near the Elends-Alm. When they did not return within a few days, Gehlen went down to Miesbach, and gave himself up. He handed over his papers. He explained who he was, and that he wished to talk with a high-ranking American intelligence officer at a higher echelon.

No American intelligence service was in existence at the time with any resemblance to the huge, and apparently very efficient, "CIA" organization of our days. There was a political intelligence service with very limited possibilities. It was under the strong influence of leftist liberal "parlor pinks" who played an important role in American political life in those times. In addition, each branch of the American Armed Forces had its own rather limited military intelligence service. They were not interested in information about the Soviet Union. There was the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) which was an organization supposed to protect the American troops against agents, saboteurs etc. This CIC had inflated in the briefest possible time in proportion to the immenseness of the territories the American Army covered while advancing in Europe. Numerous communists obtained important functions in it. The activities of the CIC consisted chiefly of hunting down nazis and "militarists". It was in the nature of its activities that it was blind to communist infiltration.

The first office to which Gehlen reported was a CIC agency. At any rate, Gehlen was of sufficient interest to be passed on to higher authorities. It was the period when General Staff officers were subject to so-called "automatic arrest", and when the plan was conceived to banish German General Staff officers for ever to a remote island.

In the course of the next weeks Gehlen passed the usual intermediate stations, and was finally taken to the so-called "Intelligence Center", Headquarters Seventh Army in Wiesbaden. It was here that, after several routine interrogations, Gehlen happened to meet the American Intelligence officer in the rank of a General, to whose initiative the present Organization Gehlen owes its existence.

This General was one of the few high-ranking American officers who was aware of the fundamental contrast between the political and ideological world of the Soviet Union and that of the western powers (at the time he was at variance even with Eisenhower and with the entire official American policy and strategy).

The name of this General has remained a secret to this day. He took it on his own responsibility to release some of Gehlen's most important staff members from interrogation camps and POW camps. The most important parts of the files of the Department "Foreign Armies East" were shipped to Wiesbaden from the secret places where they had been stored. Shortly after, still in Summer of 1945, Gehlen and several members of his staff traveled to Washington, with the files. There, too, in the top organization of the American Army's Intelligence Service, were a few officers who watched the new world constellation after Hitler's end. They had no influence yet on political and military decisions. But they were powerful enough to make their own decisions in their own fields. Their names have also remained a secret. When I asked Gehlen in 1953, he flatly refused to give an answer.

The reasons for this secrecy were clear at the time, and in a way they are still clear today. The agreements those officers subsequently made with Gehlen on their own responsibility were actually high-handed and unlawful acts. These acts were in contradiction with the policies their own country was following, and it was only by subsequent developments that they were justified.

Generous Partners

What Gehlen had to offer was: a well-functioning intelligence organization against the Soviet Union, the only one then existing in the world. This must have meant much for men who foresaw that the American Intelligence Service would soon be compelled to deal with the problem of the Soviet Union on a world-wide scale. To make use of Gehlen and his men meant that the American Intelligence Service would very soon be superior in this field.

What Gehlen demanded in return was indeed extraordinary. The obvious thing for the Americans would have been to employ Gehlen and his staff as German assistants, as they did with many German ex-Generals and specialists in the so-called "Historical Division". One of the most prominent Germans employed there was Halder, Gehlen's former chief, who had appointed him chief of the Department "Foreign Armies East".

Gehlen refused to be employed in such capacity. He demanded that the successor organization of the Department "Foreign Armies East" be a purely German organization, under his sole control, but with an American liaison office, and with a fixed American Dollar budget. Secondly, this organization should work for the United States only as long as there was no sovereign German Government. As soon as that Government was established, Gehlen, being a German, could not but feel responsible to it. Thirdly, Gehlen demanded that his organization not be forced to furnish information with no bearing on the East, nor material directed against the interests of a future German state.

Strictly Secret

One is forced to cast one's mind back to the situation as it was then, in order to understand these demands. Hardly anyone dared believe in the restoration of Germany. The Morgenthau dreams had not ended yet. The policy of unity among the victors, of friendship with the Soviet Union, was prevailing. Officially it was prohibited in Germany to speak of the Soviet Union other than of a peace-loving democratic power. In this situation, it certainly required an unusual amount of knowledge of political realities to make such demands.

On the other hand, even more was demanded from the American officers who actually accepted Gehlen's demands. It would have been easy to employ German assistants. Soon after, the British Intelligence Service, too, made use in secrecy of German advisors whose previous work had had bearing on German eastern politics, or who had been

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German officers in Ukrainian and Russian anti-Stalin formations. But the restoration of a complete German intelligence organization -- that was a game with considerable risk.

In strict secrecy, in the disguise of an American civilian agency, Gehlen and his chief staff members resumed their work in seclusion, in a remote place in the Spessart.

One after the other, the former staff members and specialists were released from their respective camps, some of them under mysterious circumstances. Old connections were reestablished. American cigarettes were a useful item of the first budget.

Thus the "Organization Gehlen" was established.

Its security system worked so effectively for many years, that hardly an outsider in Germany had the least inkling of its existence, even after its activities had been accepted in Washington as a part of the new line in American post-war policies.

Next issue:

The Visiting Card -- Accepted !

Espionage Trials Cause Sensation.

Pictures:

Mountain Scenery

Legend: When the war had ended, Gehlen withdrew to
A Remote Part of Upper Bavaria.
His archives were also safe. From here he
descended to the valley and gave himself
up to the Americans

Picture of General Vlassov and of Female Workers

Legend: Female Workers Listen to General Vlassov
Gehlen wanted to conquer bolshevism with the aid
of the opposition against Stalin in the Soviet
sphere of power.

Picture of Gehlen

Legend: With Vlassov's Troops
Gehlen Takes the Salute.

Translation

"Die Welt",
Saturday, 4 December 1955

T H E M A N I N T H E D A R K

Factual Report on General Gehlen and
His Organization

By Juergen Thorwald

IV. "Agent 0031" Becomes Loquacious

Once or twice, in recent reports about Gehlen and his organization, it has been pointed out that the first great success of this organization was the breakup of the entire net of agents in West Germany of the Czech Intelligence Service in 1948 and 1949. No more was divulged.

At the time the American Intelligence Service claimed all the credit for that destructive operation. To the press conference, especially convened for that occasion, President Truman stated in November 1948, on the day after the large-scale arrest action against the Czech agents, that this was the greatest feat of the American Intelligence Service.

Actually, this feat had solely been accomplished by the Organization Gehlen, although it is true -- and this justifies the American point of view -- that it owed its existence to the USA, and that it was still a part of the American Intelligence Service, much as it aspired after independence. Surely, a man like Gehlen -- reserved, extremely suspicious of nationalistic self-praise, and a very clever diplomat -- would never demand that the true facts be published, and that the American reports published at the time be corrected. Nevertheless, the actual facts differed from what could be divined from the rather brief reports published at the time.

On 9 November 1948, the American Military Police arrested about forty men and women, most of them in Bavaria. They were mostly Sudeten Germans. Some were sent to Landsberg, others to the interrogation camp in Oberursel, and for a few months they disappeared from the scene. Next to nothing was published about it. Of the little that was said, the population of Germany hardly took notice, after all the arresting and interning that had been done during the preceding years, and in view of the struggle for the daily bread which was still going on.

An espionage case tried in Munich a few months later, on 17 February 1949, in an American hospital in Koeniginstrasse, came quite as a surprise. An American Military Committee, presided over by Brigadier General John L. McKee, sat in judgment. The Prosecutor was Lt.Col. Thomson. The American Colonel Crawford had been assigned Chief Counsel for the Defense. Only one man sat in the dock; he was about thirty-one years old. His name was Frantisek Klecka. He had been a waiter on the Orient Express, and had been arrested on 9 November 1948. At first the trial was overshadowed by the general security regulations. As usual, there was only talk of violation of the Military Government Law No.8, according to which persons who endangered the safety of the American Army were subject to trial by a Military Court. However, surprisingly, the secrecy ban was lifted in the course of the trial, by order of General Clay and upon instruction of Major General Maxwell Taylor, who was then the Chief of Staff of the American Forces in Europe.

Twenty Years Hard Labor

The proceedings were turned into a public trial so late that the sentence to twenty years hard labor was pronounced almost immediately thereafter. However, the public, if it was interested at all in it, at least learned that Klecka, upon instruction of the Czech Intelligence Service, had held an important position in a net of agents, whose mission had been to spy out the location of American and British troops, the development of German industrial enterprises and traffic routes, and the political attitude of the expellees in the American zone of occupation.

Three Women Accused

Soon after, the American Court under McKee reconvened. Again Lt.Col. Thomson acted as the Prosecutor. There were five men and three women in the dock, who were accused of having held decisive functions in the net of agents of the Czech Intelligence Service in West Germany. They all belonged to the group which was arrested on 9 November 1948. There was 26-year old, spirited, intelligent Gerti Doerre from Moschendorf; the wife of Dr.Hablick, at the time in charge of the residence permit office in the Bavarian State Commissariate for Expellee Affairs, Maria Hablick; and Edith Dittrich, student and journalist, the last two from Munich. The men were: the waiter Adolf Frank, and Franz Bayer, Robert Kruse, Walter Friedrich, and 24-year old Egon Richter. Almost all of them were Sudeten Germans. They were all accused of having systematically betrayed military, economic, and political secrets to the Czech Intelligence Service. All of them had made only part confessions. All of them pleaded that they had been the victims of a delusion, or, at the best, that they had furnished faked or worthless information, in an effort to protect relatives against reprisals who still lived in Czechoslovakia. On the first day of the trial Gerti Doerre still smiled to herself, and Edith Dittrich flirted as if she were in a dance-hall; apparently they were sure that little could happen to them.

Suddenly, on the second day of the trial, 3 March 1949, the first surprise bomb went off. A stranger entered the courtroom as a witness for the Prosecution. He had coarse features, thin black hair, wide cheekbones, a turned-up nose, and a flabby, pale skin. He looked neither at the Prosecutor nor at the Members of the Court.

As soon as he entered the courtroom, the faces of several defendants grew pale and showed unutterable, paralyzing terror. He was none other than the chief of that field office of the Czech Intelligence Service with which all defendants had cooperated: Staff Captain Ottokar Fejfar, cover name "Filipowski", or otherwise known by the number "Agent 0031". It was brought to light that his agency had controlled all Czech agents in West Germany.

The American Prosecutor, after a side-glance at the defendants who were frantically trying to regain their composure, stated that Fejfar had left Czechoslovakia after the overthrow of the Czech Government Benes, since he was opposed to Gottwald's communistic regime. When he emigrated, he took along with him all the material of his agency, his order book, the list of all Czech agents in West Germany, and carbon copies of the reports the agents had made. Fejfar and his files were now at disposal, to bring the crime home to everyone of the defendants in Court -- and not only to them, but also to numerous others who had been arrested months ago, and who would by their trials receive the punishment they deserved.

From this moment on, the situation of the defendants was hopeless. The Prosecutor, assisted by Fejfar who made his statement, and produced proof, in a low voice and with downcast eyes, but concisely and clearly, unrolled a full picture of their activities. From 1946 to 1948 they had, more or less frequently, crossed the German-Czech border illegally near Muchlbach, Rehau, or Crafenau. They had met Fejfar's mediators in the customs buildings on the Czech side, and had then proceeded to Franzensbad with Czech identity papers. They had handed over their material in the hotels "Europa" and "Carso", and had received rewards in the amount of between 10 Dollars and 200 DM, and had then been given new assignments. All of them had cover names. For example, Gerti Doerr was "Annabella"; Edith Dittrich was "Manon"; Maria Hablick "Leila"; Robert Kruse "Don Jose".

And The Second Witness ...

The Doerre girl, who worked in the CIC office in Moschendorf, had made reports concerning Hof, Rehau, and the CIC. Dittrich, who had been an IRO secretary for a time, had provided information on the airbases Neubiberg, Schleissheim, and Fuerstenfeldbruck. Maria Hablick had taken to Czechoslovakia documents belonging to her unsuspecting husband and which had bearing on his official duties, some still in the envelopes of the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior. Franz Bayer had furnished material on the troop drilling grounds in Paderborn; Egon Richter provided information on British troops and installations in Lueneburg, Hamburg, Erlangen, Hof, and Kitzingen.

However, the Prosecutor did not content himself with Fejfar's testimony. On 8 March 1949 he led into the courtroom another Staff Captain from the controlling agency for West Germany of the Czech Intelligence Service. This was Staff Captain Vojtech Jerabek, known to several defendants as Hofmann. That his testimony was of so decisive importance was due to the fact that he had been a close coworker of the Czech Staff Captain Janda who had been Fejfar's predecessor as the chief of the controlling office "West" until 1948. Jerabek testified to the number of border crossings of the defendants, including those made before Fejfar's time.

The evidence was so overwhelming that the Assigned Counsel Crawford and the German Counsel Weinberger could not but restrict themselves to explanations of the -- sometimes tragical -- circumstances which had driven the defendants into their role of agents.

There was no denying that Janda and Fejfar, and their staffs, had systematically sought to get a hold over Sudeten German expellees in Germany by enabling them to contact their parents and relatives who had stayed behind in Czechoslovakia. Wherever this bait did not have the desired effect, they did not hesitate to make them give in by threatening that they would take it out on their relatives.

More Trials

However, the efforts of the Counsels for the Defense had but little effect. Frank and Kruse were sentenced to 18 years of penal servitude; the Doerre girl to 12 years; the Dittrich woman to nine years; Bayer and Friedrich to eight years; Maria Hablik to seven years; and Egon Richter to one year.

The Court was still in session for this trial, when two more trials were opened in Munich, and others in Central and North Germany. Not one of the agents who were arrested on 9 November 1948 escaped the verdict of the Law.

Meantime every observer had realized that this had indeed been a decisive blow. They had hit the core of that part of the Czech Intelligence Service which worked in West Germany. After this success, by which they had obtained the lists of all the agents at the time employed in West Germany, the raiding of the nest offered no difficulties.

The Czech Intelligence Service which had been compelled in 1945 to begin from the bottom up, faced complete ruin in West Germany. Several years' hard work was wasted, and its result blotted out. They were compelled to start all over again with building up their organization, and it would take years.

Gehlen Puts Two Men To Work

But how had this been achieved? Was it mere luck and coincidence? Had the flight of Fejfar and his staff to the West come as a surprise

to the Americans? Or had the American Intelligence Service brought, or lured, these two men to the West by a carefully worked out plan? Under what circumstances had they come to West Germany? No one answered these questions.

Today it is imperative to give an answer, in order not to pass over certain characteristic moments in the history of the Organization Gehlen which was of importance for the reputation of the organization, and its prestige in the eyes of the Americans who were to be their partners for many years. In Summer of 1948 the organization had learned from a few former members of the Section "Foreign Armies East" who, being Sudeten Germans, still lived in Czechoslovakia, that the so-called Field Office "TOMICKA" in Karlsbad had new managers. "TOMICKA" belonged to the Second Department of the First Czech Military District, and was believed to be the controlling agency for West Germany of the Czech Intelligence Service.

Staff Captain Janda, who had been the previous chief, and who may have been arrested, had been replaced on 1 April 1948 by Staff Captain Fejfar, who had been a member of the Second Department since Spring of 1947. It was believed that Fejfar did not possess a very active mind; he had been a follower of Benes, and he expected not much good to come from Gottwald's communist regime in the long run (including for his own person).

It was believed that Fejfar may be persuaded to change over to the West.

Therefore Gehlen put two of his men to work in Karlsbad with the instruction to start out with watching Fejfar's private life, and to establish private connections with him or with his family. In Karlsbad this mission was a matter of life or death.

Although the two men took months over feeling their way to approach Fejfar; although their work was eased by the fact that Fejfar was not averse to alcohol, -- the day came that the groping about had come to an end. They were compelled to come out into the open and speak with Fejfar. If they did, they would have only two alternatives: success or failure. If they failed, they would be arrested on the spot. Some trifle, a touch of fear on the part of Fejfar, might be fatal at the very last moment.

However, the man who talked with Fejfar, found a man who was ready for anything. Fejfar was possessed of fear of his own regime. He declared his willingness to escape to West Germany, on these conditions: (1) complete freedom in the West; (2) safe transportation to the United States; under no circumstances did he wish to stay near Czechoslovakia, or in Europe at that. In return, he was willing to take with him on his flight all important files of his Controlling Office, and those which contained the official correspondence with the superior office in Prague, the Second Department, and certainly the code-book and the papers about radio communications.

Many weeks were required in Fall of 1948 for the preparations of the flight. It was necessary to confide in other officers of the con-

Pictures

Counsel for the Defense and Defendants in the Espionage Trial in Munich

Legend:

Sitting: John F. Deery, Counsel for the Defense.
Behind him the interpreter. Standing (from ~~XXXX~~
left to right) Egon Richter, seen from behind;
Adolf Frank, Walter Friedrich, Maria Hablick, Gertie
Doerre, and concealed behind her, Robert Kruse.

Picture of General Clay

Legend:

Public Trials

demanding the American General Clay to be held
against the Czech spies.

Picture of Gertie Doerre

Legend:

Cover Name "Annabella"

The defendant Gertie Doerre. The twenty-six year old
girl forgot to smile when "Agent 0031" appeared as
a witness for the prosecution on 3 March 1949.

Translation

"Die Welt"
11 December 1955

T H E M A N I N T H E D A R K

Factual Report on General Gehlen and
His Organization

V. Skillfully Cloaked Branch Offices

It was in Fall of 1953, approximately seven years after the establishment of the "Organization Gehlen", and about four years after the Czech Intelligence Service was raided, on which occasion the organization had attracted the attention of the insiders, that Gehlen and his organization stood, for the first time, in the limelight of publicity.

The reason was a propaganda campaign launched by the new Chief of the State Security Service of the Soviet zone, Wollweber; he started the campaign on the occasion of the first successful abduction of a subordinate member of the organization from West Berlin, and the infiltration of the first agent, whose name was Geyer, into one of Gehlen's lower echelon control agencies in West Berlin. The story of this campaign, with all concomitant circumstances, will be told in another chapter. At this moment, only one thing is of importance: the campaign, launched with the assistance of the whole Soviet propaganda organization, showed clearly the effectiveness Gehlen's organization had developed. The fact that Wollweber, after a while, put a price on one million D-Mark on Gehlen's head -- the offer still stands -- is further proof.

At this point, the Organization Gehlen had already left the Spessart, the scene of its modest beginnings which were based solely on the trust of a few Americans. By Fall of 1953, it had grown into an organization with two to three thousand full-time employees. (By now the number has grown to three or four thousand.)

Gehlen had moved to Pullach near Munich, with the best of his men. There he installed himself in a strictly secluded settlement, surrounded by barbed wire, which had been built some time after 1933 as "Rudolf-Hess-Settlement", had later on been used for military purposes, and had been enlarged by a number of wooden buildings. It consisted of some two dozen buildings, and American troops had requisitioned it at the end of the war. Not only Gehlen and his staff, with the technical assistants -- radio operators, secretaries and others, including the drivers -- were housed there, but their families, including Gehlen's own family of five, lived also there.

Life As In A Camp

The unusual genesis of this organization, the chaotic first years in post-war Germany, and the fact that at first the relations between the occupation powers were confused, had made it necessary to stay hidden even from one's own fellow-countrymen. Thus, they lived quite isolated in the camp, with a camp school for the children. Had the children attended normal schools during those first years, they would have been asked questions about their fathers' occupations; other children would have wished to visit the "Gehlen-children" in their own home; and all this would very soon have resulted in discovery. The consequences of the disclosure would have been immense, considering the distrust of the French and the British of any German intelligence organization, even if it was supposed to have only limited independence, and also in view of the considerable influence the Soviet Union was still exercising on the occupation policies in Germany.

By 1953, the situation had greatly changed. A skilfully thought-out security system concealed the entire organization under a maze of industrial, commercial and research institutions, and allowed almost full freedom of movement. Only the existence of the so-called "Board of Directors" in Pullach indicated that there was something unusual about the set-up. This was of no importance, however, since it was hermetically closed to outsiders as an enclave of the American occupation power. The telephone lines were under American control; the cars stationed permanently there had American license plates. Those of the German civilians who had since moved to dwellings outside of the camp -- if for no other reasons than that the number of available dwellings was inadequate to house all the families -- were easily concealed among the large number of American civilian employees, or they passed for independent industrialists.

Gehlen And His Family

By 1953, Gehlen himself, and his family, had already been living for years in a wooden house on Lake Starnberg, and he had driven the 28 kilometers between the lake and Pullach back and forth in his Mercedes 220 with no one out there ever suspecting him of being anything but a successful commercial industrialist who worked in Munich, and whose private hobby was elementary woodwork, and other playful occupations. The family led the same life as millions of other German families. There was little difference as regards the closest of his staff.

Those parts of the Organization Gehlen which worked outside of Pullach headquarters, merged into West German civilian and economic life, at least outwardly. Organized by commercial experts as "General Agencies, District Agencies, and Branch Offices", and actually working under the cover of all sorts of business lines, the lower echelons of the organization spread out as far as the eastern borders of the British-American occupation zones, and later on of the Federal Republic.

The "branch offices", the lowest echelons of the organization in West Germany, had the immediate control of the agents who worked in the Soviet zone, in the Soviet satellite nations, and in the Soviet Union proper. No branch office handled more than six agents or "V-Maenner" (Vertrauensmaenner = confidential agents). No V-Mann knew the chief of the branch office; no branch office chief knew his superior, his district chief; no district chief knew the General Agent. No V-Mann knew his fellow agent, except in very special cases. The forwarding of assignments, and the transmission of information, were done by couriers in all sorts of civilian disguises, or by reports deposited in, and collected from, ever-changing places, and by radio messages.

It is a fact that by 1953 the organization Gehlen, as a result of years of hard work, had infiltrated its agents into important Soviet zone party offices, ministries and industries; and that was not all; the organization had also agents in high positions in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, not counting the large number of agents who watched certain events in these countries from the outside.

The information which reached Pullach through radio operators and couriers via branch offices and commercial representatives, were added to the results of minute evaluation of any material on the

East Bloc printed, or broadcast, or obtained by radio monitoring service. "Reading between the lines", an art acquired during the war, had become a masterly skill long ago.

During the war already, Gehlen had extended his field of activities far beyond purely military intelligence service, and this development was continued in post-war years. By 1953, the so-called military men were by far in the minority. The civilian experts -- among whom were many who had grown up in the Soviet Union -- were the determining factor. They worked outside the organization which was cloaked as an economic set-up, its research institutes of all types. While elsewhere in Germany there was no agency who had a clear idea of the development of atomic science, for example, here there were specialists collecting pebble after pebble of the mosaic. Numerous experts were at disposal for consultation, from linguistic philologists to geologists, who actually worked in their own professions outside the organization. Some of them had been initiated into the secret. Others had simply been commissioned by the research institutes to carry out special tasks.

The Warning System

Whenever a branch office, or an institution, was endangered, in other words, whenever the camouflage seemed to be no longer safe, it was dissolved. Specialists of the organization saw to the legal side of the liquidation, especially the transactions provided for by the commercial laws. Warning systems had been worked out for the agents employed in eastern territories, which were set in action whenever the arrest of an agent, or of a "V-Mann", jeopardized the safety of other persons.

The purpose, of which an unbelievably large portion was actually achieved, was to avoid losses by selecting as carefully as possible, by training meticulously, and by anticipating any kind of danger. The final goal of all the work, however, was to collect information on the situation in the East, and on the intentions of the East, the exactness of which would be confirmed by subsequent events.

I do not think that I am betraying a secret if I say that the situation reports made by the Organization Gehlen foresaw the results of the conferences in Berlin and Geneva with a clarity which was as bare of illusions as it was cool and bitter. I should add that I acquired this knowledge not from Gehlen, but from Germans and Americans who attended these conferences after having read Gehlen's reports, and who had in their innermost heart nursed the hope that for once this realist may be wrong.

How could this organization be set up at all? When I came to know Gehlen a little closer, I, too, had for a little while believed in the legendary miracle-working power of the Dollar. Whoever keeps in mind, however, that Gehlen's annual budget has never exceeded five or six million Dollars, or approximately 25 million DM, and whoever compares this with the fact that (to judge by the information I have) the police of the Hansa City of Hamburg swallows 66 million per year, and Munich's City Police 11 million per year, will cease to believe in the miracle-working Dollar in Gehlen's case. Twenty-five million DM for an organization whose arms reach as far as Siberia, will seem an almost ridiculous amount as compared with the 66 million for the police in Hamburg whose radius of action "comes to an end in Popped-buettel", as the "Spiegel" once put it.

Not Only Dollars

No, it wasn't solely due to the Dollars, and the times had soon come to a close when American cigarettes and food items could be had from Gehlen, a currency highly favored then. No one could get rich here. Instead, one could ruin one's health; the men at the top were exposed to the pressure of an incredible workload, just because the means were, after all, always inadequate. It is a fact that young men between thirty-five and forty have had strokes because of the overload of work. Even incredible achievements, however, cannot be the only basis for a development like that of the Organization Gehlen.

The basis for this development is probably formed by the elements of which Gehlen's work consisted during the last phase of the war: above-average organizational efficiency, combined with incorruptible scientific exactness, extreme thriftiness in the use of personnel and means. This thriftiness embraced, as Gehlen told me in 1953, "the refusal of any assignment, the expected result of which would not justify the risk; refusal of that man-wasting magnanimity so often encountered in our field; thorough preparation and working out of each assignment, taking into consideration any possible danger; rejection of dilettantism, which may under certain circumstances replace

experience and knowledge by idealism, and which, in intelligende work, invariably leads to catastrophe and useless sacrifice of men."

Very Dangerous Adventure

An experience I had myself made it clear to me how deep this viewpoint is rooted in Gehlen's mind.

It was the time when certain information from Upper Silesia was causing a sensation in Germany. The information said, among other things, that the Soviet Union had begun with sending Chinese to Upper Silesia to fill the gaps in the labor market and to populate the areas evacuated by the Germans. An editors' office hit upon the idea that a reporter might sneak into Upper Silesia through the East zone and all through Poland, perhaps in the disguise of a Vistula boatman. But who could be persuaded to accept such assignment? Only a man who had trouble keeping his head above water.

A Special Assignment

One evening in mid-March 1952 I met a young journalist and his wife in a café who found himself in considerable financial difficulties. The woman's tears attracted my attention, and I suspected that something was wrong. After some hesitation I was told what was amiss. The young man was to make up his mind until the next day whether or not he would -- with a camera in his trouser pocket, in the disguise of a boatman, without knowing a single Polish word, with an advance payment of a mere 1.000 DM, and against a ridiculously low reward in case of success -- undertake an adventure which was almost certain to throw him as a spy into the hands of the security authorities of the Soviets or the Poles, or perhaps already those of the Soviet zone. The boy, finding himself in a situation which seemed to leave no choice, was inclined to accept, despite his wife's despair.

I was determined to prevent the undertaking of this adventure, if only for the reason that I have always been opposed to mixing journalism and espionage. I remembered suddenly what Gehlen had said about the senselessness of such amateurish doings. I had no means to get hold of Gehlen directly, by calling a secret number, for instance. After a little thinking I found a way, and appealed to someone who had collaborated with me when I wrote my first books, and of whom I had reason to believe that he belonged to the Organization Gehlen. Gehlen learned of the case of the young journalists and of the plans for the undertaking. Two days later the young man, who had speaking and writing knowledge of several languages, had found work in some office unknown to me, and was in a position to decline the "suicide mission". A few months later he found employment in his own profession.

This may have been an exceptional case. Numerous other senseless adventures of agents and saboteurs have been arranged and carried out

on other occasions by one of these "information agencies" which existed in West Germany at the time, some of which, surviving to this day, have been confused with Gehlen by persons ignorant of the true facts.

The Secret of Success

That Gehlen succeeded in leading his organizations, untouched, up to 1953 despite the confusions, the colliding opinions, and the anti-intelligence tendencies of German domestic political life, is, in my opinion, due to these few facts:

- * that he restricted himself definitely to the field Gehlen pegged out when he became the Chief of the Section "Foreign Armies East": procurement of intelligence from foreign countries, with a definite orientation toward the eastern world;
- ** that he prepared himself for the task of serving the sovereign German Federal Government -- regardless of which democratic party might be its basis -- as an unprejudiced, neutral informant;
- *** that he kept the organization out of the jungle, which existed for many years, of mutual spying on politicians, power groups, and parties in German political life.

On this point, however, I am touching upon one of the most interesting chapters, namely, how the connection with the Federal Government was established, and with the opposition, especially with Kurt Schumacher, which connection was surrounded by numerous misunderstandings; and Gehlen's position in regard to the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, his connection with its notorious President John, and with the Information Office of Blank's Agency and its first chief Heinz.

Next Issue:

"A Sordid Business Deal"

The Case of the Traitor Otto John

Pictures:

Entrance to a Park

Legend:

This is the gate which Gehlen passed daily on his way to the secluded headquarters of his organization.

The area occupied by an American agency in Pullach near Munich also embraced Gehlen's office. Unrecognized and unknown, he and his family lived for years in a wooden house on Lake Starnberg, about 28 km from Pullach.

Allen Dulles

Legend:

Allen Dulles, a brother of John Foster Dulles, Chief of the American Intelligence Service, with whom Gehlen used to cooperate.

Village Square

Legend:

An idyllic spot in Bavaria
harbored secrets

A village hotel stands next to the church. In this, Pullach near Munich resembles many other small country towns.

Ernst Wollweber

Legend:

Sinister Opposite Number

Ernst Wollweber, Chief of the State Security Service of the Soviet zone, put a million D-Mark on Gehlen's head.

Europe's New Master Spy



The Sunday Star
27 Nov 55

Reinhard Gehlen looks harmless,

but he makes Russia tremble.

He's off on a new, gigantic intrigue

By NORBERT MUHLEN



BERLIN

In the world of international affairs, nothing is so dangerous as relaxation. That is why Western statesmen who have welcomed the "Geneva spirit" are remaining very much on the alert.

And even though the Iron Curtain has opened a crack, it still conceals a vast amount of information of crucial importance to Western security. For this reason, the value of a certain 52-year-old

German who looks like a successful banker remains undiminished, and has perhaps even increased in the last few months. This man is Reinhard Gehlen, who for the past 10 years has been running a highly effective spy system for the United States and its allies. Today he provides the West with its key European listening post.

The West didn't always take Gehlen too seriously. Back in 1950 he warned against the appointment of Dr. Otto John as head of the West German investigating office against subversive activities. Gehlen suspected John of being himself a member of the Communist underground, but his warning was not heeded. Four years later John defected across the Berlin border to the Soviets. In his first public statement behind the curtain he attacked Gehlen as America's most dangerous spy.

After the restoration of West German sovereignty, Gehlen's organization was returned by its U.S. sponsors to the German government. In a secret night session, Chancellor Adenauer urged his cabinet members to entrust the organization to his own personal responsibility. Though the decision was kept a secret, this reporter has learned that the cabinet agreed. Gehlen has, therefore, only one boss — the head of his government.

The large organization which

Continued on page 36

Gehlen founded and runs, deals exclusively with secrets from behind the Iron Curtain. Since the Soviets forged that curtain for the particular purpose of hiding their slave world from Western eyes, and since their secrets are part and parcel of their plan to conquer the free world, it was imperative for Western self-defense to get hold of these secrets.

Gehlen's organization is different from the almost 100 others that operate in the shadow of the Iron Curtain and offer Soviet secrets to the West. Most of these outfits hang out their shingle in Berlin, that half-Soviet, half-free city. Some are set up by the Soviets themselves to mislead the West. Others are run by adventurers who dreamed up their information at the very coffee-house tables from which they sell it.

A Really "Reliable Source"

When American officials explain, however, that a certain fact or figure came from Gehlen, it is accepted. The Gehlen label makes it a sure thing.

What is more, Gehlen's Soviet secrets are never "on the market." They are available only to the authorized hush-hush agencies of the United States and the West German governments. Partners in the cold war, both desperately need precise knowledge of the facts of Communist political, economic and military life. America — a newcomer in the field of international intelligence — receives the most benefits from having at its command a foreign source of information on which it can rely.

Gehlen is camera-shy and hates publicity. When his picture was published for the first time in Germany, although it was only cut from a 10-year-old group snapshot, every copy of the newspaper carrying it was sold within a few hours. In his personal appearance nothing seems to fit the popular idea of the master spy he is. His neighbors in the Upper Bavarian village of Starnberg, where he lives in an unpretentious lake-front house, saw no reason to doubt him when he introduced himself as a businessman. When he drives every morning to his city office and spends his evenings quietly with his family or working in his garden, he looks more like a fairly successful industrialist than a leader in the cloak-and-dagger industry.

His First Big Spy Network

Gehlen joined the German army at 18 and served for 23 years on routine jobs before he made his first contact with the undercover world. That was in 1943 when the Russians began to roll back Hitler's armies. The German High Command was ignorant of Soviet troop movements since its intelligence machinery had broken down in the internecine struggle between anti-Nazi army officers and power-drunk Nazi S.S. leaders. The General Staff instructed Gehlen to dig up information on the Eastern Front about the enemy armies. Opposed by the Nazis, whom he hated ever since, he calmly, dutifully and efficiently set up a new spy network in the East.

So well did he do this job that it almost ruined him. When he was ordered to report on the situation to Hitler in person, he predicted that the Germans would soon be defeated by Russia. The Fuehrer flew into a rage and demanded that Gehlen be committed to an insane asylum. He was saved only by his commanding general and soon thereafter by the fact that his forecast came true.

After the defeat Gehlen surrendered to the American Army. His American questioners laughed when he told them he was an intelligence expert on Soviet affairs and eager to hand over his collected reports. He described the Soviet's bellicose preparations against their American allies, and revealed his network of informants, his storehouse of information, his methods of finding facts in the Kremlin-ruled countries — but to no avail.

Only after several months in a prisoner-of-war camp was Gehlen discovered by an intelligence officer on General George S. Patton's staff who had him flown to Washington. In an interview which lasted for weeks, Gehlen impressed his captors with his memory, recalling tens of thousands of names, figures and incidents. They proved to be correct as well as most valuable to the American cause.

A Duel Between Experts

He was returned to Germany with permission to set up a new intelligence network restricted in its operations to the Communist sphere, strictly supervised by Americans. There was one condition — his own. He was never to work against the interests of a free, democratic Germany.

In the 10 years since, Gehlen has fought an almost daily battle of wits with his opposite number in East Germany, Ernst Wollweber. A heavy-set, tough professional Communist, four years older than Gehlen, Wollweber's adult life for 30 years was devoted to espionage, smuggling and sabotage on the world's water fronts for the Communist movement. After the war he became East Germany's Minister of Transportation, then its State Security Minister in charge of secret police and foreign intelligence.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

maritime expert turned Communist and in charge of Wollweber's Division of Fleets and Ports was Walter Gramsch. He did such meritorious work that the Communist government
— Continued on next page

The Hunting Grounds

awarded him the Certificate of Superior Service in 1953 and promoted him. Several weeks later he fled with his family to West Berlin.

The reason was that on his new, higher job he would have been of little use to Gehlen whom — under the cover name of "Brutus" — he had served all these years. While pretending to be a Communist he kept Gehlen posted on the plans and moves of his enemy.

To all outward appearances Gehlen's network consists of a number of various business firms. Without arousing anyone's suspicions cars can be registered, office space rented, trips undertaken. When legitimate customers try to deal with these companies, they find nothing unusual in their operation.

College Campus? No, Espionage Factory

Only the "director-general," Gehlen himself, knows all the companies that form his wide-flung undercover business empire. From the directors of these concerns down to the branch managers, none is aware of more names than those of the five men working under him. These men in turn have learned only the address and name of their direct boss.

Although surrounded by all the secrecy of a major atomic plant, Gehlen's headquarters at Pullach, a charming residential suburb of the Bavarian city of Munich and far away from the Iron Curtain, seems — once you have passed its heavily guarded entrance which is closed to most everyone — to resemble a quiet college campus. Many of the 400 people working in the compound of 24 former villas are indeed scholars in many scientific fields, from geography to nuclear physics. While they direct and evaluate the findings of the men in the field, they themselves — though in less glamorous, less dangerous ways — are on the hunt for Soviet secrets.

Their hunting grounds are Communist newspapers, statistics, other "open material." When the last East German election results showed the votes cast at "special polling places," their number served to confirm the East German army's present strength as Gehlen's agents had reported it. The "special polling places" were set up in the barracks of that new army, and by an oversight their election figures had been published in the routine breakdown of the vote. Happily, such oversights occur often.

They're Doing It for Freedom

The combination of cloak-and-dagger methods with systematic research in a streamlined business organization is one of the reasons why Gehlen's reports are so accurate. Intelligent newspaper reading and statistical analysis count at least as much in his work as beautiful ladies in slick evening gowns and men hiding behind many disguises.

Also in contrast to old-fashioned espionage where traitors were bought for a price, most men working for Gehlen are sincere patriots — often from Soviet Russia and her satellites — who wish only to help the West in ridding their countries of Communism.

To win victory over a powerful enemy we must know his strength and weakness more thoroughly than he himself does. Gehlen may well be worth as much as an infantry division ready to defend freedom. — The End



RARE PHOTO shows Gehlen in days when he ran a spy outfit in competition with Nazi SS

Wide World

ECMA 7781

7 195.

38

Chief of Base, Pullach

Chief of Base, Bonn

Info: Chief, EE
COS

Operational/ZIPPER

American Letter to UTILITY

Under separate cover is a letter addressed to UTILITY from a (Mr.) John Teani, 177 East 77th Street, New York 21. This letter carries the notification "A. H. unbekannt" and "Amerik Botschaft". When it arrived in the American postal section at the Embassy it was automatically sent to our office - presumably by someone who reads the "Stars and Stripes" and "Newsweek". The letter is forwarded to you for whatever action you deem advisable. It has not been opened by us but photostatic copies of the exterior, both obverse and reverse, are included with copies of this dispatch which do not include the original letter.

MICROFILMED

FEB 14 1962

DOC. MICRO. SER.

Encls: 8/C

Orig - PUB

Photo. copies - EE, COS

7 December 1955

Distribution:

- 2 - POB, w/encl. (1)
- 3 - COS, w/encl. (1)
- 2 - EE, w/encl. (1)

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VIA AIR MAIL

9 CENTS 9

Federal Republic
of
GERMANY

Personal

The Hon. Reinhard Gehlen
Chief of Secret Police
Office of the Chancellor
BONN

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JOHN TAENI

177 EAST 17 STREET

NEW YORK 29.

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SECRET

EGG-72145
EGG-72145

INFO: LR
PCE

Chief of Base, Bonn

Chief of Station, Germany

Operational/ZIEFFER/CANT

American Letter to UTILITY

REF: EGG-7701

In checking CDS files for traces on John TAREL, whose name appears in the return address of referenced letter to UTILITY, we found one trace on Subject in EGG-7393. The latter dispatch refers to EGG-1282, which apparently forwarded a request from Rittor von LEX for information on John TAREL; von LEX, it appears, had also been approached by Subject, ostensibly for an autograph. Our trace states that Subject had been checked out and found to have been merely a bona fide autograph hunter, since 1949, with no subversive intent, and that he had probably seen von LEX's name mentioned in some publication and subsequently contacted him for an autograph.

APPROVED: _____

Distribution:

2-EGG

2-LR

2-PCE

REC:REC

15 DEC 55

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DATE 2005

SECRET

240-GENLEN, *Winkler*

SECRET

17 October 1953

Chief of Base, Munich

Chief of Station, Germany

Info: Chief, ☐ ☐
Chief, EX

Operational/Name Trace

WILLI FRIEDLHAUER et al

Ref: EXHA-2332 dated 21 Sept 55

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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1. Frankfurt files contain the following traces on subjects cited in reference:

a. WILLIE FRIEDLHAUER - see copy of EXHA 6169, 17 Jun 53 attached.

b. Fritz ZEITLOW - Rpts. & Analysis Division Rpt. #17, 9 Oct 50; Report on the Strasser Movement: Fritz ZEITLOW residing at Rotenbaum Chaussee 103, Hamburg will be Chief Editor of the party newspaper which was planned for early Sept. 50. It is to be distributed first in the French Zone.

1b. OSR 58, 12 Mar 53: Fritz ZEITLOW had at one time been an AGATHIS correspondent in Hamburg, but ceased his activities upon the intervention of the German police. The news agency, AGATHIS, previously reported as the organ of the neofascist organization, "Oficina Europea de Documentacion" (OFADO) has been under suspicion for some time by the Spanish authorities and feel there is a possibility that it serves as a cover for some form of Soviet activity.

2b. EXHA-571, 24 Oct 51: F. ZEITLOW, a Hamburg author, in a letter of Frau Claudia KURZ residing Debschl, Glenheim 29, Hamburg, stated he received information from an informed source that an International Scientific Congress was to take place in Moscow. He asked Frau KURZ for information on the number of participants, theme etc.

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EXHA-12916
3 Jan 56

NO trace
from RI

COPY

32-6-21-2

SECRET

EGQA-72223

EGQA-72223

-Page 2

2. []: Attached is a copy of reference for tracing and a copy of EGQA 8169 for your information. Please forward any traces direct to Chief of Base, Fullach, and info EE and COS.

Approved:

17 December 1955

Distribution

2 - JCS with att. a/s

2 - C J

2 - EE w/o att.

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32-6-3/1-2050

23 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Visit of General Gehlen to the United States

In a recent dispatch Colonel Critchfield stated that if the German Intelligence Service is established in January, we should tentatively plan on the middle of March for General Gehlen's visit to the United States. Well in advance of Gehlen's trip Colonel Critchfield will forward to Headquarters a status report on the proposed Bilateral Agreement with the future G13.

15/
Chief, Eastern European Division

EE/G/Z/ C

2 :lam

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - C/EE
- 1 - RI ✓
- 2 - EE/G/Z

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75

Chief of Base, Pullach

Chief of Base, Bonn

INFO: COS
KE

Operational/CART

Newspaper Articles re Gehlen

1. The attached translation of articles entitled "The Man in the Dark" by Joachim Morwald, which appeared in Die Welt for 6, 13, 20 and 27 November and 4 and 11 December 1955, was prepared by the OCA translators at the request of Mr. Thomas C. Hughes, CIC and G-2 USAREUR Liaison Officer to OCA. It is forwarded to you for that reason and for whatever interest or convenience the translation may have for addressees.

2. Our discussions at the HfV concerning its activities, its responsibilities in various fields (e.g. in defensive CI), etc., frequently produce references to the activities of the Gehlen Organization. Mr. Hughes' request to be advised of what we learn on the same points from the Gehlen point of view is thus a natural one.

Enclosures:
As stated

27 December 1955

Distribution:
2-PAB w/encls.
3-OAS w/encls.
2-EE w/encls.

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RI-COPY

29 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army

SUBJECT: General Reinhard GHELEN's Views on the West German
Bundestag Personnel Selection Committee for the
German Armed Forces

1. According to a report dated 16 December 1955, General Reinhard GHELEN has consistently been a solid supporter of the West German Bundestag Personnel Selection Committee for the German Armed Forces. Although the work of this committee has recently become highly controversial on the cases of four senior officers of the West German Defense Ministry, General GHELEN's views are unchanged. He feels that the group is made up of distinguished citizens with a vast experience in many fields. In his opinion, this is a sound approach to ensure that leaders in the new German army are carefully selected and the single fault lies in the fact that the committee was not created three years earlier. He deeply regrets the handling of the cases of Felt, Bergengruen and Brandtstatter, but feels that the system as such is basically a necessity in the Federal Republic at this time.

2. It is requested that this information be treated with the utmost discretion and that no further dissemination be made of it.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

GORDON M. STEWART
GORDON M. STEWART

(CS) DS - 36548

cc: Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State

EE/C/Z/ ☐ ☐ :lam

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - CI

1 - RQM/ROK

1 - State Dept.

1 - RI 2 - EE/C/Z/

22 December 1955

SECRET

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DEC 30 1955

Chief of Base, Pullach

Chief of Base, Bonn

INFO: COS
EE

LIAISON/ZIPPER/CART/JOHN

Articles on Gehlen by Jaergen Thorwald
in Die Welt

REF!

E649 7844

1. Attached, in translation, is Part V of subject series of articles. As stated in reference, the translation was made at the request of Mr. Thomas C. Hughes, GIB and G-2 Liaison Officer to OCA; it is forwarded as being of possible interest and convenience.

2. This fifth article stresses Gehlen's wisdom in not trusting Otto John or P. W. Hahn (son of Ant. Hahn). The series appears to represent an elaborate public relations job in behalf of Gehlen.

3. Comments, especially by POB, re briefing of Thorwald and on the origin of the series generally would be appreciated.

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Enclosures:
As stated

19 December 1955

Distribution:

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WFOB w/enc. 1 cy
WFOB w/enc. 1 cy

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COPY

to ECMA 7851
DEC 30 1955
Translation

"Die Welt",
18 December 1955

Introduction: The Events of This Week

All of a sudden, a brochure with a very striking yellow cover has disappeared from the windows of the Soviet zone bookshops. Its title was "I Chose Germany", and a conspicuous black band bore the name of its author: Dr. Otto John. This brochure contained the statements the former President of the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution made to the world press in East Berlin three weeks after his disappearance. This brochure is of great importance now. It contains material which is of definite significance for the solution of the mystery which surrounds Otto John.

It may be true that Dr. John was taken across the border between the sectors on 20 July 1954 while he was under the influence of drugs --

it may be true that he lay unconscious in a hospital in Karlshorst, for two days --

it may be true that he found himself a prisoner of the Red Army when he regained his senses, and that he was exposed to all the pressure which is usually brought to bear in such cases --

but, when Dr. John, on 11 August 1954, went up to the platform and stood before the microphone telling the international press, and the western world listening at the loudspeakers, of the reasons why he had changed frontlines, and when many journalists from the free world crossquestioned him afterwards, no one present had the impression of looking at a hypnotized man not master of his senses and making his statement under pressure.

Aside from many utterances which caused a sensation in the West, bringing discredit on the Federal Republic and on the Chancellor, and being a very heavy burden on the relations between the Federal Republic and other nations, he also declared that there were secret supplements to the EDC Treaty, while the Federal Chancellor had definitely denied their existence. It was also of grave political consequence, especially for the German-French relations, that John stated that the Organization Gehlen was running an espionage organization in France. This statement caused an extraordinary stir in France and was a very heavy strain on the relations between Germany and France.

John did what he could to bring discredit on the Organization Gehlen. He declared, for example, that Gehlen had among his large staff of co-workers former SD- and SS-leaders who had murdered German resistance fighters. He accused Gehlen, and Blank's Agency, too, of opening

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their doors to fascists waiting for their chance to resume power. By all this he tried to cement the propaganda theses directed against the policies of the Federal Government in general, as well as against the activities of Blank's Agency and against rearmament.

Upon the question of the representative of "Muenchener Abendzeitung", why he had not voiced his opinion in the Federal Republic, John replied; "Had I said in the Federal Republic what I have said here, I would not have been able to continue any political activities because of the position I held, since I would have been arrested on the charge of having abused state secrets."

In view of Dr. Otto John's return, the importance of the sixth part of our Factual Report by Juergen Thorwald is greater still. Thorwald throws light upon the thick underbrush of intelligence agencies in the Federal Republic, and on the relations between General Gehlen and Otto John.

T H E M A N I N T H E D A R K

Factual Report on the German Intelligence Organizations

By Juergen Thorwald

V. Dr. John and General Gehlen

Shortly before this report came out, but at a time when its appearance had already been announced, I met on Rhein-Main Airfield, before I started on a flight to Canada, a person who had helped me with my first books on the collapse of Germany in the East by putting diaries at my disposal which they had kept during the war. This man asked me worriedly: "Are you sure you have thought it over carefully enough what it is you are writing now? It won't do to publish that, I think."

I replied that I thought it was high time to tell all I had learned in the course of the past years, either by chancing upon it, or by my own adroitness. In my opinion, it is necessary that the public should learn as much as possible about Intelligence in Germany, and that an end be put to the nonsense -- hairraising nonsense sometimes -- which was being broadcast out of sheer ignorance by parties and other organizations about the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, about Gehlen, about Blank's Counterintelligence, about the CIC, about the "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity", and about the numerous private intelligence peddlers.

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*could likely be
using D. Harvey*

During the past six years Germany has become a front-line area where the intelligence organizations of the two political world powers in East and West collide. The example of Austria set at liberty and rank with secret intelligence organizations fighting each other in Austrian territory, shows that such conditions cannot be changed by simple reunification, or neutralization. The only remedy is the setting up of a strong official German intelligence service which deprives the enemies of a democratic German state of their basis on which to establish support points and from where to carry out their work, and which, on the other hand, gives friendly intelligence organizations no reason to use German territory as a basis for their activities to the extent they are still doing it now.

Soviet Agents

Up to 1948, the Soviet Intelligence Service was absolute master of the situation. The Soviet Intelligence Service, faithful to the principle: "It is the aim of the Soviet secret intelligence service abroad to incite the rebellion against the capitalists", had exploited the situation arisen chiefly because of the political illusions the Americans were nursing, but also because of the infiltration of left-radical intellectuals from the British Labour Party, and because the newly established French and Italian Intelligence Services were saturated with very many communist resistance fighters.

The huge double organization of the Soviet Intelligence Service, which consisted of the civilian Committee for State Security (KGB) and the military Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) of the Defense Ministry, and was supported by Kominform as the center of the party espionage activities in all countries throughout the world, had within a very short time placed its agents and friends everywhere, even inside western governments. The free transportation granted eastern refugees, and their settlement by means of IRO throughout the world, were already means in themselves to disperse Soviet agents, recognized as such means only very much later. In West Germany, Soviet agents moved into positions anyhow, either in occupation agencies or in the slowly developing German agencies, and they are still there.

The Intelligence Services of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were set up by the Soviets exactly like their own. They did the same in 1949 in the Soviet zone, when the State Security Service was established. There was nothing in the West at the time to resemble even remotely that massive, well-trained intelligence organization which missed nothing of what happened in West Germany.

Mistake Upon Mistake

That is the explanation for the disproportionate importance the Gehlen organization, small as it still was, gained when western policies were changed. For a long time it remained a small group, as compared with the feverish growth of the long neglected American In-

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telligence Service. Being merely tolerated as an outsider, and far too insignificant at first, it was not influential enough to bridle the energy with which many Americans started their work in Germany, with no experience as regards eastern problems. The result of such money-fed energy was the growth of numerous intelligence and sabotage organizations, many of which employed Soviet emigrants or refugees from the East in West Germany, and very soon proved to be unsound.

Well-meaning and zealous Americans were doing exactly what Gehlen disapproved of on principle. They were themselves inexperienced, and they worked with inexperienced personnel; they lost men and material, and within the briefest space their agencies were infiltrated by Soviet agents. Wherever they failed, they left behind a proletariat of agents who sold themselves right and left, even to West German power groups who wanted material against persons they wished to get rid of. What British and French intelligence services did, was not much better in many instances, but their mistakes did not count so much.

Even organizations which had been established in Germany with definite aims and with American money ended up with entering the field of intelligence, where their dilettantism could not but meet with futile disasters which eclipsed the work they were actually supposed to do, namely, to unmask inhuman and illegal actions of the Soviet zone authorities, to publish them, and to help their victims.

No SS-Members

All these secret activities which were initial mistakes of the American Intelligence Service while it grew from non-existence to the world-wide organization of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) it is today, were the soil on which the jungle of intelligence agencies thrived, and the unscrupulous intelligence deal to which Germans fell victim.

It is a fact -- and on this point I was not satisfied with one-sided opinions ascertained in a conversation, for example with Gehlen -- that Gehlen and his organization kept away from the afore-mentioned institutions during all these years. On the other hand, the development of the Gehlen organization had the consequence that wherever an attempt was made to set up German auxiliary intelligence organizations, they were doomed to failure especially because the core of German experts gathered around Gehlen. In selecting his staff, Gehlen refrained from employing personnel which had had any connection with the SS, not for reasons of resentment against his war-time opponents in the Section "Foreign Armies East", but on principle; and he did so even if it meant losing a valuable worker who might perhaps go over to the East.

On one occasion Gehlen told me, during a conversation: "Intelligence work is necessary because no state desirous of maintaining itself and of acquiring an independent political position, can do so if its government is not kept objectively informed of what happens elsewhere. An American whom I know well once coined this word about intelligence work: 'Our business is so dirty that it can be handled only by

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Gehlen's
as a not free
information

gentleman !' Whoever forgets this principle when he sets up his own organization, cannot but drown in the mud which does well up in these days, at least around the edges of our work ...".

Gehlen did not mention the name of the American. I learned it accidentally a few weeks ago, during a conversation I had with an American journalist in California. If I have caught the name correctly, it was Sam Bossard, and I was told that he was one of the men who had reformed the American Intelligence Service.

Even now, "Organization Gehlen", Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, and Blank's Counterintelligence, are often confused. Gehlen's field of work, however, has from the beginning been the collecting of information from foreign countries, outside the Eastern borders. It was only for a brief interval that Gehlen was forced to use a few of his men for the type of work the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution is handling now; this was when no German authority could take up the fight against the growing activities of the Soviet agents. In other words, it was in defense against Soviet agents who had been sent to West Germany and West Berlin to work against Gehlen's agencies. But this was invariably kept within the limited scope of his organization.

Three Hundred Sources of Danger

Therefore, no one could have been more satisfied than Gehlen, when in 1950 the "Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution" was finally established with agencies in each Land. The Soviet agents -- on the one hand those who collected secret information, on the other hand those whose mission was to penetrate government agencies, parties, trade unions, youth, and economic organizations -- met with practically no hindrance at the time. The agents were supported by a host of organizations which, in the disguise of democratic institutions, pursued solely the aim either to undermine German economic life by provoking strikes, or to weaken public opinion by their so-called "peace propaganda". Under Minister of the Interior Lehr, no less than 300 of such organizations were known. About twohundred of them survive to this day.

No Exchange of Documents

When the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution was established on 27 September 1950, it had no critical contact with Gehlen's organization at all. There could be hardly anything as senseless as the assertions which were afterwards made about a rivalry between Gehlen and the first President of the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, Otto John. Not only was there no critical contact, there was hardly any contact at all between them. As I have said before, Gehlen could not but welcome it that the security of his own organization in West Germany should be safe-

Ward had dealings with Gehlen in 1947

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guarded by West Germany's own authorities. That was, and is, the definite mission of the political Home Police, for which Gehlen has never displayed any talent. A parallel situation prevails in the United States with its huge CIA Intelligence Service under Allan Dulles which collects information from foreign countries, and with the internal security organization (protecting also the CIA in American territory) of the FBI under Edgar Hoover.

When Gehlen was asked -- as far as I know, because there was a shortage of specialists -- to put such men at the disposal of the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, he complied. The selected gentlemen separated entirely from Gehlen's organization. The Deputy Chief of the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, (Lieutenant Colonel) Matke, who is still in office, came from Gehlen's organization. (d)

It was a quite different question on principle whether or not Gehlen considered the first President of the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, Otto John, reliable enough to trust his own organization unconditionally to him. When I met Gehlen on one occasion twenty-one months before John's flight to the Soviet zone, Gehlen made no reference to John. Also in Bonn, later on, he refrained from warning against John. He probably acted in this manner because he foresaw that those who, due to a misconceived feeling of solidarity, were going to any length to play the ex-resistance fighter off against the ex-General, would attribute rivalry feelings to him whatever might happen. On the other hand, it is true that Gehlen steered clear of trusting John with any material which might have bearing on his organization.

I can well imagine that he felt uneasy about this "also-one-of-the-resistance-fighters" who had always been suspected of having been a member of "Kote Kapelle"; who had joined the Intelligence Service in England; who had participated in the Nuernberg trials as an interrogator of German prisoners-of-war and assistant to the Prosecution; and who had then, at the pressure exerted by English friends of his, been appointed President of the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, although he had no qualification at all for that position.

The fact that John went over to the communists on 20 July 1954, justified Gehlen's personal prudence in regard to this man. In addition, John's return flight confirms what Gehlen thought at the time, namely, that John was no true communist agent. Gehlen had always thought of John as of one of those invertebrate intellectuals with no sense of reality who take refuge to political day-dreaming, and whose aimlessness induces them finally to believe that their dreams will come true in the East, until willy-nilly they make the personal acquaintance of the East. John was not allowed to return because of any particular feeling of sympathy with this human driftwood between the powers prevailing in our time; his return was made possible in order to be able to find out the truth, and to be able to return the blow which had been struck at West Germany by John's eastward migration.

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Blank's Counterintelligence Agency

Easier than in the "John case" comes the thought of rivalry in the case of Blank's counterintelligence agency. In this office, too, a West German intelligence agency was born in 1950 when Count Schwerin had been appointed Adenauer's first military advisor. Schwerin recommended the appointment of ex-Lt. Colonel Heinz to the position of chief of this military counterintelligence agency. In 1943, Heinz had been the Commanding Officer of the Regiment "Brandenburg" which the German Counterintelligence Service had established at the time for the specific purpose of carrying out sabotage missions in enemy country. When Schwerin was overthrown, Heinz stayed on in Theodor Blank's Counterintelligence organization.

Gehlen's field of activities included the reconnaissance of the military strength and the military plans in the Soviet area. Therefore, this task was apt to overlap with the activities of the intelligence agency which was supposed to be established in Blank's Agency under Heinz. As much as Heinz tried after his failure in 1954 to represent himself as being a victim of Gehlen's attacks, it does not correspond with the facts when carefully investigated. Of course, Gehlen could not help disapproving Lt. Colonel Heinz's strivings in Blank's Agency, if only for practical reasons. In other countries, the new organization had long ago asserted itself: the procurement of military information is the mission of a comprehensive organization collecting material in foreign countries, then forwarding such information to the Army, Navy, and the Air Forces, or the Ministry of Defense respectively. The latter has at its disposal, only for the protection of its own troops against enemy agents, not for the collecting of information, officers of the secret intelligence service, who in this case really deserve the name of "Abwehroffiziere".

It is logical that Gehlen could hardly be in favor of the endeavors made in Blank's Agency. Did he take them at all serious? Certainly not. Whatever was undertaken there without funds worth mentioning, without a staff of specialists, and under the leadership of an erratic person like Heinz -- who was soon found to be unreliable -- was speedily termed "kitchen-intelligence" by wagging tongues, an organization not at all capable of carrying out important missions. Here, too, developments proved that Gehlen was right; Heinz became entangled in rather sinister cases, the origin of which went back to his previous activities when he was the chief of a private intelligence agency. Heinz had not kept clear of the morass, and so he drowned, dragging his work down with him. Only one intelligence service of importance remained: The Organization Gehlen.

Next Issue:

SSD-Chief Ernst Wollweber's Great Campaign

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Picture of Frau Wohlgemuth escorted by two men.

Legend:

Marched Off: The Wife of Shady Dr. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth

At noon on 23 July 1954, two criminal police officers took Frau Wohlgemuth to the police for interrogation. Otto John had gone to East Berlin with her husband, a well-known Berlin physician.

Picture of Dr. Otto John

No legend.

Picture of Friedrich W. Heinz

No legend.

Picture of No.2 Ludwigstrasse

Legend:

The house 2, Ludwigstrasse in Cologne is popularly called

The House of Thousand Secrets;
the main office of the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution is accommodated there, and John worked there before he fled.

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1956

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

AIR

DLW 2130

JAN 10 1956

Chief of Base, Pullach

Chief, EE

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
Chief of Base, Bonn

Operational

Mr. John TAENI

REF: BGKA 7781, 7 Dec 55

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

An examination of Headquarters files reveals that Mr. John TAENI, Broker, 177 East 77th Street, New York City, was the subject of a dispatch from Ankara in connection with his request for an autograph from a prominent individual. GERNY was queried for information and, in May 1951, reported that TAENI and his wife had been the subjects of a special GERNY inquiry in October 1949 predicated upon their requests for autographs from prominent persons in the United States and elsewhere. At that time it was determined that neither TAENI nor his wife had any subversive intent in the collection of autographs. GERNY stated that Subject and his wife had since been the cause of numerous complaints in connection with their autograph collection activities.

6 Jan 56

Distribution:

3 - COB, Pull 2 - COB, Bonn
3 - COS, Germany
2 - EE/G/Z
1 - RI

RMP/da

EE/G

EE/G/Z

(file GEHLEN C

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SECRET

ECNA-1786

ECNA - 7986

JAN 30 1956

Chief, POB

Chief of Station, Bonn

INFO: EZ, OS

Operational

Pub. - W. Ger.
Articles in Die Welt on General Gehlen

Attached in translation are the last two instalments of subject articles by Jürgen Thorwald, viz in issues of 25 December 1955 and 1 January 1956. These translations were made at the request of Mr. Thomas C. Hughes, CIO L/O at OCA.

26 January 1956

Distribution

ECB - 3 copies w/1 copy each trans. (A and B)
✓ EZ - 2 " " " " "
Bonn-2 " " " " "

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DATE 2001 2005

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FEB 2 1956

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED:	
1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER) GEHLEN, Reinhard (Gen)	
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC. SCHNEIDER, Richard, Dr. b. 4 Mar 05 ERNST, Dr. b. 4 Mar 1905 GARNER, Richard b. 3 Apr 1902 GOMARD, Robert b. 4 Mar 1905 HOLBEIN, Hans b. 21 Jan 1905 GROSS, Dr.	
3. BIRTH DATE 3 Apr 1902	
4. BIRTH PLACE Erfurt, Germany	
5. CITIZENSHIP German	
6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION Berg, Krs. Starnberg/Feldstr 68	
7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION	
8. MILITARY SERVICE entered military service, artillery SPECIALTY LOCATION 1928 War Academy, Berlin 1933-5 General Staff 1935-8 1939-45	
9. PAST OCCUPATIONS American POW ACTIVITY LOCATION DATES 1945	
10. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER) 174 cms 65 kg blue dk blond	
11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME) nee SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene	
12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES father: Walter, b. 1871 children: Katharina, b. 19 Jan 34, Marie Therese, 4 Sep 40, mother: nee von VAERNEWICK, Katharina Margarete b. 1881 Christoph, b. 11 Feb 37, brother-in-law, SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Joachim Dorothee, 28 Feb 43	
13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED	


INSTRUCTIONS. INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/STD.

SEE CSI-10-7


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
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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Feb 1456



Bnd message center Bldg



Bnd message center Bldg.

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FEB '53

A. C. 1100 11 201

EGIA-17808

13 FEB 1956

Chief, EE

Att: C

Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: COS

Operational

Proposed Education of UTILITY's Daughter

REF: EGIA-14998; EGDW-1213

1. As a follow up to the proposals made in EGDW-1213 concerning UTILITY's daughter's attending Radcliffe, C and C spoke with her in late December 1955.

2. She was very interested in attending any college in the United States but because she was not familiar with any particular institution, had no real preference. In addition, she will be going to Portugal this year and does not want to enter college before September 1957.

3. C proposed that C ask Radcliffe about "special" student requirements, entrance tests, and other registration procedures. Radcliffe's answer to C's letter is as follows:

"I am writing in reply to your recent letter to say that we do not have special students at Radcliffe College. If your friend wishes to have his daughter make application for admission to Radcliffe College, she would have to register for the full series of College Board Examinations and apply as a full time freshman student here. Please let us know if you have any further question."

4. In light of this, it appears that Radcliffe will expect her to fulfill all the normal test requirements which, because of her intention to stay in Portugal until the summer of 1957, will be a very difficult procedure.

5. C has requested C to ask if special arrangements for her entrance can be made by KUBARK, or if such arrangements are intended.

Distribution:

3 - EE (DIRECT)

3 - COS

9 February 1956

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C/EE
CE/C/E

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EGIA-17633

Page 2

6. [REDACTED] will take no action pending receipt of [REDACTED] 7's answer.

[REDACTED]

Approved:

[REDACTED]

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SECRET


Anti-Red Spy Boss Man of Many Faces

By JOSEPH W. GRIGG,
United Press Staff Writer.

BONN, Feb. 9. — The boss of Europe's newest spy network carries a heavy revolver, flanks himself with armed bodyguards and has a warning on his gate, "Dangerous Dog."

He is a man of many faces, but only one photograph of him exists and that is at least 15 years old.

He went into business officially only this week, but at 55 he is an old hand at spying on the Russians. He has an estimated 4000 agents operating from East Germany to Red China.



GEN. GEHLEN

Keeping an eye on Reds.

Named by Heuss.

Lt. Gen. Reinhard Gustav Gehlen became president of the Federal Intelligence Service through a decree signed by West German President Theodor Heuss. His deputy, whose identity is a secret like those of all others in the Gehlen organization, was called vice president.

The service's official published budget is only \$1.2 million annually and its staff on paper is 1181 men. Gen. Gehlen's salary is \$6800 a year.

But the secret funds, for which Gen. Gehlen is accountable only to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, are believed four times the listed amount.

Few Germans could recognize Gen. Gehlen, but those in the know say he is slender, of medium height, with sparse fair hair, a high forehead, thin, tight lips, deep-set eyes and curiously protruding ears. Sometimes he sports a small mustache; sometimes he is clean-shaven. He has been variously described as looking like a history professor, a traveling salesman and a retired army man—which is what he is.

Army Background.

His career can be dug out of the old Wehrmacht files. He was born at Erfurt, now in the Soviet zone, the son of a regular army officer. He entered the army in 1920 as an artillery lieutenant. By 1942 he was in command of an artillery regiment on the Russian front. That year he became chief of the "foreign armies east" section of the supreme command, and his

talents as a spy-master blossomed and bloomed.

Coordinating military intelligence about the Red armies, he developed a network of spies, mostly renegade Russian prisoners and deserters reaching far into the Soviet hinterland.

In May, 1945, the advancing American army captured Gen. Gehlen and his staff in Bavaria. With him he had complete files on his work behind the Russian lines, although it was months before a U.S. counterintelligence interrogator spotted the haul and shipped it and Gen. Gehlen to the Pentagon.

In 1946, the Americans sent Gen. Gehlen back to Germany with an agreement to build an American-sponsored spy network to keep an eye on the Russians.

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Gen. Gehlen Keeps Post

Herald Tribune News Service

BONN, Oct. 13 — Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, the chief of West Germany's Federal Intelligence Agency, said in an interview that he planned to continue in his job for three more years, countering reports that he would be forced to resign. Gehlen came under fire last summer after disclosures that former Nazis holding key jobs in the Agency were spies for the Soviet Union.

TO : []
FROM : EE/G/Z
EXT : 2451
DATE : 13 February 1956
MESSAGE CENTER S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : Pullach, Frankfurt

FROM : Director, CIA

CONF : EE 6

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/R 2, S/C 2

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GEHLEN, Reinhold

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TO PULL

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DEFENSE

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PHILLIPS FURTHER REPORTED HE RECEIVED LETTER FROM UTILITY ADVISING HE WOULD
DISCUSS ANY MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST

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3. FOR YOUR INFO AND/OR COMMENT

END OF MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 28 FEB 1956	

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

Extraction from FBIS DAILY REPORT, FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS, No. 33 -- 1956

Thursday, February 16, 1956 (USSR and Eastern Europe)

"GEHLEN USES NAZI AGAINST WARSAW STATES

"Berlin, Deutschlandsender, in German to East and West Germany, Feb. 15, 1956, 1600 GMT--L

"(Text)

"Deutschlandsender has learned details of a talk between Under Secretary of State Globke and Gehlen, head of Bonn's espionage organization, as well as some of his leading assistants from circles in close contact with the Federal Chancellor's Office in Bonn. The war criminal and former deputy Gestapo Chief, Fritz Pansinger, who returned from the Soviet Union last October, also participated in this exchange of views, which was mainly concerned with the intensification of the espionage activities of Gehlen against the Warsaw Treaty states.

"During the Second World War, Pansinger cooperated closely with Gehlen's section, Foreign Armies East. In his capacity as Chief of the Gestapo in the Soviet Baltic republics which were occupied by the fascists, he endeavored in particular to enlist corrupt anti-Soviet elements for the Gehlen apparatus.

"On the other hand, Gehlen furnished the Gestapo with extensive material, which went either to Schellenberg or Pansinger. As late as April 1945, Pansinger met Gehlen on the instructions of Kaltenbrunner in Bavaria in order to reorganize the espionage apparatus against the Soviet Union which at that time was being dissolved. It was stated during the conversation with Gehlen that close relations already exist again between Gehlen and Pansinger."

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

Gehlen 20.1

360

CLASSIFICATION

ROUTING

DATE : 24 FEB 56

L.B/MK

S-E-C-R-E-T

1		2	
2		3	
3		4	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PULLACH

ACTION: EE 1-6

INFO : DCI 7, D/DCI 8, COP 9, A/DD/P/P 10, FI 11, FI/OPS 12, FI/BI 13-14, S/C 15-16

GEHLEN, Richard

PULL 3175 (IN 27424)

20222 24 FEB 56

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

INFO: FRAN

CITE: PULL

RE: DIR 47664 (OUT 68645)

SEVERAL WEEKS AGO C READ COPIES LETTERS UTILITY SENT
VARIOUS U.S. GENERALS THANKING THEM FOR CHRISTMAS GIFTS.
ABSTEMIOUS UTILITY THANKED GEN PHILLIPS FOR BOTTLE COGNAC AND
ADDED EXPRESSION ASSURANCE THAT "YOURSELF AND YOUR SERVICE,
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE TREATIES ARRANGED BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES
CAN ALWAYS COUNT UPON OUR FULL SUPPORT, SHOULD YOU DESIRE IT."
MADE NO REF LEGALIZATION, COMPETENCE UTILITY IN SOF NEGOTIATION
OR FUTURE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. ARMY MAY HAVE READ MORE INTO
ABOVE QUOTE THAN INTENDED. IN FACT, LETTERS WERE PREPARED BY
ZIPPER STAFFER ALIAS ROGER WHO HAD MISSION TO DO NOTHING BUT
ACKNOWLEDGE GIFTS. ALIAS HARTWIG STATES UTILITY HAS NOT
COMMUNICATED WITH PHILLIPS EXCEPT FOR ABOVE.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

14	191
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 5 MAR 1956	

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

291
MG/MK
DATE : 29 FEB 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 2005 ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PULLACH

ACTION: FE 1-6

INFO : DCI 7, D/DCI 8, COP 9, A/D/P/P 10, PPC 11-13, CI 14, CI/OPS 15,
FI/RI 16-17, S/C 18-19, DD/I 20, AD/CI 21

GEHLEN, Reinhard

PULL 3506 (IN 29261)

1952Z 29 FEB 56

ROUTINE

TO: DIR

INFO: FRAU

PRIORITY
CITE: PULL

1. UTILITY VISIT SCHEDULED END APRIL. CONSIDERING TRAVEL
BY SS UNITED STATES SAILING 3 MAY, LE HARVE, OR SS AMERICAN
SAILING 26 APRIL. WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY ALIAS HARTWIG AND
POSSIBLY [REDACTED] WILL RETURN BY AIR AFTER SPENDING CIRCA
12 DAYS IN U.S. WILL ATTEMPT FIRM UP A PLAN IN MEETING WITH
UTILITY 2 MARCH. UTILITY AND PARTY WILL BE UJDRACO VIII.
WILL ALSO ENDEAVOR FIX DATE FOR UJDRACO VII OF GROUP.

2. UTILITY DESIRES TRAVEL UNDER ALIAS; OTHERS WILL USE
TRUE NAMES. ASSUME THIS CAN BE ARRANGED WITH ODYOKE AUTHORITIES.

3. RECOMMEND BRIEFING FOR UTILITY EMPHASIZE KUCHAP AND
PARTICULARLY KUJUMP.

4. ALIAS HERDAHL HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT UTILITY WILL
BE ABSENT WHEN [REDACTED] VISITS MUNICH AND THAT [REDACTED] WILL BE ABSENT
WHEN UTILITY IS AT HQS. WE DO NOT FEEL THIS DECISIVE BUT MAY
BE FACTOR IN [REDACTED]'S TIMING HIS VISIT MUNICH.

5. REQUEST CONCURRENCE ABOVE. WILL CABLE DETAILS AFTER
TALK WITH UTILITY.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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15

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 12 MAR 1956	

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IP 8-1153

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EOGA 18 312

CLASSIFICATION

I S T H M U S

Carl J. Jr.

TO : Director, KUBARK
(Attn: Robert A. Ascham)

DATE: 15 Mar 56

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: COS (Attn: L 2)

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— 13 March Conversation with UTILITY

1. On 13 March UTILITY invited me to come, unaccompanied by any other member of my staff, to his office to discuss a matter of some importance and considerable sensitivity. No other member of the UPSWING staff was present during the conversation. UTILITY had just returned from a strenuous week in Bonn, was suffering from a cold and, quite unusual for UTILITY, gave the appearance of being somewhat fatigued.

2. UTILITY believes that the general political situation in Europe is deteriorating. In his opinion events in France and Italy are moving toward the reestablishment of Popular Front governments. The political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany also appears to UTILITY to be fraught with growing political difficulties which could lead to a rather drastic change in the complexion of the government once ADENAUER's leadership is no longer a factor. Although UTILITY believes that the German population is quite unsusceptible to communism and unlikely to accept a Popular Front government, he is convinced that the penetration of significant segments of West German society assumes enormous proportion fully understood by no one. He is not optimistic that there would be adequate opposition to a neutralist political movement combining the Socialists and the anti-ADENAUER elements of the Right—a coalition which UTILITY considers almost as disastrous as a Popular Front movement. He emphasized that he does not consider the problem acute; that the present trend could perhaps be reversed if a Grand Coalition would emerge after ADENAUER leaves the political scene. He brings this problem up at this particular time only because of his forthcoming visit to Washington and his desire to discuss this problem with Ascham personally.

3. UTILITY is convinced that he as head of UPSWING would not survive in a neutralist/nationalist government with such individuals as Identity 1, 2 and 3 in power. Such a government would, UTILITY maintains, be vulnerable to political penetration and eventual control by the East. Its establishment would mark the beginning of a period in which UTILITY would feel morally justified in taking all possible action, including the establishment of an illegal apparatus in the Federal

Att: 1 - Identities under s/c

DIST

1 Dir, KUBARK (Attn: Robert A. Ascham) - DIRECT - w/1 att as above
1 COS, Germany (Attn: L 2)

13 Mar. 56
FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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DATE 2001 2005

2735
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ECLA 18 312
13 Mar 56

Republic, to oppose elements in Germany supporting a pro-Soviet policy. UTILITY would like to discuss with Ascham a plan for such an eventuality. He requested that he be given the opportunity to do this during his visit in Washington in great privacy with only [] present.

4. UTILITY then went on to say that he is hopeful that the need for such action will never arise; that he can have another eight years as Chief of UPSWING in which to systematically develop his organization along sound professional lines, based upon a law or laws passed by Parliament and an opportunity for development within the government solidly aligned with the West.

ER 8-1154

SECRET

ISTHMUS

SEPARATE COVER IDENTITIES TO: EGLE 18 312, 13 Mar 56

IDENTITY 1 - Herbert WEHNER

2 - Otto LENZ

3 - Joseph MUELLER

2735

0/DCI
609
4 APRIL 1954

SECRET

POLLACH, FRANKFURT
DIRECTOR,

OUT 85041

ROUTINE

TO: POLL

INFO: FRAN

CITE: DIS

FROM ASCHAM FOR []

READ WITH INTEREST YOUR DESA 10 312 AND WILL BE PREPARED
TO DISCUSS ANYTHING WITH UTILITY COMING WITHIN THE PROPER SCOPE
OF OUR WORK.

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2005

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J. S. LARRAN

SECRET

EGUA 2540

APR 16 1956

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

Chief of Base, Bonn

Operational/CADORY/CALL

UPS INO/Newspaper Article on UTILITY and UPSWING

1. On the off-chance that this has not already become available to you, we are transmitting for your information a one-page article on UTILITY and UPSWING, which appeared in the special feature section of the 7 April 1956 edition of [] (Identity 1).

2. The appearance of this article in this publication is possibly of particular interest for the following reasons: [] will recall commenting in highly favorable terms upon an article on UTILITY and UPSWING, which had been written by [] (Identity 2) and was published by Identity (3) several months ago. The interesting fact is that the attached article, while apparently written by someone other than [] (the writer is named as Identity 4), is even more outspokenly favorable to UTILITY and UPSWING and appeared in [] only a few weeks after [] was named the new editor-in-chief of [].

3. In view of the foregoing coincidence and in view of the fact that the undersigned maintains a special-connection-type relationship with [] for CADORY purposes, it will be appreciated if FOB were to advise us of any indications that UTILITY has been able to establish a similar or, perhaps, even an agent-type relationship with [].

Enclosure: 5/C

A - Article as noted

B - Identity Sheet 5/C from S/C

15 April 1956

Distribution:

2 - FOB, w/encl.

3 - COS, w/encl. B only

✓ - EE, w/encl. B only

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DATE 2005

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TO: EE

SECRET

S/C

Encl

B

FCI

8546

Identity (1): "Hannoversche Presse" (an SPD newspaper)

(2): Fried Wesemann

(3): "Frankfurter Rundschau"

(4): Georg Alexander

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RI COPY SECRET